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Chapter 1
Introduction
The academic literature has developed a number of "standard prescriptions"1 for the privati­
zation and regulation of utilities. The main purpose of this thesis is to qualify some of them, 
and build on the qualifications to find new insights. Although these prescriptions have not 
been endorsed universally, they permeate most of the theoretical and empirical work done in 
the recent past. In general, they constitute a benchmark that has enriched our understanding 
of the many economic issues related to the role and performance of privatized, regulated firms. 
These standard prescriptions are broadly based on the British experience and some specific 
strands of economic theory. By and large, progress has been made in reforming countries using 
these standard prescriptions. But the British experience can today be complemented with the 
experience of other countries, and with new developments in several fields of economic theory. 
The evolution itself of the British privatized industries,l 2 interacting with the evolution of the 
political cycle in the U.K., also helps to give a more balanced and complex view of this field.
Motivated by these more recent developments, this thesis addresses some issues related to 
these standard prescriptions. In particular, in the subsequent chapters first I explore the conse­
quences of the failure to depoliticize regulatory regimes, with an application to the regulation 
of access prices. By formalizing some insights from the literature on ”regulatory takings,” it 
is shown that intense lobbying may drive connection charges (that an entrant pays for the use
lI borrow this phrase from Joskow (1996), who refers by it to one instance of the conventional wisdom elements 
I develop below: the vertical unbundling of the electricity industry.
2See Martin and Parker (1997).
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of the incumbent’s network) below the optimal ones, under some conditions. Second. 1 show 
that partially concentrated ownership and partial privatization of regulated utilities emerge as 
dominant features in many circumstances, contrary to the conventional idea of fully privatized 
firms with dispersed ownership. This result is obtained from a model that revisits some ideas 
behind the empirical literature on regulation and ownership, using insights from the new theory 
of ownership dispersion. And third, I analyze through a clinical study the specific features of 
the control market in regulated industries. In particular, managerial problems (inherited from 
privatization) in bidding firms may drive an inefficient use of the free cash flow. Takeover 
processes in regulated sectors tend to be protracted due to the mobilization of constituencies, 
which use the attention that the contest draws to the firm to defend their interests as a political 
issue. Both regulation and agency relationships derived from privatization constrain the gains 
that target and bidding shareholders can extract from the control market.
In this introduction. I describe the conventional wisdom and explain how this research is 
related to it. I briefly discuss what the literature has prescribed for the privatization, regulation 
and liberalization of utilities. Although subsequent chapters develop in depth analyses of just 
a selection of these issues, I try to ground my qualifications on a broader context, which is 
presented in the following sections. The rest of the introductory chapter is organized as follows. 
In Section 1.1, a description is presented of some characteristics of privatized utilities that make 
them especially relevant for a number of politico-economic reasons. In Section 1.2, the standard 
prescriptions are characterized and their theoretical and empirical origins are briefly analyzed. 
And Section 1.3 summarizes the main contributions of the thesis.
1.1 Some Key Characteristics of Privatized Utilities ;
It is easy to understate the role of regulated firms in a modern economy. First, there is no such 
thing as a completely unregulated firm. Second, network industries have natural monopoly 
elements (which call for price and entry regulation) or come from a tradition where large 
monopolistic incumbents dominated the industry (which calls for public policy to promote 
efficient entry if liberalization is undertaken). In many countries, heavily regulated firms that 
were privatized in the recent past dominate the local stock markets. For example, in December
6
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1998. just the two largest electricity firms in Chile. Endesa Chile and Enersis, accounted for 
369c of the market capitalization in the Santiago stock exchange.
It is the interaction of four characteristics that makes the ownership and regulation of in­
dustries such as telecommunications, electricity, gas or water especially controversial.3 First, 
the political sensitivity of the issues involved. All individuals are consumers of (at least some 
of) these industries, and will very likely use their leverage in the political system (in democratic 
societies, through voting and lobbying) to further their interests. Hence, their decision set goes 
beyond the one assumed by traditional consumer theory, and has to be enlarged with political 
variables. Second, sunk costs are widespread in these capital-intensive industries. Many in­
vestments are specific to single projects and cannot be easily redeployed. Therefore, investors 
will only contribute funds if they have a reasonable assurance that they will earn a competitive 
rate of return. Third, network characteristics imply that at least in some segments of these in­
dustries, duplication of investments will be wasteful, and to avoid abusive monopolistic prices, 
regulation will be used by policy-makers to correct this market failure. But, fourth, policy­
makers typically lack the ability to commit to particular actions or to restrict the actions of 
their successors in the future. To summarize the problem in a few words, the political pressure 
of consumers will make it very difficult for regulators not to expropriate the funds invested to 
finance the sunk costs. This makes it difficult for private investors to commit the necessary 
funds in the first place, and explains why public ownership has had such an important role in 
network industries.
Abstracting for a moment from privatization issues, it may help to clarify the nature of 
this lack of commitment in a country that has a long tradition of private regulated firms and 
has well established regulatory procedures. In the U.S., the inability of regulators to make 
explicit precommitments to prices stems from the fact that historically courts gave regulatory 
commissions a great deal of leeway in choosing rates. According to the Supreme Court in the 
landmark Hope Natural Gas case of 1944, a regulatory agency is ’’not bound to the use of 
any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates” (Federal Power Comm, 
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603, 1944). Moreover, in the United Railways case 
of 1930, the Supreme Court stated that ’’What will formulate a fair rate of return in a given
3See Newbery (2000) for a recent overview.
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case is not capable of exact mathematical demonstration." ( United Railways & Elcc. Co. r. 
West, 280 U.S. 234, 249, 251 1930).4 This lack of commitment is well known, and some of the 
standard prescriptions explained below have been designed to alleviate these problems.
What is often overlooked by the literature is that the privatized firms in the utilities sectors 
are very large companies with huge agency and corporate governance issues at stake. In many 
countries, privatized utilities are the first to pose a large scale problem of separation between 
ownership and control, and most of the corporate governance controversy has been related to 
the performance of these privatized utilities.5 As a consequence, simple two sided principal- 
agent. models involving the regulator and the firm will not capture many relevant issues. The 
problem has a multi-principal-agent nature, arising both from the complexities of politics and 
from the complexities of the firms involved.
1.2 The Standard Prescriptions for Utilities’ Privatization and 
Regulation
Since the privatization of British Telecom in 1984 the regulatory model of the U.K. has in­
fluenced most of the analysis related to privatized utilities. A plausible conjecture is that the 
British experience has interacted with several strands of economic theory to produce a coherent 
conventional wisdom. The various elements in this conventional wisdom can be split between 
privatization, regulation and liberalization issues. The following subsections describe these 
issues and relate each of them to different parts of the thesis.
1.2.1 Privatization 
•Privatization.
The view that private agents have in general better incentives at running productive units 
than agents in the public sector is now shared by almost everybody in Economics, and it has
4In the U.K., the agencies that were established to regulate the newly privatized public utilities were given 
wide discretion in setting rates. For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1984 allows the Director General 
of Telecommunications to behave ”in a manner he considers best calculated.” In other countries, the problems 
are even more acute due to the lack of established and standardized mechanisms of rate setting (prices are just 
fixed annually using ad-hoc methods).
5See for instance Yergin and Stanislaw (1997).
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gained a special credit after the collapse of communism. Laffont and Tirole. (1993. ch. 17). 
in the particular case of regulated firms, show that public firms may be better at controlling 
managers because they avoid a double-principal structure, but they may expropriate managerial 
non-contractible investment for use in projects not related to the firm, thus deterring this 
investment. Schmidt (1996) presents privatization as a deliberate commitment device in order 
not to receive precise information about the firm, which may improve managerial efficiency. 
The empirical work by Galal et al. (1994), based on a number of quantitative case studies of 
privatized utilities, finds that the main benefit of privatization consists of relaxing investment 
constraints. This evidence coexists with the fact that utilities that are kept under public control, 
such as in France or Germany, have very high levels of investment.
There are discrepancies in the empirical literature about any intrinsical superiority of the 
private sector, as far as productive efficiency is concerned. Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) 
show that the private sector is superior only when it is accompanied by a competitive industry 
structure. Ehrlich et al. (1994) using a dynamic model tested with panel data of the airlines 
industry, reach the opposite conclusion, namely that private firms have higher productivity 
growth regardless of the market structure. Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) present evidence 
that suggests that governments efficiently restructure at least some firms before selling them, 
but that the actual change of ownership does not give rise to further efficiency gains.6 Using 
cross-country econometric analysis in the specific field of telecommunications, Ros (1999) finds 
that privatization is positively associated with main lines per employee and growth in main lines 
per employee, but Wallsten (1999) finds that privatizing an incumbent is negatively correlated 
with mainline penetration and connection capacity. The latter finds that privatization combined 
with an independent regulator, however, is positively correlated with connection capacity and 
substantially mitigates the negative effect on mainline penetration.
History7 shows spells of private ownership followed by public ownership or vicevcrsa de­
pending on the economic cycle, or the political trends of the time, etc. Many political parties 
still have an ideological reluctance to dismantling the public sector. Only a small minority of
6 For recent surveys on these issues, see Megginson and Net ter (2000) and Shirley and Walsh (2000).
7The history of any network industry in most countries shows different phases of public, private ownership, 
deregulation and reregulation, See for example a brief history of the telecommunications industry in Spain in 
Bel and Trillas (1999). See also Vietor (1994).
9
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countries has undertaken a full process of privatization, transferring firm ownership and control 
of utilities to the private sector. Governments are still reluctant to transfer control to the pri­
vate sector and keep varying degrees of power through golden shares, limited (or even absent in 
many sectors) privatizations, and limits to entry by foreign investors.8 In some sectors, quality 
remains a legitimate concern. Hart et al. (1997), for example, show in an incomplete contracts 
framework that the private owners’ incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong 
because they ignore the adverse effect on non-contractible quality.
Progresses in contracting techniques and theory (see Shleifcr, 1998) and the development 
of capital markets, have expanded the potential of private ownership in today’s economies. 
There are certainly problems of contract incompleteness and political transaction costs (see 
Dixit, 1996) that sometimes make privatization reforms difficult. Nevertheless, if technology 
makes competition possible, the case for public ownership becomes weaker, especially if different 
countries try to create a new single market with an emphasis on competition policy, such as is 
the case in Western Europe.
Chapter 3 of this thesis analyzes the decision of how to privatize, and in particular the choice 
of ownership dispersion at privatization and the related issue of partial privatization. Chapter 
4 analyzes the privatization experiences of Chilean and Spanish electricity as the background 
of the takeover of Enersis by Endesa.
•Depoliticization.
Privatization has been endorsed as a way to take away business from the influence of politics 
(see Boycko et al., 1996, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This has been a general theme of public 
policy reform in transition economics. However, Rodrik (1997) shows through some counterex­
amples that the usual rules of thumb advocated by the international financial institutions in 
public policy reform (depoliticization, privatization, transparency) would have failed to achieve 
the impressive results that some countries have achieved in promoting investment. In fact, he 
shows through case studies that investment is best promoted, either from the private or the 
public sector, when it is a political priority. Doyle and Coen (1999) stress that the usual rules
®Bortolotti et al. (1999) analyze a cross section of countries and find no correlation between privatization 
and level of economic development, reaching the conclusion that "privatizations are an end-of-century trend, not 
linked to deterministic or necessary elements, but rather influenced by political decisions or financial needs, and, 
moreover, they are reversible and historically determined."
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of thumb to achieve credibility in the regulatory institutions (independence, transparency, best 
practice) may have a price in terms of flexibility and political sustainability. Most of these rules 
of thumb are related to the idea of depoliticization through privatization. However, as it has 
been argued above, there are good reasons why utilities are politically sensitive (everybody is 
a consumer and firms are usually regulated). These reasons still hold if firms are under private 
ownership. The experience of privatizing countries shows that privatization has done little to 
remove utilities from the political spotlight.
Levy and Spiller (1994) present a more subtle view of how to fit utility regulation into a 
country’s political institutions and make privatization feasible. By contrasting the performance 
of privatized telecommunication companies in five countries (Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, the 
Philippines, and the U.K.), they argue that the credibility and effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework depends on the country’s political and social institutions. Furthermore, they argue 
that performance can be satisfactory with a wide range of regulatory procedures, as long as 
arbitrary administrative action can be restrained. They conclude that the success of a regula­
tory system depends on how well it fits with a country’s prevailing institutions. If a country 
lacks the requisite institutions or erects a regulatory system that is incompatible with its insti­
tutional endowment, efforts at privatization may end in disappointment, recrimination and the 
resurgence of demands for re-nationalization.
The literature has identified three types of political constraints: the potential for regulatory 
capture (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Part II), the use of regulatory instruments to deal with 
redistributive issues (see Laffont and Tirole, 2000, ch. 3) and the lingering presence of the public 
sector in regulated firms (Bortolotti et ah, 1999). Although the two first issues have generated 
a rich theoretical literature, the third one remains unexplored at a formal level, despite its real 
world importance. Capture and redistributive concerns are revisited in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
and the difficulties for the state’s withdrawal from ownership are analyzed in Chapter 3. All 
constraints are present in one way or another in the clinical study presented in Chapter 4.
•Public  offers to  constrain  ex-post expropriation.
It has become conventional wisdom that mass privatization creates incentives for future gov­
ernments not to expropriate the utilities’ investors, which more than compensates for the alleged 
drawbacks that a too dispersed shareholding may have on managerial control (see Corbett and
11
Mayer. 1991).9
However, it remains unclear the extent to which popular capitalism may influence political 
behaviour, especially when shares are very thinly dispersed (sec Grout. 1994) or how in practice 
the number of shareholders influences the regulatory climate.10 *12 Moreover, many small share­
holders typically sell their shares shortly after buying them, or shortly after the holding period 
for ’*bonuses/’ Even if for any reason direct small share-owners keep their shares for longer pe­
riods than institutional investors, it is ambiguous whether this would promote a longer horizon 
in managerial investment strategies, due to the free-rider problem that dispersed owners face 
in monitoring management.11
Tirole (1991) argues that a precondition for the existence of a dispersed shareholding is the 
well functioning of the stock market, which cannot be taken for granted in many countries. 
Without this pre-condition, it is even possible that foreign investors have better commitment 
properties than national popular capitalism. In countries that do not have good stock market 
institutions or that operate in too uncertain environments, Tirole advocates the existence of 
stock holdings by financial intermediaries with shares in a portfolio of companies, in order to 
avoid the inequality associated with a too concentrated ownership. The role of bank holdings 
at the beginning of the railways development in the US is shown as an example of this kind 
of institutions. Dow and Gorton (1997) show that the informative properties of stock markets 
can be replicated by bank systems.
Probably the clearest counter-example of the commitment properties of popular capitalism
9This is broadly based on Median Voter theorem applications (see Biais and Perotti, 1998, and Schmidt, 1997, 
for example): by allocating enough shares to the median voter, a privatizing government can determine its or 
its successors’ future preferences and commit not to expropriate investors’ rents. See Jones et al. (1999) and 
Megginson et al. (2000) for empirical research on these issues.
10Although the implications of the commitment problem typical of utilities are well known as far as regulatory 
institutions are concerned (see for instance Levy and Spiller, 1994), the implications for corporate ownership and 
control are not well understood. Despite early warnings about the economic problems of popular capitalism (see 
Grout, 1994, and Mayer and Meadowcroft, 1986), to my knowledge this route has not been followed by subsequent 
research. Bolton (1995) claims that the Chinese emphasis on managerial incentives through appropriate corporate 
governance and product market competition instead of shock therapy through mass privatization shows the 
correct way forward for Eastern European countries.
n Bortolotti et al. (1999) show that the privatization of utilities through public offers is in most cases accompa­
nied by partial privatization, so that it may well be a defensive tool for governments to keep control while having 
some of the benefits of a listed firm (accessibility to financial markets, managerial monitoring through stock price 
information). Shleifer and Treisman (2000) show how the need to co-opt some constituencies (insiders, major 
banks) for the success of a privatization package creates a coalition that may block improvements in corporate 
governance.
12
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appeared in the U.K. Just a few months after winning the elections, the New Labour government 
established a 5 billion Pounds windfall tax on the privatized utilities, although the ownership 
structure and the regulatory regime were essentially unaffected by political change, at least in 
the short run.
The issue of ownership dispersion is addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and Chapter 4 
relates it to the control market in the case of Chile and Spain.
1.2.2 Regulation 
•Independent regulators.
Arms-length regulation has been endorsed as a way both to avoid the capture of regulators 
by industry and to insulate regulators from the political cycle. The point is related to the 
issue of depoliticization, and the analysis is based on similar arguments as for Central Bank 
independence in monetary policy (see Persson and Tabellini, 1998, and Levine, 1999), In just a 
decade, the number of separate regulators around the world in telecommunications has surged 
from 12 to 88 (Financial Times, 14-3-2000). However, these ”regulators” act with a variable 
degree of independence vis-à-vis their respective governments.
According to Stern (1997), the independent regulator model may not be the only or best 
model in countries that lack regulatory practice and appropriate institutional traditions. When 
formally independent regulatory agencies have been set up in these countries, it is questionable 
whether or not their independence is genuine and sustainable. Informal independence may be 
an alternative solution to these difficulties. TYansparency and predictability of regulation, with 
a clear assignment of functions, can be achieved in other ways which may be better than formally 
independent regulation. An advisory regulator that makes fair and justifiable recommendations, 
uses fair and acceptable procedures and operates in a transparent and predictable way may be 
better than a formally independent, decision-making regulator that does not act impartially.12
Cowen et al. (2000) point out that the credibility enhancing benefits of rules may require 
an unrealistic total removal of government discretion. Their main insight is that it is difficult 12
12A related issue is whether the independent regulator should be a single person as in the U.K., or a board of 
more persons in charge of deciding on policy. A single regulator can be more operative and build up a reputation 
of fairness, but a collective regulator may better prevent arbitrariness or blunt mistakes (see Armstrong and 
Vickers, 1996). For a good analysis of regulatory institutions from a contract theory point of view, see Estache 
and Martimort (1998).
13
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to discover information about officials bound by rules. Applying this to regulation, if the 
rule to respect the regulator’s independence cannot be everlasting, a regime that allows the 
government some discretion can be better in terms of credibility, because it may reveal to 
investors the government’s type.
Some parts of this thesis analyze the consequences of the difficulties to reach regulatory 
independence in the real world. Chapter 2 of this thesis can be interpreted as the analysis of 
lack of regulatory independence: regulatory outcomes depend on a vote-maximizing govern­
ment’s decisions influenced by interest groups. Chapter 4 analyzes the consequences of lack of 
regulatory independence in Chile and Spain, and shows how politics constrains the market for 
corporate control.
•Price-Caps.
Littlechild and Beesley13 were the promoters in Britain of the price cap system RPI-X, by 
which the regulator commits to a price level equal to the retail price index minus a percentage 
to take account of expected productivity gains, for a period of five years. This system was 
supposed to replace the less cost-efficient rate of return regulation of the U.S, and was inspired 
by the need for regulation to achieve results similar to those of competitive markets, echoing 
the stress of the Austrian School on the importance of incentives in market economies. A long 
regulatory lag is supposed to increase the incentives for cost reduction. The move to incentive 
regulation was also inspired by the new literature on regulation, which emphasized the need to  
design mechanisms that took into account the asymmetry of information between the regulator 
and the firm (see Baron and Myerson, 1982, and LafFont and Tirole, 1993). The whole regime 
was conceived to be less burdensome and have less administrative costs than rate of return 
regulation.
However, the difference between both systems is more in emphasis than in substance, since 
botli have similar problems when arbitrating between consumers and producers. Avcrch and 
Johnson (1962) noted that there is an inherent incentive to substitute capital investment for 
operating costs in rate of return regulation (where prices are adjusted to allow the firm to earn 
a rate of return just above the cost of capital). But the same incentive persists if, as is often
13See Beesley (1997), Littlechild (1978) and Beesley and Littlechild (1983), on the economic ideas behind the 
British regulatory system.
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the case, price cap incentives only apply to operating costs and not to capital expenditure. 
Mayer (1999) stresses the insurmountable difficulties of calculating the cost of capital and the 
asset base, which is necessary for both regulatory systems. Xewbery (1997) stresses that rate 
of return regulation creates a more stable environment which can reduce the cost of capital due 
to lower regulatory risk.14
Baron and Besanko (1987) point out that if it cannot make commitments to future policies 
(as is necessary in a price cap regime), the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information 
the firm reveals. They propose a "fairness” arrangement in which the firm agrees not to quit if 
in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed 
in earlier periods. They present an example in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a 
fairness agreement to a policy feasible without commitment. Along similar lines, Schmalensee 
(1989) shows that best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty, 
the regulatory objective function, and the firm profitability constraint. Under uncertainty, 
regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure 
price caps, particularly in terms of consumer surplus. An additional problem of price caps 
is that they require additional controls on service quality, since otherwise the firm has an 
incentive to reduce costs by underinvesting in quality. Burns et al. (1998) suggest that sliding 
scale regulation, under which the regulator sets some base level of prices and profits and requires 
that profits only depart from that level if prices also adjust, may offer an improvement over 
pure price caps or rate of return regulation. All these problems with incentive regulation reveal 
a basic trade-off: while incentive schemes deliver a good cost performance, they are also likely 
to leave substantial profits (or losses) to the firms’ owners.15 As Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 
41) put it: "There is no magic cure. Those who support or just accept the use of high-powered 
incentive schemes should be ready to refrain from forcing contract renegotiation when they
14The higher beta values of British regulated companies as opposed to their American counterparts may be 
related to this. Other issues, such as the differences in the political systems (in the U.K. the political majority 
has more discretion in changing policies) or the different history and tradition of each regulatory system, may 
also affect the risk differential.
15The credibility problems of the price cap were illustrated by the March 1995 breach of the price cap contracts 
with the U.K. regional electricity companies. Professor Steve Littlechild himself, the designer of the RPI-X 
system who had become the electricity regulator, had to yield to intense political pressure and reduce the caps 
substantially ahead of the planned review because the companies were making large profits.
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observe large profits.*'16
A separate but also very important issue regarding price caps is that when applied to a 
basket of products they give operators more freedom to set their rates in accordance with 
standard business practices, for example allowing them to price discriminate. This flexibility 
on the relative price structure leads to Ramsey-oriented prices if the weights of each product 
on the price constraint are properly chosen. In particular, the weights must equal the future 
realized quantities. The gains in efficiency depend on whether the unavoidable errors in weight- 
setting are compensated by the gains derived from the better demand knowledge by the firm. 
Political constraints also often set limits to the speed of the price rebalancing that can be 
achieved through such mechanism.
The choice of the power of incentive schemes is not directly addressed in this thesis. However, 
the political conflict for the rents derived from regulation and the political difficulties to obtain 
efficient Ramsey pricing, two issues that are closely linked to the debate about price caps, are 
present in Chapter 2. This conflict is shown in action in Chapter 4 for the case of Spain and 
Chile, and it is related to the market for corporate control.
1.2.3 Liberalization
Privatization and liberalization have taken place approximately at the same time in many 
countries. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the effects of competition and private own­
ership. There are three relevant dimensions related to regulated industries: product market 
competition, competition in the factor markets and competition for the market.17
•Competition will replace regulation.
There is a consensus that product market competition should be introduced wherever possi­
ble in network industries.18 The goal, as promoted for example by the British regulatory office
16This trade-off is also analyzed from a political economy point of view in Laffont (1996). Levine (1999) shows 
that delegation to an industry regulator whose preferences are more pro-industry than those of the government 
can mitigate underinvestment but at the cost of higher rent accruing to the firm.
1 Competition for the market (auctions, competitive bidding) is not addressed here (see Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). In the case of monopolistic large utilities, the firm that serves the market is usually taken as given, and 
the choice of provider is not really an issue. If entry takes place, the incumbent has to compete with other firms, 
but that is different from auctioning the service.
18For example, Newbery (2000) convincingly argues that a nationalized industry and a regulated monopolis­
tic industry at a mature stage are very similar, and the only way to introduce significant changes is through 
restructuring and competition.
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in telecommunications, OFTEL, is to substitute competition for regulation as time goes by. 
The empirical literature supports the notion that competition has positive effects not only in 
allocative efficiency (provided that good competition policy is enforced) but also on productive 
efficiency (see Nickell, 199G). On the theoretical front, however, arguments can be found that 
support both a Hicksian view (the main cost of monopolies derives from the quiet life of the 
monopolist) and the Schumpeterian view (firms innovate more if they anticipate the possibility 
of obtaining monopolistic rents).19
Many theories analyze the effects of product market competition on investment. Three 
interpretations of ’’effort” or ’’investment” should be taken into account: static managerial 
effort; dynamic innovation or R&D; adjustment of the structure to achieve a good fit with 
the competitive environment. It is possible that competition does not have the same effect 
on each of these interpretations. Moreover, the degree of competition is not, in the long run, 
independent of company behaviour. Thus, for example, successful companies in a competitive 
environment may eventually gain a position of market power. Although deregulation removes a 
crucial institutional barrier to entry, there are other very important sources of barriers to entry, 
such as: 1) absolute cost advantages through economies of scale or scope; 2) strategic advantages 
through product differentiation and informational asymmetries; 3) first mover advantages as a 
result of sunk costs, and 4) exclusionary behaviour by the incumbent, for example predatory 
pricing.
Hence, although creating a sound competitive starting point may be a good policy, compe­
tition policy and some aspects of regulation need to remain strong to avoid subsequent abuses 
of market power.20 The coexistence of competition policy issues and regulatory problems is 
most clear in the access pricing problem (see Chapter 2) and policies towards network inter­
connection.
•Vertical separation.
The idea that competition should be introduced wherever possible is sometimes accompa­
nied by the notion that this is best facilitated by breaking up previously vertically integrated 
industries prior to privatization (this was the policy followed by the U.K. on the eve of electricity
19Armstrong and Vickers (1996) apply the different arguments to the case of telecommunications.
20Some authors (see for example Laffont and Tirole, 2000, p. 279) argue that this may justify the coexistence 
of specialized regulatory agencies and antitrust authorities.
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privatization in 1989). Technological change makes unbundling vertical segments feasible, but 
the degree of disaggregation is limited by practical considerations of information asymmetries, 
transaction costs and market power (in the newly separated segments).21 However, although 
regulatory reform has been in many cases associated to unbundling, there is not much formal 
work on the costs and benefits of vertical separation. The benefits of vertical integration are 
associated to scope economies and a reduction of risk, as the company takes on a more diverse 
portfolio of income streams. The costs are the potential for foreclosure and the likely reduction 
in the quantity and quality of information available to the regulator. It has been suggested 
that the development of contracts between operators may realize some of the benefits while 
minimizing the costs, although the development of these contracts is limited.
Armstrong et al. (1994) emphasize the benefits of vertical separation as the best way 
to avoid foreclosure and facilitate regulation of monopolistic segments. However, Sidak and 
Spulber (1997) emphasize the positive aspects of allowing incumbents to compete in the various 
segments, as this leads to scale and scope economies. Joskow (1996) argues that the vertical 
unbundling of the electricity industry is only beneficial if efficient institutions of contracting are 
set up to keep the benefits of coordination and risk hedging.
In their empirical analysis of the relationship between the regulatory framework and pri­
vatization revenues, Bortolotti et al. (1999) find a statistically significant positive correlation 
between revenues from privatization and vertical divestiture. They present this as implying 
that sensible regulation prior to privatization enhances the credibility of the regulatory envi­
ronment and hence decreases regulatory risk. However, they make several mistakes in splitting 
the countries between those that require vertical unbundling and those that do not.22
Both view’s (vertical integration or separation) are actually grounded on a pessimistic view 
of conduct regulation (price fixing) as opposed to structural regulation (the outcome is mostly 
determined by industry structure). They are both vulnerable to the argument that industry 
structure is a dynamic issue. Current regulation seems however ill-equipped to deal with trends 
such as convergence, globalization, innovation, consolidation and the proliferation of operators.
21 See Yarrow (2000).
22In particular, they assert (Bortolotti et al., 1999, p. 101) that the vertical divestiture requirements in 
Spain and Chile are not dissimilar from those of the English model (where the industry was broken up prior to 
privatization in 1990). In fact, although there are some requirements for separate accounting, both the Spanish 
and Chilean systems show high degrees of vertical integration, as will be shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
18
In many cases, industrial structure is a consequence of the governments' privatization policy 
more than the companies1 organic growth, which creates incentives for takeovers in these sectors. 
The market for corporate control has indeed shown that mergers and acquisitions may become 
an important trigger of structural changes beyond those required by policy-makers.23
Chapter 2 below analyzes the issue of access pricing in a context where the incumbent 
company is vertically integrated. Chapter 4 analyzes the vertical integration of electricity in 
Chile and relates it to the market for corporate control.
•Takeover mechanism.
The proponents of privatizations through public offers argue that the stock market will 
deliver productive efficiency through the disciplining role of the market for corporate control. 
This raises two important issues: first, whether the mechanism per se can achieve its claimed 
efficiency-enhancing properties in the utilities’ sectors. And second, whether most countries 
have the necessary institutions to support a well developed market for corporate control. The 
second issue is tackled in Chapter 4 of this thesis, in the context of Chilean and Spanish 
electricity privatizations. Here I focus on the first.
In the late eighties and early nineties, the takeover mechanism was deemed a rare tool for 
the control of managers in regulated industries. Laffont and Tirole (1993, ch. 17) pointed out 
that the occurrence of takeover bids in the utilities sector was much lower than in other sectors. 
McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) analyze the issue of takeovers in the utilities’ sector using US 
data (the only data available prior to the privatization wave in other western countries in the 
80s and 90s) and report that regulation significantly constrained takeover activity. In the US, 
of the twenty-one hostile offers for utilities between 1960 and 1990, only one was successful. 
However, deregulation has triggered restructuring and since the mid nineties, and especially 
after the golden share on the British Regional Electricity Companies expired in 1995, several 
takeovers of privatized utilities have modified the previous rather stable landscape.
Hence, it becomes now very relevant to assess whether the takeover mechanism can be an 
efficient instrument to achieve managerial efficiency and to deliver efficient industry structures.
23Some authors are rather pessimistic about the effects of consolidation in regulated sectors. For example, 
Dieter Helm (The Utilities Journal, October 1999) argues that "the great monopolies of the early decades of 
the XXI century are being created across the utility markets, at precisely the time when information technology 
should be breaking down the old economies of scale. The choice is increasingly stark: whether to ensure that 
competition can be allowed to thrive, or whether to allow market power to reassert its control.”
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Jenson (1993) supports the traditional view of takeovers as a device to discipline managers and 
achieve productive efficiency. Along these lines, the market for corporate control can improve 
the matching of the structure of the firm with its environment. This view has received several 
general criticisms. Shleifer and Summers (19SS) point out that hostile takeovers breach tlie 
implicit contracts developed by the target’s managerial team, thus creating a hold-up problem 
that prevents the achievement of these ex-ante efficient contracts. Agency problems in the  
bidding firm may drive acquisitions that destroy value (see Weston et ah, 1998). For the 
particular case of utilities, Mayer (1990) argues that takeovers make the role of regulators more 
difficult by creating firms operating both in regulated and unregulated markets, thus making 
accounting and stock price information for regulatory purposes less useful.
Mergers and acquisitions should be welcome if they help to cut costs. But part of their 
motivation may be to recover some of the market power lost with the ending of official monop­
olies. They may also be the reflection of agency problems in bidding firms.2'1 These issues are 
studied at length in Chapter 4, illustrated with the takeover of the Chilean holding Enersis by 
Endesa, the largest Spanish electricity firm.
1.3 Contributions of this Thesis: a Summary
The common goal of the subsequent chapters is to explore some of the issues that the standard 
prescriptions have somehow left aside. I analyze the consequences of a politicized regulatory 
framework, the optimality of partially concentrated shareholdings in utilities and the properties 
of the takeover mechanism in regulated sectors. I take as given the importance of the private 
sector and privatization as important forces in the evolution of these sectors. This reflects my 
conjecture that there are certainly more benefits than costs to privatizing most utilities in the 
long run, and the fact that most countries, although with more difficulties than the standard 
prescriptions would predict, are actually progressing towards a larger role for private ownership. 
However, in my view societies will not get the benefits of competition and technological change 
unless some of the difficulties overlooked by the standard prescriptions are addressed. Priva- 24
24The takeover of privatized firms under price cap regulation (such as British Regional Electricity Companies) 
by firms under rate of return regulation (such as some American companies) or under state control (such as 
Electricité de Prance, which took over London Electricity in 1998) illustrate the importance of this discussion.
20
tizing and regulating privatized firms in the wrong way may cause long-lasting damage in the 
market culture of reforming countries. Identifying the weaknesses of the standard prescriptions 
and addressing them may avoid a swing of the pendulum towards policies that do not capture 
the benefits of technological change.
The rest of this section summarizes each of the following chapters and presents their results.
Chapter 2 shows the consequences of assuming that depoliticization of utilities regulation is 
not a feasible prospect. It has two purposes: to analyze the suitability for regulation of a type 
of model (the common agency theory of lobbying) that had not been explicitly used in the past 
in this field, and to make predictions on a controversial issue, the access pricing problem, based 
on game-theoretical political economy. The model presented captures the influence of organized 
interests and facilitates the analysis of multidimensional issues. The weights of the regulator’s 
objective function are derived as the politico-economic equilibrium of an electoral competition 
model. In this model, the regulated firms act as lobbies that support the political parties in 
their efforts to win the elections. The influence of lobbies is proportional to the impact of 
campaign contributions on electoral outcomes. Applying this framework to a specific case, in 
a politico-economic equilibrium the access charge for the use of a network monopolized by a 
vertically integrated incumbent is below the optimal access charge, for a fixed level of final prices. 
The analysis formalizes the concerns expressed by the literature on regulatory takings (see 
Sidak and Spulber, 1997). When final prices are chosen simultaneously and subject to similar 
political pressures, though, these final prices are higher than optimal and may compensate 
for the decrease in access prices. The solution is equal to the social optimum only under 
very especial conditions. Producers of intermediate goods such as network access are more 
vulnerable politically, because the representatives of the consumer’s services producers bid 
vigorously against access prices, whereas opposition to protection on consumer’s services is less 
intense. The endogenous inertia in the use of inefficient instruments is the source of significant 
political dilemmas in the introduction of liberalization: allowing entry but charging too low 
access charges may lead to underinvestment and heavy-handed regulation.
Chapter 3 addresses some aspects of the standard prescription that utilities should be pri­
vatized through public offers in order to have widespread ownership. A three stage model is 
presented. First the government chooses the degree of shareholder concentration of a firm that
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is privatized, and which will produce a good in a regulated sector. It does so to maximize 
a weighted sum of privatization proceeds and political objectives (modelled as the expected 
vote). Second, a manager undertakes a quality improving effort and shareholders exert a level 
of monitoring to make sure that the manager behaves in their interests. Third, a regulator 
fixes the price of the product. Dispersed ownership, in some cases, is efficient to encourage 
managerial initiative. If managerial investment is valuable for shareholders because it increases 
the regulated price in equilibrium, then dispersion may be a good commitment device to avoid 
excessive monitoring by blockholders in the firm: by allowing the manager to enjoy some private 
benefits, she has an incentive to undertake a higher effort level. There is a trade-off between 
initiative and control: the manager must enjoy some rents, but at the same time direct her 
efforts to obtain positive profits for the shareholders. The extent to which the commitment not 
to interfere too much through dispersed ownership is valuable depends on exogenous parameters 
that are related to the state of deregulation. A tough regulatory climate and an increasing level 
of firm-specific uncertainty are shown to increase the level of optimal ownership concentration. 
Political objectives may yield higher (through collusion between managers and politicians) or 
lower (through collusion between politicians and blockholders) dispersion than the benchmark 
case where the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. The degree of leniency in the 
regulatory climate is an important determinant of the political equilibrium. For example, a 
regulatory climate that is more favourable to producers encourages a lower discrepancy be­
tween the level of dispersion when politicians collude with managers and the benchmark where 
the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. The model presented formalizes and makes 
more precise the idea that regulation constrains agency relationships inside the firm. This idea 
has been exploited by the empirical literature, for example in Demsetz and Lehn (1985). It 
is also shown that governments may find it politically costly to sell an optimal stake to a pri­
vate blockholder, and partial public ownership may remain the typical form of concentrated 
ownership.
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of takeovers of privatized utilities as a tool to achieve produc­
tive efficiency. A clinical study presents the effects on shareholder value of the Endesa-Enersis 
control contest. It is an example of the free cash flow theory applied to takeovers. The pro­
tracted acquisition of the Chilean electricity holding Encrsis (the largest privatized electricity
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firm in Chile) by the Spanish firm Endesa (the largest electricity firm in Spain, also privatized) 
is a unique takeover involving two privatized utilities from two different countries. It presents 
an excellent opportunity to analyze: first, the privatization and regulation of utilities in Chile 
and Spain: and second, how privatization and regulation affect the market for corporate control. 
Agency problems in the bidding firm, as well as target strategies, are related to privatization 
methods and regulatory regimes. It is shown that in this case the takeover reflects significant 
agency problems in the bidding firm (Endesa) and that regulation and politicization shape the 
behavior of the agents involved. The effect of the takeover on shareholder value is quantified 
and shown to be negative and statistically significant. The last stages of the protracted control 
contest are an illustration of the existence of competing ideas concerning the future strategies 
of large privatized utilities. The choice of competing managerial teams that shareholders faced 
was a choice between a strategy based on a vertically integrated utility and a firm specialized 
in a broad range of consumer’s services. To the extent that takeovers of utilities have become 
much more frequent with deregulation, the insights on the specific features of the takeover 
mechanism in the network industries may be of more general interest than the particular case 
analyzed.
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Chapter 2
Regulating Utilities With Political 
Constraints
2.1 Introduction
A significant part of what the state at any level does has to do with its role as the owner or 
regulator of firms in the network industries. Even after utilities are privatized, the government 
still has the power to make a number of key decisions. The goal of this chapter is to develop 
a model of policy determination for utility regulation to explore some aspects of the modern 
regulatory game. The model presented will also shed light on the dilemmas that governments 
face when they try to liberalize some segments of the network industries.
Several authors, like Hutton (1996) and Yergin and Stanislaw (1997), have pointed out th a t 
it is not clear that the pro-market and pro-private sector reforms of the 80s and 90s can be 
politically sustainable. The current controversies have more to do with regulation than with 
privatization. The Economist (April, 18th., 1998) in commenting on the latter of these books, 
says:
’’rather than arguing about the merits of privatizing state-owned enterprises, 
political parties are more likely to disagree about exactly how, once privatized, the 
enterprises should be regulated” .
However, if the hold-up problem of investments in the presence of sunk costs is not solved
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by regulation, as the theory of vertical integration suggests, one solution in a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium is public ownership and control of utilities.
To analyze these issues, I apply to regulation the “common agency" framework of policy 
determination developed by Grossman and Helpman. This model is shown to do no worse 
than more traditional voting models in several aspects, and to actually improve upon them by 
capturing some additional realistic aspects of regulation (interest groups, multidimensionality) 
without sacrificing on simplicity. In the model, the organized interest groups (in this study, 
the regulated firms) contribute to the political parties to influence their policies. These con­
tributions should not necessarily be interpreted literally.1 They are meant to encompass legal 
contributions; illegal bribes; investing in biased media empires; publicity in party media; ”fic­
titious jobs”; the ” revolving doors” phenomenon; or appointing or accepting from pre-private 
ownership times a sub-optimal manager that owes his/her position to political reasons (the 
firm is then contributing to an ’’employment” or ’’insurance” policy that may be convenient to 
political parties). It is easy to find examples from specific firms and countries for each of these.2 
All of them imply direct revenues foregone in order to promote the objectives of politicians or 
political ” machines.”
In the model presented below, firms support political parties in their effort to win elections, 
in exchange for policy favours. As a result of the quid pro quo relationship between lobbies 
and parties, the chapter shows: 1) that policies are closer to the interests of the firms the 
less informed the voters are about regulatory policies, and 2 ) that incumbent firms that own 
networks in regulated sectors may not be compensated for their sunk investments and other 
elements of the ”access deficit” , such as universal service and other social obligations. The 
efficient price for recovering this deficit may not hold in a politico-economic equilibrium. This 
is because incumbents face the additional opposition of entrants in pricing access, which they
]See The Economist, 31 July 1999, pp. 31-32, on political parties' finances. Also in The Economist, 14 August 
1999, p. 32: ”28 of Britain’s 100 biggest public companies have donated either their Chairman or their Chief 
Executive as a part-time adviser to the government, in one capacity or another.”
Privatization does not seem to have eliminated collusion with politicians. Bortolotti et al. {1999, p.76); ”The 
overall analysis of barriers to effective ownership transfer illustrates the profound political, social and economic 
difficulty of the state’s withdrawal from production. Our analysis even underestimates the real dimensions of 
statalism, because it does not manage to capture all the more subtle forms of political interference in privatized 
companies, such as direct or indirect moral suasion, the often hidden influence in the appointment of managers, 
the incestuous relationships between political class and business class.”
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do not face in final product prices. In this context, phenomena sucli as the “Tragedy of the 
Telecommons“ (deregulatory takings resulting in network underinvestment) suggested by Sidak 
and Spulber (1997), as an undesirable but possible outcome, deserves consideration, since it 
may emerge as a politico-economic equilibrium. Grout (199G) has a similar flavour in that 
it shows how inefficient access pricing may lead to underinvestment in networks or inefficient 
bypass. These authors refer to the suboptimal investment in network elements when the users 
do not internalize the cost of the inputs due to inefficient regulation of access. In this case, 
a paradoxical solution after privatization and deregulation (allowing entry but not solving the 
access pricing problem) may be the renationalization of the network. The section presented 
below on the political economy of the access pricing problem shows under which conditions 
such predictions may come true.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 relates it to the existing literature. 
The drawbacks of the Median Voter theorem as applied to regulation lead me to develop a 
model with interest groups, which is presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 applies this ’’com­
mon agency” framework to the problem of pricing access to a network that is monopolized 
by a vertically integrated incumbent which faces entry in a downstream market. Section 2.5 
presents some extensions. It first analyzes the effects for private investment of anticipating the 
regulatory policies modelled in the previous sections. It then shows how politicians increase 
their bargaining power with entry. And finally it presents arguments as to why more efficient 
instruments are not used so that a lighter burden is placed on access charges. The conclu­
sion summarizes the main arguments and mentions caveats and limitations to the use of the 
’’common agency” framework to regulation and other micro policies.
2.2 Regulation and the Literature on Political Economy
The Chicago School and Virginia School authors made the first attempts to formally model the 
interaction between politics and economics in regulation, as in other fields of economics.3 Since 
then, a substantial body of literature has emerged which has enriched these preliminary efforts 
with more solid micro-foundations. The general background for this more modern Political
3See Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1998 and 1999) for references and comments about 
these schools.
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Economy literature can be found in Dixit (1996a) and in the surveys of Persson and Tabellini 
(1998 and 1999). In the field of Regulation, Laffont and Tirole (1993) develop normative models 
in which benevolent founding fathers design regulatory constitutions anticipating opportunism 
or capture at the regulatory stage. Many other possibilities derived from applying positive 
models of policy implementation remain largely unexplored. In this respect, the literature on 
Regulation lags behind those in Macroeconomics, Public Economics and Trade Policy.
Some authors have applied the Median Voter theorem to regulatory problems using dif­
ferent approaches.4 The median voter (the one whose most preferred policy will be chosen 
in equilibrium, according to this theorem) will likely have a very small number of shares or 
maybe none at all, and will be mainly worried about consumer surplus. In a static framework, 
the interests of producers will possibly not be taken into consideration by the policy-makers. 
However, such an equilibrium is inconsistent with the evidence of many microeconomic policies 
caring about producers’ interests, like protectionist policies, transitional periods, quotas, policy 
towards declining regions, etc.
In addition to this, the Median Voter theorem assumes perfect information both on the side 
of policy-makers and voters, and uni-dimensionality of policies. This runs counter to a huge 
literature both in political economy and in regulation that places information asymmetries at 
the core of the theory. Moreover, many regulatory policies are multidimensional in nature.
The assumptions of office-oriented (as opposed to policy-oriented) politicians, perfect in­
formation and the absence of interest groups are behind the result that both political parties 
converge presenting the platform that is most valued by the median voter. If both political 
parties converge, then in a median voter model shocks in the preferences of the median voter 
are the only source of political risk. However, the cases of countries that have privatized sug­
gest that the main sources of political risk come from the fact that different political parties 
with different policies can alternate in office and that different social groups have an important 
weight in policy determination (in a spatial model of politics, two assumptions at least are 
needed to obtain ” partisan” or divergent policies: parties arc policy-oriented and they have
4Baron (1988) applies it to the problem of a legislature that has to choose the weight of profits in the objective 
function of an imperfectly informed regulatory agency. Faulhaber (1997a and 1997b) analyzes the determination 
of cross-subsidies between different products. Beard and Thomson (1996) study the decision concerning two-part 
tariffs. Laffont (1996) and Schmidt (1997) also use a similar majority voting approach.
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incomplete information about voters' preferences5).
Moreover, the Median Voter theorem is probably not the best tool to analyze the role o f  
political parties. If activists anticipate the equilibrium result (convergence), they will probably 
not be willing to undertake costly actions to create a political party.6
However, other branches of the politico-economic literature provide us with a myriad o f  
modeling possibilities that analyze policies where interest groups and political parties play a  
crucial role (see part II of Persson and Tabellini, 1999). The more recent literature presents 
a better understanding of the interaction between interest groups and voting behaviour. T h e  
following section develops an application to regulation along these lines.
I build on a framework developed by Grossman and Helpman7 to study the political de ter­
minants of a regulatory decision about pricing policy. These authors use a ”common agency” 
framework, based on Bernheim and Whinston (1986), where several principals try to influence 
the behaviour of an agent.8 The objective is to show that realistic weights in a regulator’s objec­
tive function can be derived from a politico-economic equilibrium. This theory, first developed 
for trade policy, and subsequently applied to other issues in positive public economics (see Pers­
son and Tabellini, 1999) was motivated as a response to the lack of micro-found at ions of th e  
Chicago School positive theory of regulation. Interest groups, voters and parties are integrated 
in a simple model that can handle multidimensional issues without further complication.
The Grossman and Helpman model provides micro-foundations to a political support ob ­
jective function, relating the weights of the different interest groups to structural variables. 
Initially they made these weights contingent on the proportion of voters organized in special 
interest groups and on the weight assigned by the government to social welfare (Grossman and  
Helpman, 1994). They next endogenized the weight assigned to social welfare as the equilibrium 
result of a probabilistic voting model with two political parties, where the importance of social 
welfare basically depends on the ratio of voters that are informed about policies (Grossman and
5See Alesina and Rosenthal (1994).
6For the role of activists in the formation of political parties, see Aldrich (1994).
7See Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b), Dixit (1996b) and Dixit et al. (1997). For 
comments about these papers, see Rodrik (1995), Faulhaber (1997b), Besley and Coate (1997) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1999),
8Bemheim and Whinston (1985 and 1990) apply this framework to the study of collusion between product 
firms that use the same marketing agency. Spiller (1990) also applies a multi-principal framework to regulation, 
but in his model the agent is a regulatory agency and the principals are ’’the Congress” and "the Industry.’’
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Helpman, 1996a).
2.3 Electoral Competition, Lobbying and Regulation
The purpose of this section is to show that realistic weights in a regulator's objective function 
can be derived from a politico-economic equilibrium. I develop parsimoniously the micro­
political foundations for the case where there is only one interest group (the regulated incumbent 
firm). In the next section I further develop the economic side, and generalize the model to the 
presence of two interest groups.
The regulatory institution is the simplest possible, i.e. it consists of a political body resulting 
from an electoral process (government or legislative) that must make a decision about the price 
of a regulated and vertically integrated monopolist. There are two parties in this society, called 
L and R. The political parties have fixed positions on some issues, for exogenous historical 
and ideological reasons. On other issues, they may adopt those positions that maximize their 
probability of winning the elections. I will assume that the regulatory policy about prices 
belongs to these ” pliable1’ policies. I will also assume that firms do not have ex-ante preferences 
about who they want to win the elections, i.e., they are not positioned in the political spectrum.
The assumption that some of the voters are uninformed is made to motivate the reason 
why parties accept support from the lobbies. The following assumptions specify the agents’ 
behaviour.
2.3.1 The Incumbent
The incumbent regulated company is initially the only organized in terest group or lobby in 
this economy. It may spend resources with the aim of capturing the will of the public decision­
makers, although it does not have a prior preference for any of the parties. Let II (p) denote 
the ex-post profits that the firm derives from price policy p.
The firm may support political party L with SL and may support political party R  with 
S Ry where j  =  L, R  can be interpreted as any costly action that the firm may undertake 
to support the electoral campaign of a political party, e.g., monetary contributions, but also 
generous coverage in the media owned by the company, etc. The firm is risk neutral and
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maximizes expected profits net of political contributions. The objective function is given below, 
at the end of Subsection 2.3.3.
2.3,2 The Voters 
Informed Voters
These are the agents who know and understand the parties’ positions on regulatory policy. 
Although how individuals get their information is unmodelled here, different extended m odels 
could be used to explain how voters obtain information. Beslev and Coate (2000) show th a t  
if regulators are directly elected, then voters have more information about regulatory issues 
than if regulators are appointed and then the regulatory issues are bundled with other policy 
platform issues.9 Stromberg (1999) presents a model where the groups that get information d o  
so via the activities of profit maximizing media firms. Finally, the control market can also b e  
behind the salience of regulatory issues at a point in time.
These informed voters are a proportion 6 of the population. Let a \  unknown to the parties, 
describe the ex-ante bias of an informed individual for party R  before the electoral campaign 
and before the policy announcement. In other words, a 1 reflects the informed voters’ preferences 
for the immutable characteristics and program of the parties. Informed individuals derive u tility
Ul (pj ) =  W{jP) +  S (j) a \  for j  = L ,R  (2.1)
where 6 (L ) =  0 and 6 (R) =  1. Let p* denote the price that maximizes the welfare o f 
informed voters.
The parties cannot observe the ex ante proclivities of any particular voter, although they 
presume these to be drawn from a known distribution F(a). In particular, the party bias is 
distributed according to a uniform distribution in the interval [—^  — ƒ, ~ — ƒ], where ƒ reflects 
an a priori advantage for party L.
9More generally, how policy issues become salient in the electoral process is one of the most important 
determinants of political equilibria. See Riker (1982, 1986).
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Any one of these informed voters votes for party L or R  taking into account the difference 
in the utility she derives from pL and pR and taking into account her a priori preferences for 
one of the parties. An informed voter prefers party L if W{pL) — W {pR) > o '. This defines the 
critical value a as:
5 =  W (pL) -  U'(p»)
Then all informed voters with values of a* less than d will vote for party L, and all the rest 
for party R. Thus the distribution function of a  can be used as an explicit functional form for 
the proportion of voters that prefer party L.
In particular, from the parties’ point of view there is a probability
F  [ » V )  -  lV(p*)]
that the informed individual i will vote for party L. Then 
F  [W(pL) -  U'(p«)] =  1* =  > + ƒ +  [W (p'-) -  W  (pR)]
Thus the expected proportion of the electorate that is informed and that votes for party L  
is 0 [ƒ + 5  +  W  (pL) — W  (pR)] •
Uninformed Voters
These constitute a proportion (1 — 0) of the population. They do not know about the policy 
platforms of any of the parties. Let a un, unknown to the parties, describe the ex-ante pref­
erences of an uninformed voter for party R  before the electoral campaign. These individuals 
decide their votes according to the impression that they get from the intensity or quality of 
the electoral campaigns. In this sense, the electoral campaigns are not informative. The in- 
tensity/quality hL of party V s campaign depends on the firm’s support to this party in the 
following form: hL (S^) =  SL> Similarly for party R. A typical uninformed voter derives utility
m  (W) = uun (hi) +  <5 0 ) a unfo r j = L ,R  (2.2)
where 6  (L) =  0 and 5 {R) — 1 . Like the informed voters, they vote for party L if uun (/i^) —
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uun (hR) > a un. Assuming has the same distribution as n 1:
F  [uur,(/iL) - u un{hR)\ = £ +  ƒ 4- (S L - S R).
Then the expected proportion of the voters that are uninformed and that vote for party L  
depends on the difference in the parties campaigns, which is determined by the difference in th e  
support that the firm gives to the two parties. This proportion is (1 -  6) [£ -f ƒ +  (S ij — S R)] .
2.3.3 The Parties and the Government
The Parliament is elected with proportional representation. Each party seeks to maximize its  
vote share, or equivalently its representation in the parliament, which with the maintained 
assumptions for party L is
VL = ƒ + i  + e [\V(pL) -  W(pR)] + (1 -  0) (SL -  SR) (2.3)
and for party 7? is 1 -  vL — vH} given the nature of the two-party system . 10
One consequence of the linearity assumptions embedded in the voters’ behaviour is that th e  
objective function for each party becomes additively separable in the variables describing its own 
policy platform and the support it gets from the firm and those of its rival. With separability, 
each party can make its decisions about what support to accept and what platforms to adopt 
independently of its knowledge or beliefs about the incentives facing the other.
The firm anticipates that the legislature adopts the regulatory policy pL with probability 
$(1^ )  and the regulatory policy pR with probability 1 —t? {vL). I make the following assumptions 
about d (vL):
1) 0 ' > 0
2 ) tf(J) =  1
3) 'd,r >  0 a n d 'd (vL) —* 0 for all vL <  ^
10Readers may still feel uncomfortable with the idea of exogenously uninformed voters. However, the objective 
function of the party is also equal to (2.3) if there are only informed citizens whose decision to vote for one or the 
other party depends to some extend on the electoral campaign (for example, if the campaign has an influence on 
the party bias). See Persson and Tabellini (1999, p.81).
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4) t?" < 0 and (vl ) 1 for all vL > 11
As a result of this, the ex-ante objective function of the firm becomes
E =  t?(uL)n(pL) +  [1 -  i?(rL)] II(pR) - S L - S R (2.4)
2.3.4 Timing and Equilibrium Concept
In the first stage, the firm decides on the support that it will give to each of the parties: it 
offers a contract to each of the political parties. In the second stage, the parties
decide whether to accept the offer, or refuse it and adopt p*, the policy that maximizes the 
welfare of the informed voters. Finally, the elections take place, and policy and supports are 
implemented according to the subgam e perfect equ ilibrium  of these two stages.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
Given the two-stage nature of the game, the equilibrium will be calculated by backward in­
duction. Proposition 1 is derived from the solution of the second stage. The result of this is 
that the firm must face a participation constraint in the first stage. Proposition 2 deals with 
the solution of the first stage taking into account this constraint. I focus on interior solutions, 
assuming that =  0  is never optimal for the firm.
P roposition  1  The solution of the firm ’s problem must satisfy
S i> Y ^ g [ W ( p ') - \V ( p > ) ] j  = L ,R (2.5)
Proof. Given the linearity and separability assumptions, the decisions of each party are 
independent of those of the other party. So in a Nash Equilibrium between parties at the second 
stage of the game each party takes its decision independently of the decision of the other party.
11t? introduces some noise in the implementation process of the policy platform. It could alternatively be 
assumed that t? =  1 if vL > vR, without any noise. The qualitative results would not change, as shown in an 
appendix of Grossman and Helpman (1996a).
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Party L  always has the option of refusing the lobby's offer. In this case, it would support 
p*, the optimal price for informed voters, since it would not have any resources to appeal to  
uninformed voters. From (2.3), if the party rejects the offer and endorses p*. it will capture th e  
following number of seats:
v* =  ƒ +  i  +  0 [H'(p*) -  W {pR)] +  (1  -  0)(O -  S R).
It follows that if the firm wants to affect the policy outcome it needs to offer a contribution 
that induces a policy change and provides the policymaker with at least v*, i.e., S L must b e  
such tha t vL > v*. This implies:
(i -  &)SL > ( }  + \  + e py(p*) -  u^p * )] -  s R( 1 -  0 ))
~ ( / + 5  +  0 \}V(pL) — lF(p*)] —S R{ 1 — 0)), from which (2.5) is derived. Similarly for party  
R. u
The firm would have a motivation to give more than what is needed to satisfy constraint (2.5) 
in order to boost the chances of one of the parties to win, if the expected marginal benefit (as 
derived from (2.4) using (2.3)) from the first dollar of ”extra” contribution was higher than th e  
marginal cost. It is assumed that this is not the case, e.g., if L is the more popular party (ƒ > 0) 
then — 0) [II(p^) -  n (p fi)] <  1 (since the marginal benefit of the extra contribution to
the less popular party is lower than the marginal benefit of the extra contribution to the m ore 
popular party, if the condition holds for the latter, then it must hold for the former too).
P roposition  2  The equilibrium policy platforms satisfy
p3 — arg max 
p
& n (p ) + Y = ^ w (p ) , j  = L ,R
where =  i9(ƒ +  5 ) and -dR =  1 -  ■$(ƒ +  ^).
(2.6)
P roof. By substituting the participation constraint (2.5) with equality into (2.3), party L  
captures a fraction \  +  ƒ of the seats while party R  captures \  -  f , no matter what pL and p n  
happen to be. Substituting (2.5) with equality into (2.4), the firm’s expected utility is 
E =  -d{vL)Il(pL) +  [1 -  d(vL)\ n (pR)
- r b  [w (p*) -  w[pL)] -  [w (p*) -  w {pr ))
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from which I obtain the pL and pR specified in Proposition 2. ■
From proposition 2, the decision about pricing policy will maximize a weighted sum of the 
firm's profit and social welfare, and hence may differ from what would be chosen by a fully 
benevolent regulator. It shows the determinants of the weights given to producer and consumer 
surplus. Although in most applications it is probably not necessary to specify them, it is useful 
to bear in mind that these determinants have to do with the characteristics of the distribution of 
the party bias (represented by parameter ƒ) and with the extent to which voters are responsive 
to electoral campaigns (represented by parameter 6).
2,3.6 Regulating Prices
I present here an application based on a classical regulation model. The firm produces a quantity 
q of an homogeneous good or service (for instance, domestic electricity) at cost C  = k+cq , where 
k is a fixed cost and c is the marginal cost. The inverse demand function is p =  tp (<y). Assume 
that the quantity produced by the firm causes gross consumer surplus £ (q) and that there is a 
constitutional break-even constraint that prevents the regulated firm from having losses. By G 
I index the solution obtained in the political context described in the two previous propositions. 
I also assume that the welfare of informed voters coincides with social welfare12. In addition, 
I index by M  and B respectively the solutions obtained by an unregulated monopolist and by 
a fully benevolent regulator that maximizes social welfare. I assume that the regulator has 
perfect information about the firm.
P roposition  3
such that
The equilibrium solution obtained by a a politically constrained government is
1 t9(/ +  1 / 2 ) +  q
7? (0 / ( 1  -  0 )) + !? (ƒ +  1/ 2 ) + P
(2.7)
where g is the Lagrangean multiplier associated to the firm ’s participation constraint (g = 0 
i f  the constraint is not binding) and 
T ]= -{dq /dp)/(q /p ).
12Following Mueller (1989), this is the case if the distribution of informed voters is representative of the overall 
population. This would not be the case if, as in Stromberg (1999), the activities of profit maximizing media firms 
produced a biased distribution of information. Then policies in equilibrium would favour those groups that are 
most valuable for these firms.
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P roo f. A parliament constrained by the political framework described in the propositions 
1 and 2  would choose q to maximize
( f  +  ^  K’(? )q -  c q -  k} + Y ~r$}V
subject to tp(q)q -  cq — k  ^  0 , 
where W  = £ (g) — cq — k.
The corresponding Lagrangean is:
£(q, X) =  d  ^  [ip (q) q - c q - k }  + (£ (g) -  cq -  k) + A {ip {q) q -  cq -  k)
And the solution is obtained from
ftC(g.A) =Q
dq
using the fact that f ' (9 ) =  xp (q). ■
It is useful to compare the politically constrained solution with the monopolist's solution 
and the benevolent regulator’s solution.
An unregulated monopolist would choose q to maximize 
{tp(q)q — (cq +  &)} , and the optimal solution implies
P 1
V
A fully benevolent regulator would choose g to maximize
(2 .8 )
W = { « ( ? ) - («Z+  *]} (2.9)
subject to n(g) > 0. 
and the solution implies
pB — c] __ g 1
pB J 1 + QT}
(2.10)
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The political equilibrium coincides with monopoly pricing when = 0, i.e. when nobody is 
informed. The margin between price and marginal cost decreases as the proportion of informed 
voters increases. Since consumers will be more informed about price policies because they 
affect them more directly, price policies will in general be closer to the consumers' interests 
than structure policies. For example, policies related to the vertical or horizontal integration 
of the firms involved (less well understood and affecting consumers more indirectly), will in 
general be closer to profit-maxi mi zing policies than price policies.
However, bear in mind that the problem analyzed is static and that the fixed costs are given. 
If a previous stage were introduced in the model, where the firm had to make an investment 
decision, then in the absence of full regulatory commitment, the social optimum would not be 
achieved with all the voters being informed (see Section 2.5).
The role of regulatory agencies may be relevant even if they do not have many decision 
powers, because they can contribute to information and transparency, and at the same time 
can improve the commitment possibilities of decision making. Even if the last decision is taken 
by politicians, they will face voters that are informed thanks to the role of the specialized agency, 
which will constrain the degree to which these voters are sensitive to the firm’s pressure.
The model presented so far implicitly assumes that the firm has a negligible number of 
owners in terms of the proportion of voters/consumers (this assumption is dropped in the next 
section). If the members of the interest group form a non-negligible part of the population 
(which in the case of a regulated firm being the only lobby means dispersed shareholding), they 
also internalize in their lobbying activity the cost of higher prices in terms of consumer surplus.
2.4 Two Interest Groups: Entry and the Politics of Access
This section extends the previous model to the case of two interest groups and a policy vector 
with two arguments, and applies it to the access pricing problem. This is one of the most 
controversial issues13 in regulation. It deals with the price that a competitor in a downstream 
market should be charged by the owner of a bottleneck input (for instance, access to a net­
work), when this owner also participates in the downstream market. It is a key issue for the
13For example, Laffont and Tirole (2000, p.99) write: "the high stakes attached to the interconnection policy 
in most countries generate intense lobbying by incumbents and entrants as well as political intervention.”
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liberalization of network industries.
This problem is faced, for example, by those countries (such as the UK, Spain. France, 
Germany. Italy, etc.) that keep a former telecoms monopolist as a vertically integrated firm. 
This firm’s local loop has to be used by itself and by competitors to provide long-distance calls, 
advanced telecommunications services, etc. Other examples are the use of the transmission 
network in electricity or the use of gas pipelines.
The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) has arisen in this context as a proposal to  
create a level playing field between incumbents and entrants. 14 This proposal consists of setting  
the price with the following formula:
optimal access charge = direct cost of providing access
-{-opportunity cost of providing access
This proposal is appealing because it guarantees that only efficient competitors will enter 
the downstream market, and because the vertically integrated firm has no incentives to prevent 
entry. However, the ECPR is optimal only under a very restrictive set of circumstances (see 
Laffont and Tirole, 1996). It has also generated political opposition, the determinants of which 
have not been analyzed by the literature .15
The reason for the proponents including the opportunity cost is that the final prices charged 
by the incumbent’s output are used to pay for fixed costs and universal service obligations or 
stranded costs tha t the incumbent has to afford as a result of the regulatory contract that, 
implicitly or explicitly, the incumbent and the regulator agreed upon in the past.16 Each time 
an entrant captures part of the final product demand, the incumbent loses an opportunity to
14See Sidak and Spulber (1997). In particular (p. 1), they consider ’’the selection of access prices such that, in 
the new competitive environment, a public utility will have an opportunity to achieve for its investors the expected 
earnings associated with the former regulatory regime under which the utility made (and regulators approved as 
prudent) enormous investments in long-lived facilities and other specialized assets to serve its costumers.”
15For an informal assessment of the political difficulties of the ECPR in telecommunications in the UK, see 
Armstrong and Doyle (1995).
16Whether the deficit can be eradicated by using high, distorsion-free line rental charges is an empirical 
question. Such rental charges face constraints derived from the elasticity of demand, the public good features of 
connection and also political constraints on the choice of instruments. See Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 15) and 
Section 2.5 below.
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cover its universal service obligations or its stranded costs. Hence the need to charge for the 
opportunity cost of letting competitors use the network. The risk is that if these opportunity 
costs are not taken into account properly, inefficient investment levels will follow, and the 
physical infrastructure will be inadequate to capture the benefits of the information society, the 
liberalization of electricity, services based on new technology, etc . 17
The basic model of the previous section can provide useful tools to analyze this problem 
because, as opposed to other political economy models such as Median Voter applications, it 
is suitable to the analysis of multidimensional issues. This is important for the access pricing 
problem, as will be shown below, since it is better to analyze it in the context of a package of 
regulatory decisions (the choice of final and access prices). Also, the access pricing problem 
typically involves the participation of several interest groups, most notably the incumbent 
and the entrant. Hence, the political economy of the access pricing problem has independent 
interest as an application and an extension of the "common agency" framework, insofar as it 
involves the participation of at least two interest groups with opposed interests in at least some 
arguments of the policy vector. The model presented in Section 2.3 had one interest group and 
one policy dimension. Here, I generalize it to analyze a regulatory problem that involves two 
interest groups and two policy dimensions. I also introduce as variables the proportion of the 
population represented by each interest group. The next Subsection introduces the necessary 
additional structure on the economic side of the model.
2.4.1 The Economics of Access
The economic side follows the normative model of Armstrong et al. (1996, Section 2). The 
supply of a vital input, called access, is assumed to be monopolized by the incumbent firm, 
denoted I . Let C(qt z) be the cost incurred by I  when it supplies q units of final product to 
consumers and z units of access to the entrant, E. C\ is Vs marginal cost of providing the final 
product to consumers and C2 is Vs (direct) marginal cost of providing access to E. The entrant 
requires one unit of access from I  for each unit of final product it supplies itself. Suppose that 
if E  has a units of access it incurs an additional cost of c(a) to supply a units of final product, 
with c(0) =  0 (no fixed costs). Uniform access pricing is assumed, and the "access charge” per
17See Grout (1996, p. 128).
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unit for this input is denoted by a. The entrant is assumed to take the incumbent’s prices as 
given.
The incumbent’s price for the final product is P , and the firm must supply all residual 
consumer demand at this price and all of the entrant’s demand for access. If the access charge is 
a, in order to supply quantity a  for final output the entrant will incur a total cost fla-Hc(rr). Since 
the entrant is a price-taker, its maximum possible profit given the available margin m  =  P  — a
is
7r(m) =max: mcr — c(rr).
<7>0
If a{m) is the profit-maximizing supply of final product by the entrant then 7r'(m) =  a(m ). 
Conditions in the industry are such that cr(m) < X (P ), where X (P )  is the consumer demand 
function for the final product, for all reasonable choices of prices. Consumer surplus is v (P ), 
where v'(P) = — X (P ). The incumbent’s profit with the final price P  and margin m  =  P  — a  is
n(p,m) = P X (P ) — ma(m) -  C (X(P) — <r(m),<r(m)).
2.4.2 Regulation with Two Interest Groups
The political side extends Section 2.3 to the case of two lobbies. There are two organized 
interest groups, the owners of the incumbent firm, and the owners of the entrant. Each of them  
are a proportion a/ of the total population, where l =  I, E. The welfare of each lobby is Wi. 
Each citizen has shares in one of the two firms at most. If cq — 0 because of concentrated 
ownership, then the lobby does not take into consideration consumer surplus. 18
As in Section 2.3, the government/regulator maximizes a weighted sum of lobbies contribu­
tions and social welfare (I maintain the assumption that informed voters are a representative 
sample of the whole population), and the lobbies choose contribution schedules to maximize 
their own welfare W{ net of the money spent on contributions. Now the support th a t the two 
lobbies give to the political parties must satisfy the following constraint (the argument being
l8When the consumer surplus is not taken into account in the lobbies' objective function, it may be because of 
concentrated ownership, or because voters who own shares are myopic with respect to their investment interests 
and to their control of the firm.
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analogous to the proof of Proposition 1):
5/ >M ax 1 - 0 \V (P ,a )+ S U P ,a ) 1 -  0 1 Y(P> ,a>) +  S i , ( P !  ,a \ ) (2.11)
for j  = L ,R  and / =  ƒ, E, where S3_t is the contribution made by the other lobby to party 
h
It is assumed that these constraints are satisfied with equality. Using the analogues of (2.3) 
and (2.4), the condition for this in case that ƒ  > Oisthat tf'(uL) ( l -6 )  [U'i(P£',a il) -  ll ''/(P^,«*)] < 
1 .
The constraints (2.11) mean that the lobbies must compensate each party for what they 
forego when they choose the equilibrium policy instead of the policy they would choose in case 
they reject the support offered by lobby j . The argument is exactly the same as for Proposition 
1 of Section 2.3, with the only difference that now each lobby has to take into account the offers 
of the other lobby.
Let t’° denote the anticipated vote share for party L . The following lemma will simplify the 
computation of access and final prices in the politico-economic equilibrium.
Lem m a 4 Each party’s equilibrium platform (PJ, ai) satisfies the necessary conditions for max­
imizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfare of all interest group members and the average 
welfare of informed voters, i.e.:
# ’£/VlV,(P’,a i ) +  —^ (2.12)
1 — P
for j  =  L ,R , where =  i?(u°) and = 1 — i5(t*°).
Proof. The lobby l chooses (P /^ a f), (P /^a^), S(L, 5 /1 to maximize
=  tf(uL)lU ,(P /\af) +  [1 -  ^(vL)} W i(P ^a ? ) -  S f -  S* (2.13)
subject to the constraints that
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(2.14)Sj = M ax
P,a 1 - 0 JF(P, a) +  S^i (P , a) 1 - 0 H W ,o / )  +  5 i i(P /,a /)
for j  =  L, P  and / =  ƒ, P , where S ij is the contribution made by the other lobby to party  
J-
Let (P i(, a i f) denote the policy vector that maximizes j-^U r(P ,a )+ 5 Î / (P,fl)i i.e., the best 
that party j  could do if it were to ignore the offer from lobby l.
When lobby l gives the minimally acceptable support, it anticipates that party L  will capture 
the following fraction (which is a constant from the lobby’s point of view)
v, =  \  +  f  +  e [VK(Pf„ «£,) -  IV(P«„ a?,)] + (1 -  9) -  S*,(P-fi„«* )]
of the seats.
Substituting (2.14) into (2.13) and using the first order conditions, the platforms that max­
imize the group’s expected welfare satisfy
< P V W ,(P l,a i) + J L v W ( P ’ ,a i)  +  V 5i;(P/,a/) = 0 (2.15)
for j  = L, P , where = 0(U*) and $ R =  1 — 0(ü/).
The political parties set their platforms to maximize their share of the vote (which is th e  
same expression as in (2.3), but just replacing (p*) by (P J ,aJ), and by P>iSf). The first order 
conditions for this maximization imply
0 V W {P \a j ) +  (1  -  9)VSj (Pj ,ai) =  0 (2.16)
for j  =  L ,P , where S^(P^a^) =  E /5 /(P /,a /) .
In the equilibrium, the platforms anticipated by each lobby must be the same as those 
actually announced by the parties; i.e.
(Pi^a{) — (P J\ a J’), for l — I yE  and j  =  L ,P .
For the case of party L  the first order condition (2.16) implies:
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OV\V(PL,aL) =  - ( 1  -  6 )V S t{P L,aL) -  (1 -  0)VS!:,(PL.a L)
This can be combined with the first order conditions (2.15) of the interest groups:
tfLVlVi(P,L,a[-) -  V Sf-(P L,a L) -  V S t,(P L,aL) + V S t ,(P L,aL) =  0 
Hence, in equilibrium,
tiLV\Vi(PlL,a}‘) = V S f(P L,a L)
and similarly for party R.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, both lobbies must anticipate the same election outcome.
So vi = v° for / =  ƒ ,£ .
Hence, the conditions that the equilibrium platforms must satisfy are the ones stated in the 
Lemma. ■
It is crucial for the Lemma that support schedules must be locally truthful, i.e. af') =
aL). This means that the lobbies propose support functions that offer the parties an 
amount of marginal support for a change in policy that is equal to the marginal change in the 
lobby’s welfare experienced by the same marginal change in policy. An equilibrium in truthful 
strategies19 was proved by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to be jointly Pareto optimal for the 
principals (the lobbies) and the agent (the government) involved.
Note that the result of the Lemma is not changed if a constraint is introduced in the 
government’s problem, as long as VW (PJ, aJ) is replaced by the derivatives of the corresponding 
Lagrangean.
The weight that decision makers attach to social welfare relative to the lobbies’ support 
increases with the proportion of voters that are informed about policies, or (equivalently), with 
the extent to which they are unmotivated by electoral campaigns.
19See Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit et al. (1997) for discussions of the restriction to truthful 
strategies in common agency games, and the implications of generalizing to globally truthful strategies.
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2.4.3 R e g u la tio n  o f A ccess in  th e  P o litico -E co n o m ic  E q u ilib riu m
We solve the problem for one of the political parties (the other party's solution is equivalent, 
with the only difference that the probability of implementing its preferred policy is the comple­
mentary one). To simplify the notation. I use y =  in what follows. I focus on the optim al 
platform chosen by party L, and hence use — D. According to the lemma, final p rices 
and access prices chosen in equilibrium must satisfy the necessary conditions for the following 
maximization:
M ax W i( P ,  a) +  tW ^ P ,« )  + yH*'(P,a) (2.17)
P,a
subject to the constitutional constraint that the incumbent has to break even.
Proposition  5 In the politico-economic equilibrium, the output price and the access price are  
chosen according to the following modified Ramsey rules:
P G -  C\ 1 ’ •d [1 — Eaj] +  g"
P °  7]X [ d +  y + q
where 7]x  =  —(P /X )dX /dP  > 0 is the elasticity of demand, and
m G -  (Ci -  Ç2) _  1 q
m G ~  t)s +  7  +  g
where ijs =  (m /s)(dS/dm) is the elasticity of the entrant’s supply, and 
g is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the participation constraint.
Proof. The relevant welfare levels are as follows:
W/(P,m) =  II(P,m) +  a/i/(P)
is the welfare of the owners of the incumbent firm;
W k ( P ,  m )  =  7 r(m ) - f  a ^ f P )
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The ECPR holds if the constraint is not binding, otherwise it has to be corrected by a 
Ramsey term.
Recall tha t (r^) —► 1 for all vL > | .  Then, it can be seen that the expected access price 
will be equal or below the optimal one for a fixed level of final prices. Then excess demand 
and overconsumption of the network will follow, and negative externalities should be expected 
from too high levels of network usage. However, expected final prices can also be higher than  
the optimal ones. For a fixed level of final prices, the politically constrained access price will 
be lower than the optimal one if 7  >  0. In other words, it suffices that a minimal proportion 
of the electorate is informed for the access prices to be lower than optimal. This is because 
the pressure of both lobbies cancel each other out, but the balance is resolved by the informed 
voters, that are interested in a lower access price than the one that would result from the  
pressure of the incumbent.
The politically constrained expected prices are equivalent to the optimal only in the case 
that 7  — 0  and Ea/, = 1 , i.e. when the weight attached to social welfare is zero and when the 
owners of both the incumbent and the entrant encompass the whole population (then the costly 
joint actions of both lobbies internalize social welfare). However, the welfare of the lobbies is 
lower in the political equilibrium, because they have to pay the political contributions to reach 
the same outcome policies than the optimum.
The result that the final price is above the optimal one and hence the incumbent can 
compensate with it for the lower access price depends on it being regulated and being subject 
to the same political procedure as the access price. However, there are two important reasons 
to believe that this is not the case:
A) If it were the case that P  and a were chosen in different administrative decisions,20 it can 
be conjectured that the weight attached by the government/regulator to social welfare in the 
choice of a would be lower than in the choice of P. Recall that the weight 7  increases with the 
fraction of the voters that are informed about the policy being analyzed. Since access price is 
something not directly perceived by voters/consumers, the proportion of them that are informed 
about it is lower than the proportion informed about final prices. The latter are perceived much
20Armstrong et al. (1996) probably have intuitively this distinction in mind when they mention that it is ”of 
some practical importance to consider optimal access pricing assuming some fixed, and perhaps somewhat ad 
hoc, retail tariff which is imposed on the incumbent.”
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more directly by consumers/voters. In this context, a welfare improving constitutional decision 
would be to introduce global price-caps, by which the provision of access is incorporated in a 
basket of capped services. In this case, if the weights are appropriately chosen, the constrained 
profit maximizing choice of price structure by the firm implements Ramsey prices. Society 
would benefit from the superior knowledge of demand and technology by the firm, and this 
flexibility is highly valuable in changing industries such as telecommunications. Indeed, the 
choice of the cap level would also be vulnerable to politico-economic considerations, but the 
regulator's discretion would be much reduced. Whether policy makers are willing to give up 
such discretion is however an open question.
B) In reality, the objective of introducing entry is precisely to substitute competition for 
regulation, and hence the final price should decrease.21 Since the incumbent monopolizes the 
network, however, the access price will typically still be regulated after entry. And that is the 
main policy dilemma with liberalization: with entry, access prices should substitute for final 
prices as a source of funding for social obligations; however, the political process for access 
prices is very different from the political process before entry (which only affected final prices), 
pushing them to a level that makes social obligations (such as cheap local calls, universal service, 
etc.) difficult to sustain. If politicians want to keep social obligations alive, and at the same 
time introduce competition, this will put the incumbent’s finances under heavy difficulty. This 
is the logic behind Sidak and Spulber (1997).
There are three additional considerations to be made about the politico-economic equilib­
rium.
First, it is interesting to observe that the politico-economic equilibrium depends on the 
overall proportion of the population involved in the ownership of regulated companies (two 
companies in this case). Changing the proportions among the two firms does not change the 
equilibrium. The intuition for this is that what really matters is the proportion of the overall 
population that internalizes the consumer surplus through their lobbying actions.
Second, there is an important difference between the political economy outcome of final
21As Laffont and Tiróle (1996, p.230) argue, one of the reasons why the ECPR is no panacea is that "it 
is a partial rule as it does not specify how to determine the telephone operator’s prices on the competitive 
segments (which form the basis for the computation of the access prices)." Additionally, they insist that ”it 
makes limited sense to propose a general access pricing rule without consideration of the environment in which 
access is provided.”
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products and the political economy outcome of intermediate products (such as network access). 
On the one hand, with the two firms acting as interest groups, the best that the incumbent can  
achieve is the social welfare maximizing level of access price. Paradoxically, that is obtained 
precisely when the weight that the regulator attaches to social welfare is zero. But th e  
competition between the two lobbies for policies of opposite sign cancels each other out. As "> 
increases, m  increases and, consequently, a decreases. On the other hand, with the two firms 
acting as interest groups, the incumbent can do better than the social welfare maximizing level 
of final price, P. That is because the entrant, in its role as a lobby, is interested in a lower P  
only to the extent that the owners represent a fraction of consumers, but the entrant has much 
less interest in fighting for a lower P  than it has for fighting for a lower a.
Third, the simultaneous choice of P  and a shows that although politics and lobbying push for 
a lower access price, the incumbent can compensate that with a higher final price, in the same 
political environment. This supports the criticisms of Williamson (1996) to the proponents 
of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, in the sense that this rule assumes a benevolent 
regulatory framework, but once capture in the setting of final prices is taken into consideration, 
the ECPR will be unlikely to emerge as an efficient policy.
The fact that it is a politico-economic equilibrium that may result in too low access prices 
may not be reflected in the rhetoric of the participants in regulatory procedures. Indeed, they 
may find more appealing to use arguments such as the defence of forward looking cost based 
prices, such as Total Long Run Incremental Costs (TLRIC). It must be clear, though, that cost 
based prices are not optimal, since they do not take into account the welfare distortions due 
to differences in elasticities. In addition to this, incremental costs fail to recover any of the 
incumbent network owner’s shared costs or common costs. Because of this, it interferes with 
the incumbent’s opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on its investment or even to recover 
its investment. Although any actual policy will arbitrate imperfectly between the objectives of 
static efficiency and dynamic investment incentives, a rhetoric of fair and non-discriminatory 
access prices as opposed to Ramsey prices (probably more difficult to understand for the general 
public) is probably a convenient way to hide the lobbying game.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Private Ownership and Investment
The model presented in the previous sections may shed light on issues related to the role of 
private investment in regulated companies operating in network sectors. Some lines of future 
research that are related to this are suggested here.
Sidak and Spulber (1997, p.l) point out that failure to provide investment incentives due to 
breach of the 11regulatory contract11 may make private ownership of networks not sustainable: 
”As regulators dismantle barriers to entry and other regulatory restrictions, they must honor 
their past commitments and avoid actions that threaten to confiscate or destroy the property 
of utility investors on an unprecedented scale.’1 Incumbent telecommunications operators, for 
example, would not build local infrastructure if they expected not to be able to enjoy some 
markups when reselling or exploiting the local loops themselves. The argument is similar 
to the one made by Levy and Spiller (1996), where they point out that unless regulation is 
credible enough to overcome the hold-up problem of investment, private utilities are not a 
Pareto improvement relative to public sector ones.22
If there is no entry, a certain proportion of uninformed voters may sustain the first-best level 
of investment in the absence of regulatory commitment. This insight builds on the idea (put 
forward among others by Laffont and Tirole, 1993, chapter 11, and Armstrong and Vickers, 
1996) that some degree of capture may be necessary to alleviate underinvestment. To see this,23 
assume that there are two periods, t =  1,2. Costs have a fixed component k and a variable 
component c, and ^ - 1(P,) is the inverse demand function. Let 8 be a discount factor. The firm 
operates with exogenous profits in a first period and reaches an agreement with party L  over a 
support schedule that tries to influence the decision this party has to make over the regulated 
prices in the second period. In this second period there are two stages. In the first stage the 
firm can make an investment i that reduces fixed costs in the second stage according to the 
function ƒ(«). Then investment is chosen to maximize
22Waverman and Sirel (1997) show that European countries with public sector monopolies in telecommuni­
cations did not have accute investment problems on the eve of deregulation. The motive for privatization and 
liberalization had more to do with operating inefficiency, lack of innovation and pricing imbalances.
23This subsection is based on joint work with Paul Levine.
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the first order condition for this optimization can be written
1 =  M (vL)f'{i)
The politically constrained solution for the final prices can be written as
L(q(i)) = P(i) —c 1 [1 -  E»/] +  Q
p {i) Vx L ^ +  7 + Q
It follows that g > 0 and the firm’s participation constraint binds (II =  0) iff
¿(«*(0 ) >  TVx
$ [1 -  Ea/)
d +  7
(2.19)
where q*(i) =  and P*(i) is the solution to n (P ,i)  =  0 .
It can be now investigated what happens as the proportion of informed voters falls. If 6 =  1 , 
the case of no uninformed voters, clearly the inequality holds, since L > 0. But as 6 decreases 
(and so does 7 ), eventually the condition fails at some threshold value 9 = 9 and by the Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions g =  0 and II > 0. Then output is given by the first order condition of the  
politically constrained problem, with g = 0, from which U(q) > 0  can be calculated. Then 
investment is given by 1 =  6,d(vL) f t(i) provided that iL < — I l2 (pL(0 ) ,0 )],
a condition tha t guarantees that the local optimum is also a global optimum.
However, the same argument cannot be made if the final prices are fixed and the only policy 
decision concerns access prices. It has been shown that for a fixed level of final prices, as the 
proportion of informed voter decreases ( 7  decreases), access prices increase when the constraint 
is binding, i.e., when II = 0. Hence, in this case the change in the degree of information of the 
electorate has no impact on profits and hence does not alter the incentives of the incumbent 
to invest. When the constraint is not binding, the access price is equivalent to the ECPR, 
independently of 7 . And the ECPR has the property that it keeps the profits of the incumbent
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constant. Hence a change in the degree of information among the electorate does not change 
the incentives to undertake sunk investments. This means that the idea that some regulatory 
capture alleviates the underinvestment problem (made for example in Laffont and Tirole, 1993. 
chapter 11, and Armstrong and Vickers, 1996) does not hold when the only instrument is the 
regulation of access.
Hence, other devices that may alleviate the underinvestment problem must be used, and 
become more relevant if access price is the main regulatory instrument, in case of lack of 
regulatory commitment. One such device is the appointment of an independent regulator. The 
fact that separate telecommunications regulatory agencies have been created in 80 countries in 
the last ten years coinciding with deregulation is consistent with this argument (see Financial 
Times, 14-3-2000).
2.5.2 Equilibrium Contributions, Gains from Trade and Choice of Instru­
ments
There are two related additional differences between the political economy of final prices and 
that of access prices. First, in the former case, the lobby (the firm’s owners) captures all 
the gains from its relationship with the government. In the second case, it is the government 
that captures all the gains from its relationship with the two lobbies (the incumbent’s and the 
entrant’s investors). Second, for this reason, it can be conjectured that both lobbies prefer the 
use of more inefficient instruments (which is not the case with only one interest group). Next 
I examine each of these issues in turn.
The gains from the relationship between firms and government
From the binding constraint about the support schedule, conclusions can be derived on 
which party will capture the gains from the relationship between firms and government. Let 
( P ^ ,a i |)  denote the best that the party can do if it rejects the support from lobby l. Let 
(pj,a*) be the platform in the political equilibrium. And let (P ,a ) be the socially optimal 
platform, i.e., the one that would be chosen by a benevolent and omniscient regulator. In 
equilibrium,
e
1 - 0
w i P L ^  + s i ^ P i ^ )
e
1 - 0
W iP ^ a ^  + S i ^ P ^ a ’ )
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It can be seen from this that in case there is only the incumbent as interest group (because 
there is no entry), then { P i^ a ^ )  =  (P,a). That is because if the party rejects the offer 
from the incumbent, it can appeal only to the representative informed voters and hence i t  
maximizes social welfare. Then, Sj (P^a^)  = j 3 jU r(P,a)J -  . The incum bent
compensates the party for the political costs of deviating from the socially optimal policy, a n d  
these costs logically increase with the proportion of informed voters. Since the party rem ains 
with the same utility as with the socially optimal policy, all the gains from the relationship 
between the firm and the party (which leads them to deviate from the socially optimal policy) 
accrue to the firm.
However, if there is entry and the policy upon which the party makes a decision is access 
price, then ( p i ya?) =  (P,S), in the case that nobody is informed about regulatory policy. T hen  
the two firms have to make positive contributions to achieve what they would achieve if b o th  
of them were to refrain from giving contributions. But the prisoner’s dilemma between th e  
two firms makes this difficult to sustain, although they would both clearly prefer ex-ante to  
cooperate and avoid lobbying.
T h e  choice of instrum ents
The binding constraint on the support schedule can also be used to conjecture how the  
firms would prefer to impose the use of inefficient instruments on the regulator. If there is 
only one lobby because of lack of entry, the contribution to the party is larger, the larger the 
difference between the socially optimal outcome and the political outcome, i.e., the larger the 
deadweight loss. Hence the incumbent is interested in minimizing the deadweight loss, which is 
done with more efficient policies. However, once there is entry and the fight is for access prices, 
the contribution depends on what the rival lobby and the government can jointly achieve on 
their own. And the rival lobby and the government can jointly attain greater welfare in a policy 
regime that allows more efficient policies than in one that does not. It follows that the lobbies’ 
contributions may be higher and their net welfare lower if the political regime allows for more 
efficient instruments.
In some cases, consumer and other groups may join the firms in a powerful coalition against 
more efficient instruments. Think of a society that is divided in several groups (e.g. different 
types of consumers, each of which faces a different telephone tariff), each of them characterized
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by a different political characteristic, e.g. the distribution of swing voters. Then it can be 
shown (Persson and Tabellini. 1999. pp. 80-85) that equilibrium regulated prices are influenced 
by both the lobbying activity and the voters’ attributes: organized groups, and groups with e.g. 
more swing voters, are overrepresented in the political process.2'1
Departing from the swing voter example, regulatory policies depend on the political char­
acteristics of the groups affected by these policies, not on their economic characteristics or on 
considerations of economic efficiency.23 This may contribute to explaining the dramatic differ­
ences between countries in relative prices across products and in absolute price levels (Grout, 
1996, p. 121). Then, a change in policy instruments may imply a change in the relevant politi­
cal characteristics of the individuals, and hence a change in the size and composition of groups 
(for example, an individual may be in one group when the instrument is income taxation and 
in another group when the instrument is universal service in local telephony).
Removing cross subsidies or dealing with the stranded costs problem by more efficient 
instruments may become politically costly because of a time inconsistency problem in the polit­
ical process. Individuals will oppose changes of instruments that leave them in disadvantaged 
groups.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a model for the analysis of regulatory policy based on the ’’common 
agency*’ framework. It is a contribution to the analysis of the forces playing the modern 
regulatory game. It builds on the politicized nature of regulation, where firms exchange support 
to political parties for policy favours. First, it has shown that regulatory decisions in equilibrium 
are biased in favour of groups that are organized, and that this is so to an extent that depends 245
24 The swing-voters case can be used to explain some aspects of the timing and design of privatization programs. 
For example, Saunders and Harris (1994), in an empirical study based on survey data about the determinants 
of voting in the UK election of 1992, find that a small number of swing voters that owned shares in the recently 
privatized water and electricity companies were crucial in the unexpected Conservative victory. This suggests 
that Tory privatization policy and the regulatory package that accompanied it may have been targeted at this 
important, although small, set of swing voters.
25For example, if political parties have a transaction cost advantage in delivering favours to some specific 
groups (because they have developed over time a skill that reduces the cost of caring for them), then these 
groups become a ’’core” of supporters that counterbalance the weight of the swing voters. This effect may be 
reinforced in countries with political systems based on patronage and may explain the difficulties of removing 
the advantages faced by certain groups of consumers, investors, managers or employers.
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on the role that electoral campaigns play in an election’s outcome. Second, it has shown th a t  
network access charges in a politico-economic equilibrium may be lower than optimal ones, 
but that final prices may be higher. The determinants of the degree of departure from optim al 
policies have to do with the proportion of the population that is organized in interest groups a n d  
with the weight that governments attach to social welfare.26 If other instruments besides access 
prices are not used (and the chapter has provided endogenous reasons for why this may be th e  
case), then deregulation may substantially change the political economy of utilities and former 
incumbents may be disadvantaged. This is especially true if the only segment that is regulated 
after liberalization is the access to the network. The outcome of the politico-economic game 
shows that the effects of liberalization on the funding and sustainability of social obligations 
cannot be neglected. With liberalization, it is not only the economics of regulated industries 
that changes, but also the politics.
However, the model still has some limitations. The firms’ ownership structure is taken as 
given, whereas an important issue in modern economies is how it evolves over time. Relatedly, 
the number of organized lobbies is taken as given, whereas it would be interesting to endogenize 
it. I have mentioned as examples the role played by organized interests like incumbent and 
entrant firms. The role of other groups, such as rural, poor, industrial or commercial consumers, 
could be added to the analysis. However, most of these limitations are also shared by other 
politico-economic models, such as applications of the Median Voter theorem. These models 
have other problems that the "common agency” framework may improve upon, such as the 
attention to the role of special interests and the potential multidimensionality of policies. The 
chapter has confirmed the insight by Grossman and Helpman (1994, p. 849), tha t "producers 
of intermediates are more vulnerable politically, because the representatives of the final-goods 
producers bid vigorously against tariffs on intermediates, whereas opposition to protection on 
consumers goods is much less intense.” This must be traded off against other characteristics 
of the usual producers of intermediate goods in regulated industries that make them powerful: 
former incumbent monopolists, public sector firms, recognized brands. The next chapter shows
26The ”common agency” model applied to trade policies has been empirically tested by Goldberg and Maggi 
(1997). They find that the pattern of protection in the U.S. in 1983 is consistent with the basic predictions of the 
model. The weight of welfare in the government’s objective function is estimated to be between 50 and 88 times 
the weight of contributions. Their estimate of the fraction of the population represented in lobbies is above 90%.
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that one of these remaining advantages is the persistence of partial public ownership. However, 
as time goes by. and incumbent advantages diminish after privatization and deregulation, the 
emphasis will probably shift to the effect stressed by this chapter.
In some industries, such as telecommunications, technological forces are strong enough so 
that competition delivers its promised benefits in the long run. In the short run, however, 
and especially in industries where technological change is less intense, political constraints are 
significant obstacles for regulatory reform. This chapter has just hinted at the main forces 
behind these political constraints. More work needs to be done to explore the consequences of 
varying the assumptions on the composition of social groups and lobbies, on market structure 
and on the choice of instruments.
55
Chapter 3
The Structure of Corporate 
Ownership in Privatized Utilities
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to study the concentration of ownership in a privatized, regulated 
utility. The discussion illustrates some aspects of the costs and benefits of different corporate 
systems. Privatized utilities are large firms with professional management: there is a separation 
between ownership and control. The agency costs1 of this separation interact with the regulation 
of the product market. Although the empirical literature has already addressed this issue, this 
has not been explicitly the case in the theoretical literature.
In the model I present, a government privatizes a regulated firm and decides the proportion of 
the ownership that is allocated to a blockholder. The privatizing government has both political 
and economic objectives in mind. It anticipates that, in order for the firm to create value and 
thus increase privatization proceeds, the manager must enjoy some rents as an incentive, but 
at the same time direct her efforts to obtain positive profits for the shareholders. The exact 
terms of this trade-off between initiative and control depend on exogenous parameters that are *
Privatization decisions determine to a large extent the agency relationships inside the firm. Puzzling differ­
ences in regimes can often be observed in privatization techniques across countries, inside countries and over time. 
For example, UK regional electricity companies were floated in the stock market, whereas some rail operating 
segments in the same country were sold to private firms. Mexico sold its telecommunications incumbent both to 
a hard core dominated by national investors and to the stock market, whereas Brazil sold different parts of the 
telephone system to a number of bidders in an international tender offer.
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related to regulation or deregulation* Political objectives may yield more or less shareholder 
dispersion than the benchmark where the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. Such 
objectives are the reason for partial privatization in many countries. They are also behind the 
fact that collusion between managers and politicians emerges as an important cause of high 
dispersion. The regulatory climate is an important determinant of the political equilibrium in 
all these cases.
It may be argued that the way a company is privatized depends on the conditions of the 
financial markets of the country in which it operates.2 But it can also be argued that the form 
of financial markets is shaped by the way large firms are privatized. Public  offers in the 
form of share issue privatizations (SIPs) aim at involving small shareholders and ten d e rs  or 
asset sales aim at involving large shareholders, although many privatizations combine different 
techniques.3 The patterns that can be observed in the real world are undoubtedly a combination 
of both of these effects, as shown in Megginson et a). (2000). I will focus here on the second 
one: how privatization shapes financial markets and control systems.
The empirical work on the interaction between regulation and the relationship between 
shareholders and managers shows that regulated firms have significantly different corporate 
governance than firms in other sectors. More information from the regulatory agency has the 
effect of subsidizing monitoring. This creates scope for more dispersed shareholding and/or 
causes less need for performance related compensation for managers,4 According to Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) whether a firm does or does not belong to a regulated industry is a significant 
determinant of its control structure.5 In their empirical work based on American firms, they
aHowever, there is a wide variability in the percentage change in the number of listed domestic firms across 
countries between 1981 and 1994 according to Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996, p.18). The changes range from 
an increase of almost 100% in Switzerland to a reduction in Spain, which makes it difficult to have an accurate 
picture of each country’s "inherited” system.
3Different techniques can be used for the privatization of different tranches of the same company: British 
Petroleum used an offer for sale at a fixed price in the first tranche in 1979 and a tender in the second tranche 
in 1981. See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996, p.144). Yeaple and Moskowitz (1995) also say that most methods 
of privatization are derivatives of either public or private offers.
4In particular, Joskow et al. (1993) write: "intervention in the compensation process by well-informed and 
influential outsiders may affect the contracts between shareholders and top executives." Geddes (1997) shows, 
using data from the American electricity industry, that a significant reason for managerial turnover in that sector 
is consumer’s, and not necessarily shareholder’s, disutility.
5Cabral and Riordan (1989) analyze the diferent implications of rate-of-return and price-cap regulation for 
cost reducing investment, although they do not address the agency problems inside the regulated firm. They 
conclude that investment in cost reduction is higher under an optimal price-cap regime. However, while expected 
cost is lower under price cap regulation, the same is not necessarily true for expected price, which makes the
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show that regulated firms have more dispersed ownership structures than firms in other sectors. 
They also argue that a better "regulatory climate," i.e. an attitude by regulators favourable to  
producers, improves the control potential for blockholders and hence derives into more concen­
trated ownership structures. This second argument (which I challenge below), however, once 
empirically tested, is not robust to different specifications of the econometric model.6
The empirical work emphasizes the benefits of ownership concentration, whereas more recent 
theoretical work focuses as well on its costs, beyond those derived from inefficient risk allocation. 
One of these costs is that higher concentration reduces the room of manoeuvre for the manager 
and hence her initiative. Burkart et al. (1997) build on the difference between formal and real 
authority suggested by Aghion and Tirole (1997), to show that ownership dispersion may be a  
commitment device that encourages management to take initiatives.7 The optimal ownership 
structure trades off this ” initiative effect” with the ’’control effect” of making sure that managers 
select projects that produce positive cash flows for shareholders. The incidence of the initiative 
effect on regulated firms remains unexplored, but one may conjecture that as well as regulation 
determines the ’’control potential”, it also determines the ’’initiative potential.”
The literature on the implications of a diffuse ownership of equity goes back to Berle and 
Means (1933). The trade-offs of a d ispersed  ow nership based on the stock market8 and a 
large shareho lders  system have been well studied both from economic9 and political perspec­
tives.10 * I focus here on the trade-off between initiative and control and how privatization and 
regulation affect it. The model presented shows how deregulation may increase the optimal 
stake of the largest shareholder of a firm that is being privatized. It reflects some features of 
large firms in regulated sectors. 11
welfare effect ambiguous,
6More recent work by Kole and Lehn (1997) shows that deregulation in the airline industry has been accompa­
nied by increased ownership concentration and a more active market for corporate control, and predicts that the 
same developments will take place in the telecommunications and electricity sectors as deregulation progresses.
7See also Rajan (1992), Myers (1998), Cremer (1995), Acemoglu (1994) and Boss and Harms (1995).
8Some authors have argued that, by making investor's "exit” easier (Jensen, 1993), such a system may lead to 
breaching of implicit contracts (both those internal to the firm and those between the firm and the regulators), 
potentially leading to underinvestment, and to political opposition from losing groups.
9Burkart et al. (1997) summarize the literature on the costs and benefits of shareholder concentration. See 
also Salas (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Allen (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Dow and Gorton 
(1997), Maug (1998), Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) and Pagano et al. (1998)
10For politico-economic perspectives, see Roe (1994), Cantillo (1998), Vietor (1994).
n Roemer (1997) and Faulhaber (1997b) also address the interaction between regulation and corporate gover­
nance, but without focusing on managerial incentives. Spiegel (1994) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994) analyze
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In the setting presented below- there are three stages. First, at privatization, the government 
decides the stake of the largest shareholder. It does so to constrain the future actions of the firm 
and the regulator,* 12 anticipating their equilibrium behaviour. Following the recent empirical 
literature on privatization (see Jones et al., 1999), the government chooses the terms of the 
sale of public firms taking into account both political and economic ends. 13 In particular, 
governments trade off privatization proceeds with the achievement of various goals related to 
politicians’ or their parties self-interest (modelled as the expected vote). For example, in the 
case of the privatization programme of the Thatcher government in the UK, Newbery (2000) 
argues:
’’The fiscal constraints facing the new government were severe in the extreme -heavy deficits, 
a world recession, and manifesto commitments to increase spending on defense, pensions, the 
police, and not to cut spending in the NHS. At this point privatization emerged as an appealing 
solution from the fiscal as well as the ideological perspective.”
Second, the largest shareholder and the firm’s manager choose simultaneously a monitoring14 
and an effort level, respectively. The modelling of this stage is based on Burkart et al. (1997), 
although here managerial effort is an action that may improve the quality of the regulated 
product, whereas in their setting managerial effort is a search effort to find the real pay-offs of a 
sequence of possible projects. The optimal stake of the largest shareholder is rationalized here 
as a privatization decision, whilst in Burkart et al. (1997) it is unclear how the optimal stake 
of the largest shareholder is obtained. And, third, a regulator sets the price of the product 
or service provided by the firm. It does so taking into account the interests of investors and
how the design of financial structure can reduce regulatory risk, following the empirical work of Taggart (1985). 
For the interaction between corporate finance and industrial organization, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and 
Maksimovic (1995).
12The regulator may be the same government at a future point in time, an independent regulator, a future 
government in the same country with a different ideology, or a supranational authority. In the European Union, 
while the national governments decide on privatization, many regulatory issues depend on policies promoted by 
the European Commission. This is the case, for example, of liberalization policies in telecommunications and 
electricity.
13See Vickers (1993). Scarpa (1994) mentions as potential privatization objectives the development of the 
stock market and the promotion of popular capitalism. The literature is not conclusive, however, as to whether 
mass privatization can achieve neither of these objectives.
u There are certainly other mechanisms to discipline managers beyond monitoring, such as monetary incentives, 
takeovers, product market competition or the managerial labour market. See Nickell (1995). These other 
mechanisms are not explicitly addressed here.
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consumers, in a proportion that depends on the regulatory climate. 15
In the benchmark case where the government maximizes privatization proceeds, it is shown 
that the optimal level of concentration increases with parameters that may be associated with 
deregulation. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that ideologi­
cal motivations, consumer surplus considerations and lobbying with managers induce levels of 
shareholder dispersion that are higher than in the benchmark case. Collusion with large share­
holders, however, may yield higher concentration levels than in the benchmark. The leniency of 
the regulatory climate may still have a negative impact on the equilibrium stake of the block- 
holder, and has a negative impact on the difference between the political and the benchmark 
outcomes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I present the model. 
Section 3.3 solves the subgame where regulators and the firm’s agents interact. Section 3 .4  
presents a benchmark, where the government maximizes privatization proceeds. Section 3.5 
adds political considerations to the analysis of the equilibrium, and derives implications related 
to the role of the consumer surplus in the median class and the role of manager’s or block- 
holder’s lobbying. Section 3.6 presents a simple extension of the model. It shows that partial 
privatization may be the result of a combination of the need to have a large shareholder and 
political considerations. The related empirical evidence is discussed in Section 3 .7  and Section 
3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Firm  
Assumptions
A firm in the public sector is to be sold to private owners. This firm produces a good with 
inelastic unit demand. Let e > 0 denote an effort level that is decided by the firm’s manager, 
and p > 0  denote the regulated price of the good produced by the firm. Consumers obtain the
l5The assumption that regulated prices are fixed after the firm has already chosen its actions reflects the fact 
that adjustments of regulated prices are typically made on a much more frequent basis than firm’s strategic 
choices. This illustrates the lack of commitment as stressed in the introduction of this thesis.
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following surplus:
C S(p,e) = U (e ) -p (3.1)
where U'  > 0 .
The effort is not verifiable.
The relevant profits at the regulatory stage (the ex-post profits) that the firm’s shareholders 
may capture are:
n(p) = p -  c (3-2)
where c are the operating costs.
It is assumed that U{e) > c  for all e > 0.
Comments
Both quality enhancing or cost reducing specific investment play an important role in the 
literature on regulation (see for example Laffont and Tirole, 1993, or Spiegel, 1994). Here e is 
an effort that is undertaken by the manager. The shareholders benefit from this effort with a 
probability that depends on their monitoring effort, and on exogenous factors, as it is shown 
below.
Since the specific effort is not verifiable, its optimal level cannot be enforced neither by 
the regulator nor by the shareholders. A particularly relevant example might be idiosyncratic 
skills, possibly embodied in human capital (see Scarpa, 1994, p. 361, footnote 10). The manager 
makes a costly effort to learn on new technologies that improve service quality. Another possible 
example is that managers spend time and resources to know about complementary markets that 
improve quality through scale or scope economies. Executives develop relationships in industries 
such as broadcasting or information technology, or in distant geographic markets, in order to 
analyze potential alliances or acquisitions.
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3*2.2 P rivatization
Assumptions
The government decides the terms of the privatization.16 It captures a fraction (1 — z) of the 
surplus that private owners expect to extract from the firm. The expected benefits for all 
shareholders, V , are equal to the expected profits of the firm, £(II(p)), minus the private costs 
of monitoring, 1¿>(a), t£(ia)' > 0, where a is the monitoring effort. The expected profits will 
depend on the parameters of the interaction between shareholders and managers, in a manner 
that will be specified below.
The exact measure of dispersion or concentration used here is the stake of the largest 
shareholder, cr, 0  <  a < l . 17
The firm once privatized has two types of shareholders. One large shareholder who holds 
a proportion cr of the firm’s shares, and a continuum of infinitesimal shareholders who hold 
a proportion (1 — a). The expected value of investing in the firm for the large shareholder is 
Vf, =  <t£ ,(II(p ))— And the expected value of investing in the firm for the small shareholders 
is Vs =  (1 — £r)£(II(p)). The value of the firm for the whole shareholders is denoted by:
V = VL + VS (3.3)
The government chooses the stake of the largest shareholder to maximize a weighted sum of 
the expected vote for the party in government in the next elections and privatization proceeds. 
Let £(.) denote the expected vote that the party in the government will obtain in the next 
election.
Formally, the government chooses a  to maximize
,£ ( .)  + (1 -* )V (.)
16Yeaple and Moskowitz (1995), Schmidt (1996), Boycko et al. (1996), Megginson and Netter (2000) and 
Shirley and Walsh (2000) present some of the main issues in privatization.
17Grout and Laisney (1987), Habib (1993) and Boss and Harms (1996) use the number of shareholders as a 
measure of ownership dispersion in different contexts. The empirical measures of ownership concentration used by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) are: 1) the percentage of a firm’s outstanding common equity owned by the five largest 
shareholders; 2) the percentage of shares owned by the twenty largest shareholders, and 3) an approximation of 
a Herfindahl measure of ownership concentration.
62
The relationship between shareholder concentration, measured by the stake of the largest 
shareholder, and the expected vote, is modelled as follows.
There are two political parties. Assume that the privatizing government belongs to party R  
and the opposition belongs to party L. There are three classes of citizens: the rich, the median 
class, and the poor. The total number of citizens is N  and the total number of citizens in the 
middle class is N m. The rich always vote for party R, the poor always vote for party L, and 
there are the same number of citizens in the rich class and in the poor class. All the small 
shares are bought by the median class. There is no abstention, and hence the elections are 
decided by the median class. At privatization, the incumbent party takes the position of the 
other party as given.
Let $m denote an ex-ante bias of a median class citizen for party L. This bias, which is 
ex-ante unknown to the parties, determines the voting behaviour of the median class citizens. 
This party bias is distributed according to a uniform distribution in the interval
The function y(a i Ci) reflects an a priori ’’ideological” advantage for party R, where cr, the 
stake of the largest shareholder in the privatization, gives a quantitative measure of shareholder 
concentration, and Ci is a contribution from a lobby that has a stake in the privatization policy 
(lobbying will be further developed below, in Section 3.5). It is assumed that <  0 and
The ’’direct” utility that a median class voter derives from the privatization policy of party 
R  is:
W W  =  - ¡v - C S (< 7 ) +  (1  -  o)zV ,(o)
Let W™ denote the ’’direct” utility that a median class voter derives from the privatization 
policy of party L, which is fixed when party R  adopts its privatization platform.
The overall utility of a median class voter is defined as
Um =  k T O W  -  WJ?] +  6(j)6m, 6(j) = 1 if j  =  L  and 6(j) = 0 if j  = R .y
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where k is a parameter that measures the importance given to the policy issues relative to  
ideology.
Then a median class citizen * prefers party R  if k [tt’JpM  — IT™] > 0m, i.e., if the difference 
in favour of party R  in the utilities derived from the policy of interest is higher than the 
ideological bias. This defines a critical value 6m as:
Then all median class citizens with values of 0m less than the critical value will vote for 
party R , and all the rest for party L.
Thus, from the parties point of view there is a probability (cr) —IT™)) that a median
class citizen votes for party R, where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of 9m. Thus, 
the expected proportion of the median class that votes for party R  is F(/:(JVjp(o') — IT™)) =  
y(<T,Cl) +  £ +  * ( W W  -  W ?).'*
Hence, the privatizing government chooses the optimal stake of the largest shareholder to  
maximize
V +  ( i -  *)V M (3.4)
Comments
The stake of the largest shareholder can be chosen directly for large stakes, if the privatization 
method is a tender offer or a direct sale. Or it can be determined by rationing or appropriately 
designing the institutional tranche in a public offer for smaller stakes. Burkart et ah (1997) set 
up the value maximizing ownership structure of a firm but do not model how society may reach 
this level. Introducing a privatization process as a first stage does just that. It is obviously 
important that the government or the investment bankers working on behalf of the government 
be able to identify the appropriate large shareholder. 18 9
Monitoring has the characteristics of a public good among shareholders. Once supplied, all
18For an overview of this type of probabilistic voting models, see Persson and Tabellini (1999).
19In Stoughton and Zechner (1998), for example, it is critical that the investment banker be able to differentiate 
between large and small investors and to enforce agreements whether they are explicit or implicit.
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of them can benefit from it: there is a free-rider problem, and therefore the large shareholder 
is the only one that monitors the manager.
The parameter 7] can be interpreted as the weight on electoral concerns relative to privati­
zation proceeds. For example. 7] would be lower the higher the pressure to reduce fiscal deficit 
(for example, for those countries that were privatizing at the same time as meeting the Maas- 
trich criteria for the EMU). Also, it can be conjectured that it will be higher at the earlier 
stages of the privatization programme, when voters can be more easily impressed by the effects 
of "popular capitalism.” The parameter z, the bargaining power of private shareholders at 
privatization, is exogenous, and it is implemented through the privatization price.
The function y(.) can be further rationalized as follows. Having shares makes it cheaper, 
and at the same time more profitable, to pay attention to shareholding society issues as opposed 
to other issues. Shareholder concentration would play a similar role to a price in the demand 
for these issues as opposed to other political issues. Lower concentration increases the attention 
on ownership and shareholding issues. A median class that is more focussed on these issues 
makes it cheaper for a right wing party to ’’self’ its ideological package. Sec Riker (198G) for 
the role of issues and cleavages in politics. Another way to make it cheaper to campaign for 
the party is just to have contributions from lobby groups.
3.2.3 Manager and Shareholders 
A ssum ptions
In the regulated firm, there is a separation between ownership and control. I assume that the 
manager of the firm chooses the effort level e, which has a different effect on consumer surplus, 
on the private control benefits of the manager and on the shareholders’ profits.
Precisely, if the interests of manager and shareholders are congruent, which happens with 
probability A, then the manager gets a payoff of 6(e), with 6 ' > 0, from the investment and 
the shareholders get a payoff of II(p). However, with probability (1 — A) the manager and the 
shareholders have opposed interests, and then their payoffs depend on the monitoring activities 
of the large shareholder. This large shareholder invests a, 0 <  a < 1 , in monitoring activities. 
Then, with probability a the effort results in a payoff of II(p) for the shareholders and 0 for the 
manager, and with probability (1 — a), the effort results in a payoff of 6(e) for the manager and
65
0  for the shareholders.
The manager and the large shareholder decide simultaneously. 
The following table summarizes the payoffs in each case:
Probability Manager’s payoff Shareholders’ payoff
Congruence A 6(e) n(p)
Monitoring Unsuccessful (1 — A)(l — a) 6 (e) 0
Monitoring Successful (1 -  A )a 0 n(p)
Through product quality, the effort affects price (as it will be shown in the solution of 
the regulatory stage), and hence it potentially affects profits, with a probability A +  (1  — A)a. 
The probability that the surplus is captured by the shareholders has an exogenous component, 
namely A, and an endogenous one, namely a.
With probability (1 -  A)(l — a) the profits obtained thanks to the price fixed by the regulator 
get wasted, nobody captures them and nevertheless the manager enjoys 6 (e).
The large shareholder’s objective function is
YL = ( ( l -A)a + A)<rII(p)-ay (3.5)
where V’(a) =  a y  is the private cost of monitoring, and q > 0  is a parameter that reflects 
the exogenous cost of monitoring.
The manager’s objective function is
Vra =  ( ( l - A ) ( l - o )  +  A ) 6( e ) - 0 ^  (3 .6)
2
where is the private cost of the investment for the manager, and p  > 0  is a parameter 
that denotes exogenous factors related to this cost, reflecting the manager’s background, his 
skills or technological development. Manager and shareholders are risk neutral.20
20Other studies emphasize the costs of concentration derived from inefficient risk allocation. For example, it is 
implicit in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), as formalized by Salas (1992), that in the absence of risk sharing problems, 
ownership concentration would be as high as possible and hence one shareholder would have 100% of shares. In 
my model, optimal concentration is lower than 100% in the absence of risk sharing concerns.
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Com m ents
The separation between ownership and control is meant to capture the fact that privatized 
firms in sectors such as telecommunications or electricity are very large firms. These firms are 
complex organizations with professional management. To capture the potential incongruence 
of interests between manager and shareholders, I use a variation of the models developed by 
Burkart et al. (1997). There are two main differences between the modelling of this stage 
and the structure of their model. First, here the profits that the shareholders may obtain are 
determined by the regulation of the product market, whereas in Burkart et al. (1997) they are 
exogenous. Second, here managerial effort is an action that may improve the quality of the 
regulated product, whereas in their setting managerial effort is a search effort to find the real 
pay-offs of a sequence of possible projects.
The manager decides on effort and the shareholder decides on monitoring before knowing 
whether their interests are congruent or not. This reflects a situation where there is uncertainty 
about the future corporate governance regime or the protection of property rights in the econ­
omy. It may also reflect uncertainty about the technology or the final market structure of the 
industry.21 However, the firm makes its decisions before these issues are settled .22
A possible interpretation of b(e) is that in this case the Courts and the law prevent the 
managers from appropriating a vast amount of money such as the profits of the company, but 
cannot prevent them from enjoying the private control benefits. In Boss and Harms (1996) 
managers capture the whole profits if monitoring is unsuccessful. I find this unrealistic, at least 
in the case of large privatized utilities.
The exogenous cost of monitoring may depend on the legal environment, e.g. through the 
legal protection of shareholders’ rights, disclosure requirements, accountancy standards, etc. It 
may also depend on the industry’s environment. Supply shocks, technological change or entry 
may make monitoring harder. Firm-specific uncertainty makes it more difficult to disentangle 
the relationship between output and managerial effort from the relationship between output
2‘One may be tempted to think that this situation only holds for transition or developing economies, but the 
corporate governance regimes of Western Europe are far from settled at the begining of the year 2000 (see The 
Economist, 11/2/2000).
22It is also assumed that the uncertainty is resolved before the regulatory stage. The equilibrium price, however, 
is unchanged if the uncertainty is resolved after prices are set.
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and other factors. The parameter a may also be related to the exogenous efficiency of the large 
shareholder as a monitor.
3.2.4 Regulation 
Assumptions
The regulator chooses p to maximize
U'(p,e) = [CS(p,e)]l^[n(p)r (3.7)
where 7 , 0 < 7  < 1 , is an exogenous weight that reflects the regulatory climate.23 Following 
Spiegel (1989), this specification is consistent with a bargaining game. The parameter 7  mea­
sures the degree to which the regulator cares about the ex post profits of the firm relative to  
consumer surplus. The resulting regulated price allocates the expected social surplus accord­
ing to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for the regulatory process. The disagreement 
payoffs of both consumers and investors are set to zero.
Comments
As in Spiegel (1994), U(e) can be viewed as consumers’ willingness to pay for the firm’s output, 
over and above their next best alternative. Similarly, the firm’s disagreement payoff can be 
set equal to zero since monitoring costs or managerial investment costs are completely sunk 
and claimholders are protected by limited liability (then their disagreement payoff cannot be 
negative) . 24
This functional form is appealing because the price that maximizes the regulator’s objective 
function is a convex combination of the monopoly price and the zero-profit price, where 7  is
23Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Joskow et al. (1993) mention that investment firms sistematically rate the 
regulatory climate in which US utilities operate. The ranking is based on how much consumer or producer 
friendly regulators are in each state.
24Sutton (1986) draws the attention to the different implications that different assumptions on the disagreement 
payoffs have. In particular, the breakdown point (the option of the parties outside the negotiation) will not be 
used unless it yields a higher utility than the outcome of bargaining. Then the impasse point (or deadlock 
point, the result of delaying a resolution of the bargaining game indefinitely, which is usually normalized to zero) 
becomes the relevant disagreement payoff. See also Binmore (1998, pp. 80-82). In my model both are equivalent 
and equal to zero.
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the weight on the monopoly price.
This approach follows models of the rate-setting process as a bargaining problem between 
consumers and investors (Spulber, 1989: Besanko and Spulber. 1992). where the regulator acts 
as an arbitrator.23 It can also be interpreted as the regulator maximizing her own Cobl»-Douglas 
utility function, which would be consistent with Peltzman’s (1976) political economy model of 
rate regulation.25 6
3.2.5 Time Sequence
To summarize the sequence of events, first the government announces the stake of the largest 
shareholder in a privatization scheme designed to maximize a weighted sum of the expected vote 
and privatization proceeds. Elections are held and if the incumbent party wins again the policy 
is implemented. Second, the manager of the firm and the largest shareholder simultaneously 
choose a quality improving effort and a monitoring level. And, finally, after the uncertainty 
concerning the congruence between managers and shareholders is resolved, the regulator sets 
the price of the regulated product or service, with the objective of maximizing an objective 
function that is the result of the regulatory climate, as captured by the parameter 7 .
3.3 The Interaction between Regulation and the Firm
This section starts the analysis of the model’s equilibrium. The game is solved as usual by 
backwards induction. First, the solution of the regulatory stage is presented. Second, the 
sub-game at the firm’s level is analyzed, anticipating the regulatory outcome.
3.3.1 The Regulated Price
Maximizing the objective function of the regulator is equivalent to maximizing
25In Scarpa (1994) the agents in the bargaining game are the regulator herself (instead of the consumers) and 
the firm.
26It can be argued that it is the managers and not the shareholders who bargain at the regulatory stage. Then, 
the postulated regulator’s objective function is a strong assumption. Nevertheless, it considerably simplifies the 
analysis and makes it easier to focus on the role of managers as agents in charge of undertaking quality enhancing 
effort. And it sticks to the more traditional view that regulators take into account investors’ interests. Future 
research may focus on the delegation of regulatory bargaining to managers. See Spulber (1999) on the importance 
of delegation in bargaining.
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( 1 - 7 )  in (U(e) -  p) +  7 ln(p -  c)
The first order condition is
+ _ Y _  = 0
U ( e ) - p  p — c
Hence, since the objective function is concave in p, the optimal price as a function of the 
investment level is
p(e) =  7 Ì/(e) +  (1 -  7 )c (3.8)
The price fixed by the regulator raises with the effort level, to an extent that depends on 
the marginal effect of effort on consumer surplus. The intuition for this is that the regulator 
does not compensate the firm for past effort costs, but only for the effects of effort at the 
regulatory stage. If the effort does not play any role on consumer utility then it does not have 
any influence on the regulator. The price fixed by the regulator also increases with marginal 
costs. The intuition for this is that the regulator wants to make sure that the firm can fund its 
current expenditures.
Since ^  =  [i/(e) — c], if the utility that consumers derive from the effort is high enough, 
and marginal costs low enough, as has been assumed at the outset, then the effect of the 
producers’ weight at regulation on price is positive. Again, it is the value that consumers 
derive from managerial effort that makes it valuable for the regulator to compensate for the 
actions undertaken at the firm’s stage. Also, the lower the current expenditures of the firm, 
the cheaper it is to satisfy investors.
3.3.2 Effort and Monitoring
The large shareholder and the manager choose simultaneously a monitoring level and an in­
vestment level that determine the performance of the firm.
The large shareholder’s first order condition is:
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ît(1 -  A)IT(p) -  qq — 0 (3.9)
The second order condition holds because, by assumption, a > 0. 
Thus the optimal value of a is
_ <7(i -  A)n(p)a = ----------------
a
Substituting the solution of the regulatory stage yields the reaction function of 
shareholder:
(3.10)
the large
a = c ( l - m V ( e ) - c ) }  ( 3 n )
Hence, the monitoring level by the large shareholder increases with her stake in the firm, 
with the degree of incongruence in the interests of shareholders and manager, and it increases 
as well with the weight of investors in the regulatory process. Conversely, the monitoring level 
by the large shareholder decreases with unit cost and with the costs of monitoring.
The first order condition of the manager’s problem is
(1  -  (1  -  A)a)6'(e) -  (3e =  0 (3.12)
The second order condition holds if (1 — (1  — A)a)£>"(e) - /?  <  0. This is the case, for example 
if, as will be assumed below, b(e) is linear.
Hence, the reaction function is
e =  d  (3.13)
From this expression, it can be seen that the higher the monitoring by the large shareholder, 
the lower the managerial effort. However, the large shareholder has to monitor, because oth­
erwise he may find himself in a situation where he does not capture any profit, which would 
happen with probability (1 -  A). Hence there exists a trade-off between initiative and control.
The following proposition derives conclusions from the equilibrium in the firm’s sub-game.
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P roposition  6  In the equilibrium of the sub-game between manager and shareholders, man­
agerial effort decreases with the stake of the large shareholder if
b"(e) [a — tr(l — A)2")(t/(e) -  c)] < b'(e)rr(l — A)2"|i/'(e) 4- a*3 1 (3.14)
P roof. Substituting the reaction function of the large shareholder into the first order 
condition of the manager’s problem yields:
g ( l-A )» [7 ( ^ ) ]
a
Using the Implicit Function Theorem,
de*
dor
- b f( e ) { l -X Ÿ h (U (e ) - c ) \
6"(e) -  [y (c )«(| - >) y H I  +  v i 'M i- W W  |  _ /jl
____________ 6 '(e )(l -  A)2 [7 (t/(e) -c ) ]_____________
a 6"(e) — a(l — A) 27  {l/f(e)(U(e) — c) +  ¿/(ejt/'fe)} — a/?
Then, ^  < 0 if 6"(e) [a -  a (l  -  A)27 (£/(e) -  c)] < tr(l -  X)2^b'(e)Ur(e) + a/? ■ 
Although inequality (3.14) seems complex, it holds in a straightforward way when 6(e) is 
linear. In this case, the larger the stake of the large shareholder, the lower the managerial effort. 
However, this does not mean that the optimal level of concentration is zero, because this would 
imply no monitoring at all, and hence the shareholders would capture no profits if A > 0. It 
can be shown that the same condition for ^  <  0  holds for ^  > 0 , and hence the optimal 
level of <7 will strike a compromise between these two effects.
The analysis suggests that the equilibrium level of managerial effort could be increased 
if it were possible to manipulate some of the parameters that determine the outcome of the 
firm’s game. The government’s privatization decision allows the government to choose one 
of these parameters: the stake of the largest shareholder. By appropriately designing the 
privatization process, cr can be chosen to give the managers just the level of initiative that 
maximizes shareholders’ value.
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3.4 A Benchmark: Optimal Ownership Concentration when
the Government Maximizes Privatization Proceeds
In this section, it is assumed that 77 = z = 0 . The government places no weight on reelection 
considerations when it chooses the privatization policy, and captures all shareholders' value 
through the privatization price. The privatizing government chooses the stake of the largest 
shareholder to maximize V:
K = (A +  (1 -  A)a(o-)) b(t/(e(<r)) -  c)] -  v{a(a))
The first order condition of this problem is:
S  =  g [ A W ' +  ( l - A  h l/ 'a W ]
+ f a  K1 “  -  c) -  v ’) =  0
The first term of this expression depends on the effect of the stake of the largest share­
holder on managerial effort. The second term depends on the effect of the stake of the largest 
shareholder on monitoring. A necessary condition for an interior optimal stake of the large 
shareholder is that these two effects compensate each other in a way that depends on the 
parameters of the model.
As it can be seen in the previous first order condition, the regulatory climate, as captured by 
7 , plays a crucial role in the determination of the optimal level of shareholder’s concentration. 
The general expression of the effect of 7  on the optimal stake of the large shareholder can be 
obtained using the Implicit Function Theorem:
da* ________________ -  [eg W  +  (1 -  A)£/'q((t) +  q, ( 1  -  A)E7(e(ff))]________________
d l Coo [A7 Ul +  (1 -  A)7 t/'a(ir)] +  aoa [(1 -  A)7 (i/(e(<r)) -  c) -  if/] +  2aaca [(1 -  A)7 Ì/']
where
d l da dea dao
€a ~  da' a° = d~a' ,<W ~  Q<r
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The effects of regulatory climate on the optimal stake of the largest shareholder could have 
either sign, depending on whether the parameter values make it more valuable the control effect 
or the initiative effect. A particular case shows, however, sufficient conditions for a negative 
relationship, which is contrary to the predictions made by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), which 
took into account only the effects of regulation on the control effect. This particular case, also, 
makes it possible to analyze the privatization choice with closed-form solutions.
Hence, to make further progress, the following additional assumptions are made.
Assumptions
c = 0 (3.15)
fc(e) =  £e (3.16)
U(e) = e (3.17)
The assumption of zero marginal costs makes it possible to focus all the attention on the 
effort and monitoring costs. The function relating effort to private control benefits is linear. 
The direct utility that consumers derive from the firm’s product or service depends only on the 
effort undertaken by the firm’s manager. This simplifies the analysis in a way that is standard 
in the literature. See for example Chakravorti and Spiegel (1995). The last assumption is 
necessary to obtain interior solutions.
Proposition 7 I f  the government m axim izes privatization proceeds and under assumptions 
(3 .5)-(3.7) and (3.15)-(3.18), the equilibrium is characterized by
* =  (!-* )/% * 
a  f  7  J  +  0ot
(3.19)
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°  -  H
(3.20)
IIft (3.21)
Wiere J  =  (A -f 1) (A -  l )2, i f  =  2 ^ 7  (A -  l)2 + f a  and K  =  £7 */ +  f a
(3.22)
Proof. From (3,2) and (3.8), II =  7 e, and
a2
Vi = a<7 7 e(l — A) + A7 e — a — (3.23)
Using the First Order Condition, the reaction function is
cr7e(l -  A)
a ---------------“a
(3.24)
The manager maximizes
Vm = ( l - ( l - A ) a ) { e - / ? y (3.25)
Using the First Order Condition, the reaction function is
c -  0  “  0  ~ A)a)i
¡3 (3.26)
In the Nash Equilibrium, the large shareholder’s optimal monitoring level and the manager’s
optimal effort are as follows:
a(<r) = -------------------------- ___ _  H l - > )
0a  + a i i  -  2 o-ï î A +  <r7 i A2 ~  f a + <nt f i -  A) 2
0a  +  <t~iÇ 2<t7ÎA +  (t7 çA2 /3a  +  CT7 Î ( l - A ) 2
(3.27)
(3.28)
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Note that the optimal monitoring level increases with the stake of the large shareholder an d  
the optimal managerial effort level decreases with the stake of the large shareholder:
da
da (pa
a
+  0 7  4  -  2 c h£A +  c h £A2) 2
> 0
z-2 t 1 ~  'v ^ n4 07----------------------—------- t~2 < 0
(/3a  +  (T74 -  2(77^A +  iT7^A2) J *'
The government chooses the stake of the largest shareholder with the objective of maxi­
mizing V. At this stage, all shareholders will pay as much as they will get from their fu ture 
cash-flow rights in the firm, and, among them, the large shareholder anticipates the private 
monitoring cost of controlling the manager. Hence, the government chooses a to maximize
de
do
(3.29)
The following is obtained by replacing e in V  by its expression in a given by the FOC,
V = (a(l -  A) 4- A)7 (1 — (1 — A)a)4 
P
This expression is maximized for the following value of a:
a* = 4 7
1 -  2A + A2
247 — 447A 4- 247A2 + /3a
Assumption (3.18) ensures that 0 < a* < 1 .
Finally, o* is obtained by equating a* =  o(cr), and isolating o.
The equilibrium expressions for price and effort are obtained by substituting the equilibrium 
value of cr in (3.28) and (3.8), taking into account the assumptions made. ■
The equilibrium level of shareholder concentration is derived from the optimal level of 
monitoring, which strikes a balance between managerial initiative and shareholder control. 
This is the concentration that would be chosen by a government that maximizes privatization
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revenues.27
The following corollary derives the effects of changes in the parameters of the model on the 
optimal level of shareholder concentration:
Corollary 8  The optimal stake of the large shareholder is
i) decreasing in the weight of producers in regulation, v
ii) increasing with monitoring costs, a , and with the exogenous private costs of effort for 
the manager, (3.
Hi) decreasing unth the effect of effort on the manager’s private control benefits,
iv) increasing with the congruence of interests between manager and shareholders, X, if
2-yX ( A - l ) 2 > /3a
Proof. To simplify, the following notation is used: L — ÎÇy (A +1) (A -  l ) 2 +  /3aj , M  =
(A + 1) (A -  l)3
d<T* _  [-0^7] M ^  n
W  ~~ L > U
iv) follows from %  =  ■
Hence, the more lenient the regulatory process, the lower the optimal level of ownership 
concentration. This is con trary  to  D em setz and  Lehn’s predictions. The reason is that 
they only take into account the control effect, and their discussion deals exclusively with the 
(exogenous) costs and benefits of control. A better regulatory climate just increases the control 
potential. They do not attach any value-enhancing properties to dispersion in their informal 
presentation of the hypotheses, and hence the "initiative effect" stressed in this chapter is not 
addressed in their study. In my model, a better regulatory climate increases the commitment 
value of dispersion.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Given a high level of concentration, the large 
shareholder obtains a very high payoff if he can extract a high level of effort from the manager. 27
27An important question is whether the shareholders have any incentives to change the ownership concentration, 
once the firm has been privatized. Burkart et al. (1997, p. 707) show that the value maximizing ownership 
structure is robust to retrading. It can be shown that this insight is also valid with the modifications introduced 
here, i.e., the role of the regulatory climate and the different nature of managerial effort.
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However, managerial effort is not contractible, and the manager anticipates that with high 
concentration, monitoring is also high and his payoff from making effort is low. The large 
shareholder cannot commit not to monitor at this stage of the game, because with a high stake 
the gains from a marginal increase in the monitoring effort are high. Hence, in equilibrium the 
manager settles for a low effort level. With low levels of concentration, however, since the gains 
from monitoring for the large shareholder are lower, the manager settles for a higher effort level 
because he anticipates a lower level of monitoring. Therefore, if the shareholders are very keen 
on high effort levels from the manager, they may be interested ex-ante in committing to a low 
level of concentration, which can be done through an appropriate privatization scheme designed 
by a government interested in maximizing privatization revenue. But this interest in a low 
ownership concentration depends on the degree to which a high effort level translates into high 
profits for the shareholders. And this relationship between managerial effort and shareholders’ 
profits in this context depends on regulation. Through a lenient regulatory regime (i.e., through 
a high 7  in the regulator’s objective function), high effort translates into high profits and hence 
makes the benefits of dispersion more relevant for the equity holders.
The following explanations develop the rationale for the effect of the other exogenous vari­
ables on the optimal shareholder concentration:
a: the higher the exogenous monitoring costs (as may be the case in industries subject to 
fast technological change, such as telecommunications), the lower the level of monitoring for a 
given stake of the large shareholder. That pushes the optimal stake to higher values, in order 
to make sure that the optimal level of monitoring is achieved. 1 .
/3: the higher the private cost of effort for the manager, the less effort he makes even in the 
case of low shareholder concentration, and hence the lower the commitment value of dispersion. 
The marginal benefit of initiative relative to the marginal benefit of control decreases.28
£: the easier investment translates into higher private benefits, the higher the optimal effort 
level for the manager and hence the higher the commitment value of dispersion.
A: as congruence increases, there is less need for monitoring for a given stake of the largest
28Salas (1992) obtains the opposite result, i.e. that the optimal stake of the largest shareholder decreases with 
the managerial cost of effort. The reason for that is that higher monitoring translates into better precision for 
incentive schemes, which allows the controllers to extract a higher effort from the manager, for a given level of 
the managerial cost of effort. If the cost of effort increases, the marginal benefit of monitoring decreases. In my 
model, monetary incentive schemes play no role.
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shareholder, as long as the exogenous costs of monitoring and investing are low enough. Hence 
the commitment value of a low level of concentration decreases.
The benchmark can be interpreted as analyzing the relationship between deregulation and 
privatization techniques. Monitoring is facilitated by the degree of mandatory information 
disclosure and in general by the legal protection of outside investors. The existence of statutory 
regulatory agencies that collect information about the firm is a subsidy to the monitoring efforts 
by shareholders. If deregulation involves that these agencies disappear or their role is much 
reduced, this subsidy becomes lower and the monitoring costs increase again. If deregulation 
involves an increased level of firm specific uncertainty, it becomes more important for the firm as 
an organization to undertake the right projects with the right level of effort. The actions of the 
manager determine more of firm’s value and at the same time are more difficult to monitor.29 
Deregulation may be also associated with a less lenient regulatory climate. Incumbents are 
still regulated, but entry occurs (sometimes by technological reasons or due to supranational 
decisions beyond the control of national regulatory authorities) and reduces the level or the 
stability of the incumbent’s profits. Entry also reduces the bargaining power of the incumbent 
in the policy making game. A more competitive environment may also increase the congruence 
between managers and shareholders.30
Deregulation tilts the balance of privatization techniques in favour of concentrated owner­
ship, if the government is interested in maximizing revenues.
3.5 Privatization with Political Objectives
In general, governments take into account not only privatization proceeds, but also political 
considerations, as shown in the more general set-up presented above, in Subsection 3.2.2. How
29Part of the cost of managerial effort can also be associated with regulation, following Salas (1992). Regulation 
is a source of complementary slackness for the managers, increasing his opportunity cost of effort. Deregula­
tion should then decrease this opportunity cost. However, I conjecture that deregulation also increases other 
components of the managerial cost of effort, such as learning in new technologies, following the competitors, etc.
30If competition is introduced in some segments of the firm’s activities but not in others, shareholders may have 
an incentive to allocate their best managers to these competitive activities (managerial cross-subsidies). Laffont 
and Tirole (2000, p. 146) argue that "investment choices that jointly affect the marginal costs on competitive 
and regulated segments may be distorted towards achievement of low cost on competitive segments and high 
cost on regulated ones. Furthermore, if competitive environments provide more information about the quality of 
managers because they require more innovation on their part, the firm will overemphasize its fast-track policy of 
selecting its future top managers through the allocation of promising managers to competitive segments.”
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does politics change the optimal policy from the point of view of the privatizing government? 
To answer this question, assume now 77 > 0 and 0 < z < l .31 This means that the privatizing 
government attaches a positive weight to the expected vote relative to privatization proceeds, 
and that the bargaining power of private investors at privatization is also positive.
Inspection of the expression (3.4) helps to understand in which circumstances the addition 
of political objectives yields a level of dispersion that deviates from the level of dispersion in 
the benchmark case where the government maximizes privatization proceeds.
First, one has to consider the influence of the ideological bias, both through the direct effect 
of dispersion on it, and through the potential role of contributions from especial interests to  
influence the bias in electoral campaigns.
Second, the direct utility that median class voters derive from the privatization policy, both 
as consumers and as shareholders, must also be taken into account.
However, it can be shown that in many cases the comparative statics result that the equi­
librium level of concentration increases with deregulation still holds. For example, consider 
again the effect of the parameter 7, which denotes the bargaining power of producers at regu­
lation. This parameter reflects the leniency of the regulatory regime. It can be proved that if 
the only political consideration besides privatization proceeds is the direct ideological effect of 
dispersion on the ideological bias (i.e., 77 > 0  but k =  0  and = 0 ), then the impact of 7 on 
the equilibrium level of dispersion is negative, i.e. a negative correlation remains between the 
leniency of regulation and shareholder concentration.
3.5.1 The Role of Consumer Surplus and Shareholder Rents of M edian Class 
Voters
The literature has focused so far on the role of mass privatization as a way to further the 
interests of the voters as shareholders. However, it is apparent from equation (3.4) that although 
median class voters increase their share of profits with dispersion, the overall amount of profits 
depends on the trade-off between initiative and control. Besides, the bargaining power of private 
investors at privatization, z, has to be positive for the profits to play any role in the voting
31If 77 > 0 but 2  =  0, then the largest shareholder does not have incentives to lobby and the small shareholders 
do not take profits into account at the privatization stage, since they do not capture any rents from privatization.
L
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behaviour of median class voters.
Using the same assumptions that have been used to obtain closed form solutions for the 
benchmark case, it can be shown that consumer surplus increases with shareholder dispersion, 
to an extent that depends oil parameter q, which denotes the bargaining power of producers at 
regulation.
Recall from the previous sections that CS = £/(e(rr)) — p(<r). As in the benchmark case, 
assume U(e) =  e and c = 0. In the equilibrium of the regulation subgame, it was shown that 
the price is p* = ')tf(e) + (1  — 7 )0 . Then CS  =  t/(e(i7)) — p(a) = e(l — 7 ). And it was 
shown that if 6 (e) linear, then ^  < 0. If, for example, as it was assumed in the analysis of 
the benchmark case, 6(e) = £e, then the positive relationship between consumer surplus and 
shareholder dispersion follows.
An important implication of this is that the party that has a direct ideological disadvantage 
with dispersed shareholding may also privatize with more dispersion than the benchmark if 
the median class is large large) and the contribution of the managerial input to consumer 
surplus is important. The role of median class voters as consumers is usually neglected in the 
analysis of the political determinants of privatization.
In this case politics has a benign effect on the outcome, since the government takes into 
account consumer as well as producer surplus, and both are ingredients of social welfare. How­
ever, the following sub-section explores another effect of politics that is usually harmful for 
social welfare.
3.5.2 Collusion between Politicians and Managers or Large Shareholders
There are two obvious candidates to behave as lobbies in this model: the manager and the large 
shareholder. Both derive rents from the privatization policy, which they can use as resources 
to put pressure on the privatizing politicians, in the form o f ’’support” or ’’campaign funds” to 
have an influence in the bias of median class voters. Both cases can be motivated with real world 
examples. In the case of Russian privatization, the co-optation of insiders was a key strategy to 
make the privatization strategy politically feasible. In the privatization of telecommunications 
in Mexico, collusion between Carlos Slim, the largest shareholder in the privatized Telmex, and 
the then ruling party, PRI, was not a secret. In some other developing or transition countries,
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privatization has been tainted by corruption scandals where government agents were suspect of 
favoritism towards the agents in control of the privatized firms.32
Here I do not model lobby group formation. I consider two separate cases: either the 
privatizing government is lobbied by the manager or it is lobbied by the blockholder.
Assume that median class voters are only motivated by ideology, i.e. k = 0. And assume 
further that ^  =  0, i.e. that dispersion has no direct effect on the ideological bias. The 
ideological bias takes the form y = hCi, with h > 0, where l =  m, L. Ci are the contributions 
that either the manager or the blockholder pay to the party in government to campaign in 
order to influence the ideological bias of median class voters. Then, the privatizing government 
maximizes 77(3 +  hC\) +  (1 — z)V{a), / =  m, L. The timing of the lobbying game is as follows. 
First, the lobby (either the manager or the blockholder, depending on the case) offers the 
party in government a contribution schedule: an amount to support the party’s campaign, in 
exchange for each level of shareholder dispersion that the government approves at privatization. 
Second, the party in government either accepts the offer made by the lobby and chooses a level of 
dispersion accordingly, or rejects it and chooses the level of dispersion without funds to influence 
the bias of median class voters (equivalently, it chooses the level of dispersion to maximize 
privatization proceeds). The lobby anticipates that the incumbent party will implement its 
chosen policy with probability <^(£°):
¥>(S°)
1 if£ °  >  \  
\  otherwise
E° is the expectation that the lobby forms about the proportion of votes that the incumbent 
party obtains in the election. This expectation must be true in equilibrium. Therefore, if the 
lobbying contributions are positive in equilibrium, the lobby anticipates that the party will 
implement its chosen policy after the elections. To simplify, the following notation is introduced: 
q = ¡^=jp Assumptions (3.15)-(3.18) are maintained.
P roposition  9 I f  g is not too high, the manager lobbies the incumbent politicians and the
32Although small shareholders also have a stake in the privatization policy, it is reasonable to assume that the 
free-rider problem will prevent them from acting as an interest group and that they will exert political pressure 
through voting.
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follouing results are obtained:
i) Collusion with the manager yields a higher level of dispersion than in the benchmark case.
ii) If q is high enough, then the sign of the impact of an increase in the leniency of the 
regulatory climate on the stake of the blockholder in equilibrium, is negative.
in) The difference between the equilibrium level of dispersion and the benchmark decreases 
with the leniency of the regulatory climate, i. e. [(d[f7* -  £])/('/'))] < 0 .
Proof. The manager maximizes tp{f£P)Vm ~CmA where Vm =  ((1 — A)(l —n(ir))H-A)i»(e(rr)) — 
{3^Y~. The payoff of the government if it rejects the offer is +  (1 -z)V (a * ). where a * is the 
stake of the blockholder that maximizes the government's objective function in the absence of 
lobbying contributions, or, equivalently, the stake that maximizes privatization proceeds. The 
payoff of the government if it accepts the offer is r/(| + hCm) + ( l —z)V(o). Hence, the condition 
for accepting the offer is 77(3 + hCm) +  (1  — z)V(a) > +  (1 — z)V(a*). Or, equivalently,
Cm >q[V(<r*)-V(a)\
This constraint is satisfied with equality because once lobbying contributions are positive, 
their effect on the probability that the incumbent party will implement its policy remains 
unchanged (this probability is always 1 as long as contributions are positive). Hence, the 
marginal benefit of an increase in the contribution beyond that needed to influence the policy 
of the incumbent party is 0, whereas the marginal cost is 1 . Let a denote the equilibrium level 
of the blockholder’s stake when it accepts the contribution from the manager. Then, if the 
contribution is positive, replacing the contribution in the objective function of the manager by 
its expression in the constraint:
a  =argmax Vm((r) +  1 , - V (a ) =  /3a—  ^ J
qh K } ç7 b £ ( A + l ) ( A - l ) ^  +  /?a]
If the manager decides not to lobby the government (Cm = 0) then  ^ and she
obtains jV W O . Hence, the condition for the contribution being positive is then Vm(^) “  
g[V(a‘) -  V(B)\ > l v m{0'). Then, Cm > 0 if q < [(Vm(S) - \V m{o’)) / (V (a ') -  Via))}- 
The other results in the proposition are obtained as follows:
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^ a * ** r)bi(A+l)(A-iy-i+(3a] >
ii) [(dir) /  (d->)] = ~ ' The si§n of this expression is deter­
mined by the sign of the numerator, 2^^ (A +  1) (A — 1) 2 +<?7 2 (A -l-1) (A — l ) 3 -f $a. From this, 
[(da) /  (dy)] <  0 if (A +  1) (A -  l ) 2 +  0a < qy2 (A +  1)(1 -  A)3, i.e. if -
27^ (A +  1) (A — l ) 2 +  pa  
7 2 (A + 1) (1 — A)3
iii)[(d[iT* -ff])/(d 7 )] = [^+7g(A+l)(A-li2] + ^ (A-Hi(A-l)217?72[7i(A+l)(A-l)2+J9a]‘ < 0
It is common to refer to privatization strategies such as mass privatization as a mechanism to  
influence the voting behaviour of the population in the future. The conventional wisdom prevails 
that share ownership by a high number of voters will constrain future governments to investment 
friendly policies,33 However, the proposition shows the possibility of a different channel for the 
outcome that mass privatization is politically desirable. It may be not so much the direct 
utility of individual citizens, but the lobbying behaviour of managers that pushes governments 
to privatize with a very high level of shareholder dispersion. Massive share ownership may be 
the outcome for reasons other than constraining the regulator to investment-friendly policies. 
This is consistent with the proliferation of golden shares, poison pills or constraints to political 
rights of shareholders, in the privatized utilities of countries such as Spain, Italy or France.34
Interestingly, also in this case a negative relationship between regulatory climate and share­
holding dispersion may still be obtained, contrary to the predictions of Demstetz and Lehn 
(1985). The condition for this is that the value that politicians attach to privatization proceeds 
be not too low. When the weight of the privatization proceeds in the politicians objective func­
tion is very low, then the equilibrium level of dispersion is so high due to manager’s lobbying 
that any improvement in the profitability increases the equilibrium stake of the largest share­
holder. Hence, there is a range of values of q for which the manager lobbies and the relationship 
between the equilibrium stake and the leniency of the regulatory climate is negative.
And the regulatory climate has also an impact on the deviation from the benchmark case.
33This is an argument usually put forward by the political economy literature in favour of mass privatization 
in transition economies. See Biais and Perot ti (1997) and Schmidt (1997).
34It is also consistent with the existence of serious corporate governance problems in recently privatized utilities 
(see Chapter 4 below and Thompson, 1999).
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The better the regulatory climate for the investors, the lower the deviation from the bench­
mark. A more lenient regulatory climate, by increasing the size of the profits, narrows the gap 
between the lobbying outcome and the benchmark where the government maximizes privatiza­
tion proceeds. The reason for this is that as the regulatory climate improves for the firm, the 
commitment value of dispersion increases, and both managers and shareholders benefit from 
high dispersion. On the contrary, a tougher regulatory climate for the firm makes concentration 
more valuable for shareholders but not for managers, and hence increases the deviation, yielding 
shareholding structures in the political equilibrium that are farther away from the shareholder 
value maximizing ones.
However, lobbying by the managers is not the only possible source of especial interest 
politics. If instead it is the large shareholder who lobbies the government, then the level 
of shareholder concentration is pushed upwards. In this case, the political survival of the 
government encourages high concentration levels. The following proposition develops this case.
P roposition  1 0  I f  q is not too high, then the blockholder lobbies the incumbent politicians. In 
this case, a sufficient condition for the equilibrium level of shareholder dispersion being lower 
than the benchmark is that the proportion of the privatized firm ’s surplus captured by the private
investors is high enough and the regulatory climate is lenient enough:
z >  1 - 1(A -  1)27'£
and 7 > (1 -  A) — Xzrjhpa
< A -1)3 £ ( * - 1)
Proof. The large shareholder maximizes — Cl , where Vi — ((1 — A)a(cr) +
A)irll(p) -  a ^ - .  The payoff of the government if it rejects the offer is rf\ +  (1  -  z)K(ir*), 
where a* is the stake of the blockholder that maximizes the government’s objective function in 
the absence of lobbying contributions. The payoff of the government if it accepts the offer is 
■q(\ + hC l ) + (1 -  z ) V { o ) .  Hence, the condition for accepting the offer is 77(3 -f /iCl) +  (1 -  
z ) V ( o )  >  r } \  +  (1 — z ) V ( o * ) .  Or, equivalently,
CL > q [ V { < r ' ) - V { o ) \
This constraint is satisfied with equality because once lobbying contributions are positive,
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their effect on the probability that the incumbent party will implement its policy remains 
unchanged (this probability is always 1 as long as contributions are positive). Hence, the 
marginal benefit of an increase in the contribution beyond that needed to influence the policy 
of the incumbent party is 0 , whereas the marginal cost is 1 .
Let a denote the equilibrium level of the blockholders stake when the politicians accept the 
contribution. Thus, if the contribution is positive, replacing the contribution in the objective 
function of the blockholder by its expression in the constraint,
J — 2
a  =  argmax z Vl ((t ) H------r—K(ît)
a
~ ¡3a-
XzTfhpa +  (A — l ) 3 £7 ( 2  — 1) *7
(1  -  z) [(A -  1)2j3a +  (A +  1)(A -  1)4£t1 -  ^h /3 a  (A +  1) (A -  1 )'
If the blockholder decides not to lobby the government (C i = 0) then v?(E°) =   ^ and she 
obtains 5 zVl {<7*). Hence, the condition for the contribution being positive is then zVl (Ît) — 
?[V(<7*) -  V(5)] > \ zVl (<t') . Then, Cl > 0 if ? <  * {{Vm(S) -  £Vm(ir*)) /  (V(<r*) -  V(S))].
~  ( I-A ) f la  a _____________ À3J7/iffat+(A-l)3g 7 (z - l )______________
If the denominator of o is lower than the denominator of a *, then a sufficient condition for 
a being higher than a* is that the numerator of the former not be lower than the numerator of 
the latter. If z  >  1 — fx r ip ^ i ^ en the denominator of a  is smaller than the denominator of 
a*. Then for the numerator of a to be larger than the numerator of <r*, a sufficient condition is
(1 — A) — Xzrjhfia
7 -  ( A - 1)3 {(2 - 1)
If the bargaining power of the government at privatization is not too high, so that the 
blockholder derives substantial rents from privatization, lobbying by the blockholder happens 
in equilibrium and may yield a higher level of shareholder concentration than the benchmark. 
A sufficient condition for this is that the regulatory climate be sufficiently benign for private 
investors, so that the profits to be derived from a larger stake are high enough, and that private 
investors capture a sufficient proportion of the firm’s value through the privatization price. The
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difference in the interests of the blockholder and shareholder value as a whole is twofold: one 
the one hand, the blockholder directly increases his rents as his stake increases: on the other 
hand, only the blockholder monitors. In equilibrium, the direct effect for the blockholder of 
a larger stake dominates the costs in terms of lower managerial effort. Then the rents of the 
blockholder increase when his stake is larger than the one that maximizes shareholder proceeds. 
And the incentives for lobbying increase with the profitability of the investment, which depend 
on the privatization price and the regulatory climate.
Notice that the degree of deviation from the benchmark, both in the case of managerial 
lobbying and in the case of blockholder’s lobbying, depends on parameters 77, h and z. The 
higher the value of these parameters, the more the equilibrium policy will be biased in favour 
of each of the pressure groups.
The equilibrium level of dispersion will be closer to the benchmark as the weight on political 
considerations relative to privatization proceeds, 77, diminishes. This reflects that if the priority 
is to obtain revenues, the politicians will be less interested in lobbying contributions to obtain 
political advantage.
The equilibrium level of dispersion will also be closer to the benchmark if the bargaining 
power of private investors at privatization, z, is low. This will reduce the available rents that 
the blockholder extracts and that can be used to lobby the politicians, and increase the interest 
of the government in revenues both in the case that the blockholder lobbies and in the case 
that the manager lobbies.
Finally, the equilibrium level of dispersion will be closer to the benchmark if the effect of 
contributions on the ideological bias of median class voters, h> is low. The intuition for this is 
that if median class voters are not very responsive to money spent on convincing them, then 
the political value of this money decreases,
3.6 Extension: The Identity of the Large Shareholder and Par­
tial Privatization
This section extends the model in the case that 77 = z = 0 to show that partial privatization 
may arise as a combination of efficiency considerations and political strategies. Both motives
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for keeping the government as the blockholder have been analyzed separately in the literature 
(see Perotti, 1995; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, respectively) . 30
In addition to the set-up introduced in Section 3.2. 1 assume that the government can choose 
between staying as the large shareholder of the company or selling the largest stake of the firm 
to a private strategic investor. The problem that the privatizing government solves consists of 
choosing the optimal a as in the previous sections for two different potential large shareholders, 
and then choosing in the first place the one with which it obtains a highest payoff. These two 
potential blockholders are the government itself and a private strategic investor. The other 
shareholders are assumed to be atomistic as in the previous sections, regardless of the identity 
of the large shareholder. The two possible blockholders differ in their efficiency as monitors. If 
the government stays as a large shareholder it can obtain direct benefits of control35 6 in addition 
to the profits of the firm, for example in terms of votes and patronage.
The private shareholder can also derive private control benefits, which do not benefit the 
small shareholders. In both cases, the control benefits are independent of the exact proportion 
of shares held by the blockholder, and are assumed not to interfere with the cash flows of the 
firm.
Let cue denote the exogenous monitoring costs if the government is the largest shareholder, 
and ap  the exogenous monitoring cost if the largest shareholder is a private strategic investor. 
Let B e  denote the control benefits if the government stays as the largest shareholder and Bp  
the control benefits of the private strategic shareholder. These parameters will typically vary 
across countries, depending on the political system, the constraints on cross shareholdings, the 
characteristics of the financial system, etc .37
Let a* (a*), i =  G, P, be the optimal stake of the largest shareholder, which is the equi­
librium of the model presented in the previous section. Then the expected payoff for the
35The choice of partial or full privatization does not exhaust the description of all possible options available for 
the structure of corporate ownership in a privatized utility. Trujillo et al. (1998) have analyzed the possibility 
of unbundling the financial and operational responsibilities in an infrastructure project. The water regulator in 
the UK has recently considered the possibility of allowing non-profit debt financed firms to own infrastructure 
assets. For the strategic advantages of non-profit firms, see Besley and Ghatak (2000).
36Jones et al. (1999) show that in practice governments introduce control restrictions after privatization for 
political reasons.
37It is assumed that different countries will have different private strategic investors available. These may be a 
consortia of private investors, a foreign group, banks, pension funds, another utility, etc. All of these may differ 
in terms of monitoring efficiency and the private benefits that can obtain from the firm’s control.
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government under partial public ownership, Vc, has three components:
1) the revenues from the public offer to sell shares to the small shareholders, equal to
( 1 -¿ r* )[(l -  A)a(cr* (a<?),ac) +  A ) n ( p f e(<7* (Qc ))):
2 ) a proportion of the expected profits of the firm minus monitoring costs, equal to
a* [(1 -  A)a(<r* ( a c ) , Qg ) +  A] n(p, e(a* (q g )))  -  y ' - ;
and 3) the "political” control benefits Be- Adding these three terms,
Vg =  [(1 -  A)a(<r* (q g ) , q g ) +  A] II(p, e(<r* (q g ))) +  B e  -  Qg
[a(a* (aG) , Qg ))2 
2 (3.30)
The expected payoff for the government if it sells the largest stake to a private strategic 
investor, Vp, has two components:
1 ) the revenues from the public offer to sell shares to the small shareholders, equal to
(1 _  ff-) [(i _  x)a(a* (aP) , aP) +  A] II(p,e(ff* (q p )));
2) the revenues from selling a stake to the strategic investor. The government has all 
bargaining power at privatization and hence can extract all the surplus expected by the large 
shareholder. This expected surplus has two parts: a proportion of the expected profits of the 
firm minus monitoring costs, equal to
[{1 -  A)a(a* ( M  , Qp) +  A]II(p,e(cr* (o p ))) -  Q p N g ' W ' a f ) f .
and the private control benefits Bp. Adding these terms:
Vp =  [(1 -  A)a(ir* (a p ) , Qp) +  A] II(p, e(a* (ap))) +  BP — a P [q(<t* (a p ),Q p )]2 
2 (3.31)
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Let A denote the difference between the "political" control benefits and the control benefits 
that can be obtained by the private strategic investor, i.e. (B p  -  Be) =  A.
I will focus attention on the interaction between monitoring efficiency, control benefits and 
regulatory climate, making simplifying assumptions about the other parameters. Proposition 
11 and Corollary 12 show the results.
P roposition  11 With A =  0 , /3 = £ =  1 . partial public ownership is prefcnv.d if
7 72 +  7qg 1 7
2
7 7 2 +  q a P _ 1 7
2y -f ctQ 2  7  +  a G 2 ° ° 2 7  +  a G 2 7  + ap 2q +  a P 2 .2q p
(3.32)
Proof. With A = 0, /? =  f  =  1,
7 +  c*i
This is substituted in the expected payoffs of the government under each regime, i.e. (3.31) 
and (3.32), and the inequality in the proposition follows. ■
The preferred regime depends on a comparison of the monitoring efficiency of both large 
shareholders (the government and a private investor) and a comparison between the ’’political” 
benefits that the government may obtain under partial public ownership and the control benefits 
that a private strategic investor may obtain. Corollary 12 follows immediately from the previous 
proposition’s inequality:
Corollary 1 2  I f  7  = 0 and A < 0, then a regime with partial public ownership always domi­
nates a regime with a private strategic investor, i.e. Vq > Vp . In particular, this holds true 
for any value of a c  and ap .
No matter what is the differential efficiency as monitors of public versus private owners, 
if the regulatory climate is completely unfavourable to producers then if the political control 
benefits are higher than the private control benefits, partial public ownership is always preferred 
to a private strategic investor.
This formalizes the idea that a successful privatization must guarantee a positive return 
to investors. Levy and Spiller (1994) compare utilities’ privatization and regulatory regimes
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in several countries and conclude that different successful privatizations may have a number 
of institutional differences, but have in common that they are able to commit to a relatively 
lenient regulatory regime.
As liberalization progresses the private sector will be dominant in network industries be­
cause the costs (political and economic) of nationalizing entrants are much higher than the 
costs (political and economic) of keeping incumbents in the public sector (at least partially). 
As reflected in the previous exposition by parameter Bq , incumbents will typically have well en­
trenched interest groups associated to public ownership that will try to block full privatization. 
Entrants, however, will typically not have interest groups associated claiming for nationaliza­
tion. Nevertheless, for the reasons presented above it should not be surprising that incumbents 
under government control still play an important role in these changing industries.38
3.7 Empirical Evidence
The following empirical implications emerge from the previous model: 1) we should expect 
blocks of limited size in the ownership of privatized utilities; 2 ) wre should expect the type of 
privatization of utilities to evolve over time in accordance to the evolution of the parameters 
of the model, i.e. deregulation leading to higher shareholder concentration; 3) In some cases 
political and economic considerations may lead to partial privatization.39 The second prediction 
is related to one of the findings of the literature on takeovers and industry effects, namely that
380ther theories may also help explain the preference for partial privatization. Perotti (1995) points out that 
by keeping a stake of the firm, the government signals to private investors its commitment to policies that are 
favourable to investors. Bhagat et al. (1990) argue that concentrated ownership after takeovers may be only 
one step towards a restructuring of the firm through the reselling of some assets, leading to a new corporate 
specialization with new entities that, again, have a dispersed ownership. Both theories are consistent with an idea 
of partial privatization or concentrated ownership as a temporary stage. Neither of them is incompatible with 
the model presented above, by which some parameters loosely related to deregulation make full privatization 
through a dispersed shareholding a sub-optimal strategy. Whether and how governments that have partially 
privatized their utilities will eventually transfer their stakes to the private sector remains an open issue.
39If risk concentration is added as a concern for the privatizing government, a corollary follows these empirical 
implications. Given the size of firms in the utilities sector, single institutional investors that have smaller costs of 
underdiversification than individual shareholders should have high control of utilities. These single institutional 
investors may be governments themselves (partial privatization or sale to foreign state owned firms) or banks. 
Hence, except for the possible role of banks or other financial intermediaries, deregulation would not be a trigger 
for full privatization. In fact, by increasing the optimal size of the largest shareholder, it may make full sale to 
the private sector more difficult. A concern against wealth or power concentration in private hands would have 
the same effect.
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deregulation is a significant factor explaining mergers and tender offers across industries.40 This 
similarity of results should not be surprising, since a takeover implies an increase of shareholder 
concentration.
It is certainly too early in the privatization process of many countries to undertake an 
exhaustive statistical analysis of these predictions, but evidence can be provided to strengthen 
some of the points made above.
Megginson et al. (2000) analyze the determinants of the choice between share issue and 
asset sale at privatization for a sample of 1992 privatizations between 1977 and 1998, The 
evidence they present is consistent with the idea that governments have been increasingly in­
clined to privatize through asset sales yielding concentrated shareholding.41 They show: 1) that 
governments are more likely to relinquish majority ownership through asset sales; 2 ) that asset 
sales have become larger and more numerous over time; 3) that strategic industries are more 
associated with asset sales in less developed countries; and 4) that share issue privatizations are 
positively related to the size of the firm and to its profitability. Although they do not distin­
guish between total and partial privatizations and they do not include the regulatory climate as 
an explanatory variable (which are important ingredients of the model presented above), their 
results are consistent with the main idea here, namely that total privatization with a very dis­
persed shareholding is a very extreme and unlikely case. Interestingly, they report that ’’prior 
to the 1990s, asset sales accounted for 38% of the privatizations in the number of transactions 
and 8 % of the assets privatized. In the 1990’s, these numbers changed dramatically, with assets 
sales accounting for 64% of the transactions and 38% of the privatized assets.”
These results can be interpreted using the tools of the model presented above. The fact 
that asset sales have increased as a proportion over time is consistent with a tougher regu­
latory climate that has decreased profitability, at least in the case of regulated firms. Share
40 See for example Mitchell and Mulherin (1996).
41 In a previous study, the same authors were providing arguments as to why governments were supposedly 
increasingly privatizing via share offerings (see Megginson and Netter, 1997) . They made the following claims: 
1)” Public offers are the only practical method of selling off the very largest state owned firms, from both an 
operational and a financial perspective.” 2)” A public share offering is by far the most transparent method of 
selling corporate assets.” 3)"Governments have realized that they can modify the share allocation, pricing, and 
other terms of a public share offering to achieve political -as well as economic- objectives."4)"Public offers aimed 
(at least partly) at domestic investors have vastly increased the total capitalisation and trading volume of almost 
every major non-US stock market.”
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issue privatizations increasing with the profitability of the firms is consistent with more lenient 
regulation favouring the "initiative effect"’ on managerial effort.
Two reasons emerge for why strategic industries are more associated with asset sales in 
developing countries. First, in these societies the size of the median class is small, which reduces 
the political pressure for a dispersed ownership to increase consumer surplus. Second, these 
societies lack a managerial class that can make a significant contribution to product quality or 
that are politically strong enough to collude with politicians (note that transition economies 
do have such a class, which would favour mass privatization).
Since the privatization of BT in 1984 it has become a standard prescription to privatize a 
large telecommunications or electricity firm by means of a public offer. This would promote 
popular capitalism and facilitate regulation through the information provided by the stock price. 
According to the conventional wisdom, a privatized utility should be a public company based 
on the anglo-saxon model. Some large scale public offers, which were publicized as the largest 
in history in each country or even in Europe (such as Endesa in Spain or Enel in Italy) have 
contributed to the image that privatizations through public offers are the best option available, 
and that privatized utilities should normally have dispersed shareholdings. However, data on 
privatization techniques of electricity companies and a description of ownership structures of 
telecommunications incumbents in important European countries give quite another picture. In 
many cases, it turns out that public offers have been a complement to partial state ownership, 
so that the resulting companies can best be described as companies with a large blockholder, 
the blockholder being the government itself.
Out of seventeen countries analyzed by Bortolotti et al. (1999), only four have fully pri­
vatized their electricity firms to create a broadly dispersed shareholding. Out of these four, 
the English Regional Electricity Companies in the distribution sector were taken over after the 
British government lifted the golden share in 1995; and in Spain, another one of these four 
countries, the government has a 10  year golden share on the fully privatized and broadly held 
Endesa.
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3.7.1 The Privatization of Telecommunications Incumbents
Megginson et al. (2000) also report that telecommunications predominate among share issue 
privatizations (SIPs), representing 41% of the assets sold through SIPs (while being only 12.3% 
of the value sold through asset sales). Using the model presented above, a possible interpretation 
is that this is the case because the role of quality improving managerial effort is very important 
in an industry subject to technological change, and this more than compensates the effect 
of increasing firm-specific uncertainty. However, another explanation is that many of these 
SIPs keep the state as the largest shareholder. This is something that cannot be confirmed in 
Megginson et al. (2000), because they do not distinguish between total and partial privatization 
(this may also partly explain why larger firms in the sample favour SIPs; as a matter of fact, 
they find that governments are more likely to relinquish majority ownership through asset 
sales). Data from European incumbents seems to confirm this hypothesis.
In many countries, the privatization of stakes in telecommunications firms has taken place 
before electricity privatization. Hence, one would expect that telecoms privatization is basically 
a finished process in most countries. However, inspection of the reality in most Wetern European 
countries shows that, at the beginning of 2 0 0 0 , most of them still have the government as the 
controlling shareholder.
The following table summarizes the situation for fourteen countries in Western Europe. 
Most of these countries liberalized their telecommunications services in 1998, following the 
decisions of the European Union.
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O w nersh ip  S tru c tu re  in E u ro p ean  Telecom m unications Incum bents
P artia lly  P rivatized D ispersed Ownership C oncen tra ted  O w nership
Portugal Telecom (Portugal) 
France Telecom (France) 
Deutsche Telekom (Germany) 
Austria Telekom (Austria)
KPN (Netherlands) British Telecom (UK) Telecom Italia (Italy)
Telenor (Norway) 
Telia (Sweden) 
Swisscom (Switzerland) 
OTE (Greece) 
Sonera (Finland)
Telefonica (Spain) Telecom Eireann (Ireland)
Source: Financial Times Database
Most of the firms in which the government has the control have partially privatized the 
companies through public offers (most of them in the second half of the nineties), but the 
government still has a stake large enough to appoint the chief executive. Two companies have 
a fully privatized and broadly held shareholding. However, there are many differences among 
them. BT was privatized in 1984, a time of economic expansion in the business cycle (see 
Martin and Parker, 1997), and facing the prospect of a stable market share due to the British 
duopoly policy. Telefonica was fully privatized in 1996, when the telecommunications sector 
was already facing immediate liberalization and much faster technological change.42 Only two 
companies have a fully private ownership and a blockholder of large size.43
It is remarkable that at the end of the nineties, after very significant public finance pressure 
(especially acute in some countries due to the creation of the single European currency), privati-
42Although at the time of the last privatization tranche Telefonica had a ’’hard core” of shareholders (two 
banks and one savings bank each holding 5% of the shares), the new management took steps to ensure it would 
have a large margin of manoeuvre. See Bel and THllas (1999). The largest shareholder has become BBVA in 
February 2000. It reached 10% of shares but did not have the power to appoint the Chairman or CEO. The 
Spanish government holds since 1996 a ten year golden share on Telefonica.
43The controlling investor in TI is Olivetti after the takeover in March 1999 and the largest shareholder in 
Telecom Eireann is KPN of the Netherlands (itself under the control of the Dutch government, which holds 44% 
of the company’s stock).
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zation waves, and deregulation, most important countries in Europe still keep their telecommu­
nications incumbents under state control. A plausible conjecture is that a sizeable controlling 
block maximizes the value of the company, and that selling such a block to a single private share­
holder would raise important issues of risk and wealth concentration (possibly in the hands of 
foreign investors). Also, the state may keep the valuable real option of selling at a future 
date when the value of the exogenous parameters may make the choice of a broader ownership 
more desirable. But at the end of the nineties deregulation may have influenced the value of 
parameters such as monitoring costs, regulatory climate or congruence between manager and 
shareholders in such a way that dispersion has become a suboptimal strategy.
3.8 Conclusion
Privatizing governments may value shareholder dispersion for a number of reasons. A broadly 
held company may have a positive effect on managerial initiative, and there may also be political 
advantages of dispersion. The extent to which dispersion is ex-ante an efficient commitment 
device that increases the value for investors depends on exogenous parameters that may be 
generally related to the state of deregulation. High levels of firm specific uncertainty due to 
deregulation make ownership concentration more desirable, under some conditions. That is 
because a tougher regulatory climate, higher monitoring costs and better alignment between 
manager and shareholders may reduce the commitment value of dispersion.
Political objectives may yield more or less shareholder dispersion than the benchmark where 
the government maximizes shareholder proceeds. More dispersion may be caused by three fac­
tors: a direct ideological effect of dispersion on the median class bias in favour of the incumbent 
government; the impact of managerial effort on the consumer surplus of median class voters; 
and collusion between politicians and managers. Less dispersion may be caused by collusion 
between politicians and blockholders. Partial privatization may follow if the political costs of 
selling the optimal largest stake to a private blockholder are too high. The regulatory climate 
is an important determinant of the political equilibrium in all these cases.
The fact that there are very few regulated firms that have been fully privatized in the 
nineties by means of public offers is consistent with the model presented. There are available
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options other than full privatization through public offers, such as selling the firm to strategic 
investors; keeping the firm temporarily in the public sector; or breaking it up and privatizing 
each segment differently.44
Some authors argue that the terms of a privatization can be chosen to promote the devel­
opment of stock markets (see Jones et al., 1999). It may be conjectured that there are better 
instruments to achieve the objective of a more efficient stock market. Tirole (1991) argues con­
vincingly that the order of priorities should be the opposite: first develop the stock market , and 
next base privatizations on it .45 Recent takeovers of quoted privatized firms in Latin American 
countries have substantially reduced the liquidity of their stock markets, which shows that share 
issue privatization does not necessarily yield a developed local stock market after some time .46
An important topic that is left for future theoretical research is the role of the control market 
in constraining the political equilibrium. Burkart et al. (1997) show that, although an increase 
in the blockholder’s stake would be ex-post beneficial, the optimal ownership structure is robust 
to retrading due to the free-riding problem among small shareholders.47 A similar argument 
could be made to show that it is robust to takeovers. In their basic model they do not allow for 
the possibility of changes in the management of the firm nor for the existence of private control 
benefits for the blockholder.48 The integration of these important issues in a political economy 
model would shed light on the role of privatized firms as bidders or targets in the market for 
corporate control.
44Joskow and Schmalensee (1995) argue that political and information constraints may preclude widespread 
fine tuning of the existing industrial hierarchies prior to privatization.
4SFulghieri and Zingales (1998) favour dispersed shareholding in the long run, but in the short run, and until 
legislation that protects small investors is introduced, they favour the presence of strategic investors.
46The clearest example is the bid by Spanish Telefonica to acquire 100% of most of its American subsidiaries 
in January 2000.
47The literature on takeovers is inconclusive about the issue of whether the free-rider problem among small 
shareholders is enough to prevent efficient takeovers from happening. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that 
takeovers will not take place in equilibrium if shareholders are infinitesimal and have complete information 
about the raider’s value. Yilmaz (1999) shows that takeovers do take place in equilibrium if there is incomplete 
information about the raider’s value, and shareholders have the opportunity to vote for the raider as manager 
even if her takeover fails. On the other hand, takeovers in regulated sectors have additional problems that make 
them more costly and protracted (see below, Chapter 4).
48For the role of private benefits in control transactions and posttakeover moral hazard, see Burkart et al. 
(1998 and 2000).
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Chapter 4
The Takeover of Enersis by Endesa: 
the Control of Privatized Utilities
4.1 Introduction
The acquisition of the 32 per cent of Chilean Enersis by Spanish Endesa in 1997 and of another 
32 per cent in early 1999 illustrates the specific features tha t characterize the control market 
in sectors that experience regulatory reform. A firm with a majority of state ownership at 
the beginning of the events studied here, and that was in the process of being privatized, took 
over a fully privatized utility. The analysis suggests that the transaction did not create value 
for the shareholders involved. It is an example of the free cash flow theory: when there are 
no positive net present value projects available to the manager, he may waste the available 
resources instead of giving them back to investors. More than correcting a managerial problem 
in the target firm, the case shows an agency problem in the bidding firm.
Endesa, 1 the largest electricity company in Spain, initially expected to take control of En­
ersis, the dominant conglomerate in the Chilean electricity sector, for $1,500 million, and it 
eventually spent more than $5,000 million. The present chapter aims at answering the fol­
lowing questions: why was taking control of Enersis such a costly and protracted process for
Endesa stands for Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, S.A. By this name, I denote the Spanish firm. There 
is also a Chilean firm with the same name, that initially had no relationship whatsoever with the Spanish firm. 
To distinguish among them, I will refer to the latter as Chilean Endesa or Endesa Chile.
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Endesa? What was the value impact for the shareholders of both companies of the different 
episodes in the control shift? Figure 1 shows the evolution of the stock prices of both compa­
nies, as compared to the S&P 100 index, during the pre-takeover period, the takeover period 
and the post-takeover period up until March 2000.
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The analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that takeovers of regulated firms are vul­
nerable to the political mobilization of affected constituencies. Control contests bring light to 
regulatory issues, which acquire a new salience as a result of takeovers.2 This decreases the 
benefits of the acquisition (because it tilts regulation in favour of consumers), increases its costs 
(because incumbents use political tools to defend themselves) and also increases the time needed 
to complete the takeover, if it is successful. It is shown that the impact of the events in the 
case under study on shareholder value is consistent with the agency hypothesis of takeovers, by 
which the acquisition is a result of agency problems in the bidding firm. In the case of Endesa, 
these agency problems have their origin first in public ownership and also in the method and
2In terms of the model presented in Chapter 2, they increase the proportion of voters that are informed about 
these issues.
Comparison between Endesa, Enersis and S&P 100
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timing chosen to privatize the firm.
Endesa wanted Enersis to become its central platform for its expansion in Latin America. 
This chapter aims at judging Endesa’s performance by its own standards, i.e., inquiring whether 
the acquisition of Enersis was favourable to shareholders’ interests or not. The methodology 
employed is similar to other clinical studies3 that analyze value creation or destruction in 
acquisitions by large firms, such as Ruback (1982 and 1983), Baker (1992), Lys and Vincent 
(1995), Bruner (1999) and Gillan et al. (2000).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents key elements of the framework 
in which the events under study took place: electricity privatization in Chile, and the recent 
history of both Chilean Enersis and Spanish Endesa. It also explains the hypotheses used to 
analyze the facts and data. Section 4.3 shows the facts, and the quantitative results. Section 
4.4 tackles the issue of whether Chilean companies benefitted from synergies in the vertical 
integration between different segments in the electricity industry. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Electricity Privatization in Chile: the Role of Enersis
As it is well-known,4 during the military dictatorship (1973-1989) Chile reduced the size of its 
public-enterprise sector in relation to GDP from 39% in 1973 to 16% in 1989 (6 ,6 % if the largest 
remaining public enterprise, the copper-mining CODELCO, is excluded).
The privatization of the electricity industry took place at the end of this process. Although 
there were several firms in the resulting industry, Enersis was kept as a dominant holding with 
stakes in generation, transmission and distribution. The legislation on electricity left little scope 
for the regulators’ discretion, in that it fixed precise formulae for the computation of tariffs. 
As a result, the industry undertook important investment projects and obtained high rates of 
return under private hands. Credibility and commitment were achieved at the cost of lenient
3As argued by Ruback (1982), the study of individual takeovers may complement the research based on 
averaging techniques. The latter are usually based on one single announcement per firm, whereas a takeover 
often involves several distinct information releases. The analysis of protracted control contests shows that the 
definition of a ’’major announcement” is ambiguous.
4See for instance Galal et al. (1994).
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regulation and high levels of market power for the incumbents.3 In the last years before t&e 
takeover, and during the takeover, however, the regulatory climate had become Iefi?^avo\£§ble 
for privatized utilities.
Just before the takeover by Spanish Endesa. Enersis had 5.4 million clients, controlling 
40% of distribution in Chile (8.134 GWh). This it did througli Chilectra. of which it owned 
75%, and Rio Maipo, who were the market leaders. 48% of Chilean generation was controlled 
by Enersis through its 25.3% stake in Endesa Chile. It also participated in Transclec, which 
controls energy transmission in the Chilean system. It also owned shares in firms in Colombia, 
Peru and Argentina. The ownership of Enersis was distributed among the Chispas companies 
(Chispa Uno, Chispa Dos, Luz y Fuerza, Los Almendros, Luz) who owned 1/3, the pension 
funds (AFPs: Próvida, Habitat, Santa Maria, Summa, Cuprum, Protección) with 1/3. The 
last 1/3 was dispersed amongst the stock exchanges of New York and Santiago, although some 
local investors, such as the Luksic group, had important stakes. The political rights in the 
holding were concentrated in the executives of the Chispas companies.5 6
4.2.2 Endesa: Preparing for Deregulation
Endesa was founded in 1944 as a public sector firm. In the 1980s it started a strategy of 
expansion and diversification. The company expanded in Spain and abroad, and in other 
sectors, such as telecommunications and oil. As far as the privatization of Endesa is concerned, 
the following table summarizes the four privatization tranches of the company:
5See Levy and Spiller (1996), Spiller and Viana (1996), Bitran and Serra (1998) and Galetovic (1998).
®Bebchuk and Zingales (1996) show how dual vote shareholdings (such as Enersis’ prior to Endesa’s takeover) 
may increase the gap between the private and social optimality of an ownership structure based on a controlling 
group as compared to a structure based on dispersed ownership.
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Table 1
Privatization Tranches of Endesa
Date
Daily Initial 
Returns (%)
Gross Proceeds 
Euro 10®
Capital SoId(%)
Remaining state 
stake
6 / 8 8 6 .2 445.9 20 76
5/94 1.5 1007.9 9 67
10/97 -1.5 4195.8 25 34
6/98 -1.5 6834.8 33 3
Source: Bel (1999)
The figures in the table show tha t most of public ownership was divested in a very short 
period of time, with a high priority given to obtaining revenues, since there was no under- 
pricing in the last two tranches. The government had also to be consistent with its objective 
of promoting popular capitalism and preserving (as in the privatization of other firms in th is  
period) the managerial teams appointed by the government. The result of the privatization 
was a company with a very dispersed shareholding and a managerial team, certainly previously 
appointed by the government, tha t could behave with a high degree of discretion. Along th e  
lines of protecting the managerial team from any interference, and as part of its privatization 
policy, the government established a 10 year Golden Share in Endesa.
On 12/5/97, before the privatization of the last tranche, the shareholders meeting approved 
a number of defensive measures to protect the management team and facilitate the appointment 
of independent directors. The statutes of the company were modified to open the door to  an 
even bolder diversification strategy.
Endesa had in 1999 50% of generation and 43% of distribution in Spain. Historically, i t  
has faced the competition of a number of private firms, the most important of which being 
Iberdrola. Iberdrola has also assets in both generation and distribution, but a higher weight in  
distribution . 7
7See TVillas (2000) for further analysis of electricity privatization and regulation both in Chile and Spain.
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4 .2 .3  H y p o th e se s
The introduction of competition in the original businesses may push incumbent utilities to 
diversify into other regions and sectors.8 In developing countries, to the extent that some 
transfer of know-how is non-market able, this transfer may only be possible through the direct 
involvement of foreign utility companies. However, takeovers may have important costs, which 
have been studied by the rich literature on the motives of takeovers (see for example Weston 
et al., 1998). The specific case of the corporate control market of privatized utilities raises two 
concerns. First, privatized firms may present inefficient corporate governance structures that 
shape mergers and acquisitions strategies. Second, regulation and the control market interact 
constraining the gains from takeovers.
The corporate governance problems of privatized utilities may be related to the free cash 
flow theory of takeovers (see Jensen, 1986 and 1988). Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of 
that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital. Thompson (1999) shows that in their immediate post-privatization, 
regulated environment the UK utilities experienced severe attenuation of all the principal forms 
of corporate governance, while remaining substantial cash generators but with limited scope for 
core business growth.
The takeover of a regulated firm may easily end up with the regulator expropriating the 
gains, if they exist, from the acquisition.9 Additionally, on the one hand the time required for a 
utility transaction may reduce the value of any spread between the market and the transaction 
price. On the other hand, the pressure to consummate an acquisition gives intervener groups 
high leverage. Delay may be a significant impediment to any hostile offer. It allows the target 
firm time to arrange defenses or seek alternative bidders. Many stakeholders with little ability 
to affect a  non-regulated offer can use the delay to organize opposition to a regulated offer and
8This makes the work of regulatory authorities more difficult (for example, to compute the equity cost of 
capital of particular segments through the stock prices).
flInside the group of regulated industries, different types of regulatory regimes may favour or not a takeover. 
With price cap regulation, if bidders retain efficiency gains made under the price cap, bidder incentives would 
be restored and the control market would be enhanced. Regulation in Chile at the time of the events studied 
here was not exactly based on price caps. It was similarly based on forward looking cost based prices, calculated 
using a benchmark ”efficient firm.” Efficiency gains could be expected to be kept because of this forward looking 
characteristic and because of the leniency of regulation. However, the regulatory climate in Chile was changing 
towards being less pro-investor at the time of the takeover.
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influence the decision of the regulatory bodies. Regulatory scrutiny usually increases during a 
control event and typically includes public analysis of the potential effect of the offer on prices. 10 1
4.3 Facts and Impact on Shareholders’ Value
The quantitative methodology used consists of estimating a market model in an estimation 
window and computing the three day abnormal returns for the events of interest (the day before 
the event is announced, the announcement day and the day after). Abnormal returns and t- 
statistics are computed in a way that is standard in the event study literature (see Armitage, 
1995, and Trillas, 2000),
The market returns (the index Ibex-35 in Spain and the index IPSA in Chile) have been 
adjusted to account for the high weight of the companies of interest, that is
adj _  r m — <^ ir i 
m ( ! - < * )
(4.1)
Where stands for the adjusted market return, rm is the unadjusted market return, u.', 
is the weight of each company in the market index and r* is the company’s return. A weight of 
11% was used for Endesa and a weight of 36% for Enersis11. Sensitivity analysis with different 
models and t-statistics is provided in the appendix. The estimation window used goes from 
01/01/94 to 30/6/97.
Information on the events of interest was collected from CNSE reports, the web page of 
the Spanish stock exchange regulator (CNMV), plus press articles from the Spanish newspaper 
El Pats, the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio and The Wall Street Journal Stock price and 
accounting data come from Datastream and Sequencer,
10McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) analyze the issue of takeovers in the utilities sector using US data (the 
only data available prior to the privatization wave in other western countries in the 80s and 90s) and report 
that regulation significantly constrained takeover activity. In the US, of the twenty-one hostile offers for utilities 
between 1960 and 1990, only one was successful. In spite of this low rate of completion, announcement period 
returns to target utilities are positive and significant, although substantially lower than average returns to 
nonregulated targets.
11 These correspond to the weight of Endesa in the Ibex-35 index at the end of 1998 and to the weight of both 
Enersis and Endesa Chile in the Ipsa index at the same time. The composite weight of both Chilean companies 
is the one used because Endesa Chile, controlled by Enersis, was also affected by the events reported here.
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4.3.1 T h e  F i r s t  T akeover B id
In the early days of August 1997. Endesa, the Spanish largest electricity company, announced 
a strategic alliance with a group of key executives of the largest Chilean electricity company. 
Enersis. At the time Endesa was still partially state-owned12 with a majority of public owner­
ship (66.9%). The alliance included a tender offer for the 5 investing Chispas companies. There 
were two types of shares in the Chispas societies: ordinary ones (type A) and the ones with 
political rights attached (type B). These ultimately guaranteed the control of Enersis by Jose 
Yurazcek and the group known as key executives ("directivos clave”).
Endesa planned to acquire control of Enersis by taking over the Chispas societies (which 
owned around 30% of Enersis) and reaching an agreement with the managers that held the 
majority of political rights in them and the key managerial positions in Enersis. However, three 
related sets of events prevented Endesa from reaching its objectives:
1) One of the Chispas societies, Luz, initially rejected Endesa’s offer.
2) Both the Spanish and Chilean securities regulators (CNMV and SVS, respectively) ob­
jected to the lack of transparency in the agreement reached between Endesa and the key exec­
utives.
3) Both the Chilean and Spanish Parliaments started inquiries about the deal struck between
Endesa and the key executives.
It was known later in August that the agreement included the guarantee that the key 
directors, including Yurazcek, would remain in their positions in exchange for Endesa’s control 
of Enersis’ Board of Directors. Furthermore, these executives were given the option of buying up 
to 5% of Spanish Endesa’s stock, thus becoming pivotal in the control of the Spanish company. 
During the following week, Endesa managed to buy up to 32% of Enersis. However, following 
a regulators-sponsored inquiry, Yurazcek and the key executives had to resign and Spanish 
Endesa had to partially pull back from the operation: it would remain the owner of 32% of 
Enersis, but it would not have a majority of the Board of Directors.
Meanwhile, the Spanish government was trying to sell 25% of Endesa through a Share Issue 
privatization. When the public offer started on 29 September, Endesa’s stock price was 3,195
12The government had just announced the public offer of 25 to 35% of the capital, which would take place in 
September-October 1997.
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pesetas. When the price was fixed, on 20 October, the stock price, and tlie price actually paid 
by institutional investors, was 2,685 pesetas. In addition to that, a proportion of the shares 
initially reserved for institutional investors had to be transferred to retail investors, who were 
sold the shares with a 4% discount. This change in the distribution, due to lower than expected 
demand from institutional investors, reduced the state’s receipts because institutional investors 
did not afford any discount.
Before summer 1997, there was a de facto control scheme in Enersis based both on the 
percentage owned by Chispas and the trust and long-term relationship (cemented by political 
trajectories or affiliations and a good administration) between other shareholders and the key 
executives. Endesa anticipated at that time that the cheapest way to have a significant control of 
Enersis was by taking over Chispas and signing a management contract with the key executives.
The following table summarizes the chronology of this first period (for each event and 
company, the three-day abnormal return and the t-statistic, in brackets, are reported):
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Table 2
D ate E vent description (F irs t Bid)
A R
End.
A R
Ene.
30/7/97
Negotiations between Endesa and Chispas 
are known, and the trading of the Chispas 
societies is suspended.
0.30
(1.19)
-0.45
(-0.15)
1/8/97
Endesa announces a strategic alliance with 
Enersis, which includes the creation of 
the joint venture Endesis and the takeover 
of Chispas.
-1.55
(-0.97)
2.61
(0.89)
3/8/97
Endesa offers $220 for Chispas A shares ($260 for 
employees) and $185,000 for Chispas B shares, 
belonging to the 14 Directors-owners of Enersis.
-1.83
(-1.15)
0.65
(0 .2 1 )
5/8/97
It is announced that Endesa will have 4 out of 7 
Directors in Enersis and two key executives of Enersis 
will be in Endesa’s board,
S&P places Endesa’s long term debt under surveillance. 
Endesa announces bidding conditions for Chispas shares
-1.27
(-0.79)
-1.29
(-0.44)
19/8/97
The Chamber of Deputies sets up a special Commission 
to inquire on the transaction between Enersis’ 
managers and Endesa.
0.33
(0 .2 1 )
-1.80
(-0.61)
*: Significant at 0.10 level
**: Significant at 0.05 level 
* * *: Significant at 0.01 level
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D ate Event descrip tion  (F irs t Bid) A R
End.
A R
Ene.
28/8/97
Endesa completes the takeover on Chispas, 
obtaining the control of 25.28 of Enersis through them. 
Endesa controls all Chispas societies except Luz.
0 .0 1
(0 .0 1 )
-0.18
(-0.06)
16/9/97
Endesa increases its stake in Luz,
from 21% to 33%, and buys a distribution
electricity company in Colombia, Codensa.
-2.31
(-1.44)
2.76
(0.95)
29/9/97
Starting day of the Public Offer of Endesa’s 
shares.
1.04
(0.65)
-1.94
( - 0 .6 6 )
9/10/97
It is known that Endesa reported to the
New York SEC details of the agreement
with the key executives. By these
details, if Chispas lost control of
Enersis, Endesa would be free to
terminate its agreement with Enersis
and be able to purchase Enersis’ stake
in Endesis at book value instead of market value.
2.06
(1.29)
-0.48
(-0.16)
14/10/97
It is known that the strategic plan about joint 
investments of Enersis and Endesa through Endesis, 
presented at the SEC on 17 September, has not been 
filed in the Spanish CNMV. This plan reveals that 
Endesa, but not Enersis, will have veto power in 
this company.
-3.91***
(—2.44)
-0.81
(-0.28)
15/10/97
Both Endesa and Enersis declare their 
willingness to revise their strategic alliance.
-4.70*"
(-2.94)
-0.81
(-0.28)
16/10/97 The setting up of Endesis is stopped.
-2.95*
(-1.84)
0.80
(0.27)
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Date Event description (First Bid)
AR
End.
AR
Ene.
17/10/97
Endesa informs the CXMV that it will keep
the investment in Enersis, and that the renegotiation
of the alliance will not affect the amount invested.
-5.90***
(-3.69)
0.58
(0.20)
20/10/97
The government fixes the prices of Endesa’s 
shares sold in the privatization.
-4.85
(-3.03)
-0.02
(-0.01)
23/10/97 The Board of Enersis asks Jose Yurazcek to resign.
3.68**
(2.30)
-0.76
(-0.26)
30/10/97
Endesa informs the CNMV that the agreements 
with the key executives are no longer valid.
1.06
(0.66)
8.05*’*
(2.75)
6/11/97
SfcP downgrades Endesa's long term debt 
from AA+ to AA.
-0.20
(-0.13)
-3.28
(-1.12)
18/11/97
Endesa reaches an agreement with Luz, 
by which the latter sales to Endesa its rights
in Enersis.
-3.68**
(-2.30)
-1.51
(-0.51)
27/11/97
A new board of Enersis is chosen, where 
Endesa has 3 out of 7 directors.
0.53
(0.33)
-0.01
(-0.03)
As can be seen in the table, the most significant events for Endesa’s shareholders during the 
first takeover bid had a negative effect on stock value. The only significant effect for Enersis 
took place precisely when the initial terms of the agreement with the former managers of Enersis 
were overruled.
To see the effects of the Enersis events on the public offer (PO) to sell a 25% stake of Endesa 
that took place between 29/9/97 and 20/10/97 (the day in which the price was fixed according 
to the closing stock price of the day), the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the PO 
period and for 1 and 2  weeks after that are reported here:
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T ab le  3
Days CARs t-statistic
29/9 to 20/10 -9.89*** -2 .6 8
2 1 /1 0  to 27/10 5.22*** 2.52
21/10 to 3/11 5.88** 2 .0 2
The problems in Chile undoubtedly reduced the value of the shares that were being sold: 
once the effect of the overall market movements is discounted, the residual effect, as an esti­
mate of the abnormal return, is negative and statistically significant. The new shareholders 
obtained significant gains in the two weeks after the PO, but these less than compensated for 
the government’s loss during the PO. This is clearly at odds with the definition that experts 
give of a successful equity offer.13
4.3.2 T he Transition: Endesa, a  M inority  in E nersis’ Board
Endesa eventually obtained 3 out of 7, instead of 4 (as it was its initial target) of the direc­
torships on the Enersis board. It had to reach an agreement about the appointment of a new 
Chairman, José Antonio Guzman, with the other blockholders in the company, mainly the 
pension funds. Endesa had spent US$ 1,500 million in the operation. In 1998, the Spanish 
company kept insisting that its final aim was to obtain strategic control of the company.
However, Endesa did not undertake any attempt to gain further control of Enersis during 
1998. The last privatization tranche of Endesa took place in May-June 1998. Again, the 
revenues obtained by the state were lower than initially expected.
On December 18th of 1998 a crucial decision was taken by the Enersis Board of Directors, 
with the abstention of Spanish Endesa’s representatives. This put an end to the stalemate in 
the company and opened the door to the final control contest. This decision was the sale of
13According to Lilja (1997): "If the offer is one of shares that are already being traded, then the share 
price should not decline between announcement and pricing. The share price should experience a modest rise 
and should not underperform the local index or comparable companies. (...) Fund managers often feel that 
companies come to the market before they are ready. This is the case with many privatizations where politicians 
dictate the timetable and where banks feel compelled for competitive reasons to recommend that the company 
do a deal as soon as possible.”
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Enersis’ stake in Chilean Endesa, the electricity generating company. 14 *Il
Table 4
D ate Event descrip tion  (T ransition  Period)
A R
End.
A R
Ene.
11/3/98 Enersis and Endesa sign a new strategic alliance.
7.47***
(4.67)
3.57
(1.2 2 )
2/4/98
A consortium integrated by Endesa and 
Enersis wins the tender offer for the 
51% of Coelce, a Brazilian electricity 
firm with 1.5 million clients, in a deal 
valued at $873 million.
1.81
(1.13)
0.18
(0.06)
3/4/98
The Spanish government decides the 
sale of its 41% in Endesa.
2.87*
(1.80)
1 .1 1
(0.38)
17/4/98
A consortium leaded by Endesa reaches 
an agreement to manage the electricity 
interconnection between Brazil and Argentina.
-3.68**
(-2.30)
0.51
(0.17)
8/6/98
The Spanish government announces the 
final price and share distribution of 
Endesa’s privatization.
-8.23***
(-5.15)
2.63
(0.90)
14Some investment and asset restructuring decisions may be undertaken as defensive adjustments against 
ongoing or potential takeover attempts, as predicted by Dann and De Angelo (1988). The decision of a majority 
of Enersis’ board to sell its stake in Chilean Endesa in December 1998 is an example of a bidder-specific deterrent. 
This sale had the objective of drawing the attention of antitrust authorities (which effectively happened) and 
creating unique (i.e. incumbent specific) advantages over the alternative management team (since it was argued 
that Spanish Endesa’s experience was based on a vertically integrated company).
I l l
ADate Event description (Transition Period) AR
End.
AR
Enc.
12/8/98
The Fiscalia General del Estado brings 
criminal charges against former key 
executives of Enersis and "other persons" 
responsible of the deal with Endesa.
3.00*
(1.91)
-1.60
(-0.54)
14/10/98
Synapsis, a subsidiary of Enersis, 
loses against a subsidiary of Endesa in 
in a bid for a supplying contract with a 
Colombian firm controlled by Endesa. At 
the same time, it is known that Endesa's 
executive will face more legal problems from 
the agreements with the Yurazcek team. Endesa 
reaches a strategic agreement with Gas Natural.
-9.02***
(-5.64)
1.90
(0.65)
18/12/98 Enersis board announces sale of stake in Endesa Chile
-4.36***
(-2.72)
9.54***
(3.26)
21/12/98
A consortium integrated by Enersis and 
Anglian Water wins the tender offer for 
the privatization of 35% of Esval, a water 
company in Valparaiso (Chile).
-4.60***
(-2.88)
5.90**
(2.02)
It has to be taken into account tha t the events in the second half of December may have 
confounding effects from the controversy about the securitization of the stranded costs that was 
taking place in Spain. This decision was discussed by the Spanish Senate and Congress in the 
two last weeks of the year, and it was accompanied by numerous articles and statements from 
opposition politicians against it. It was also opposed by the electricity watchdog, CNSE. All this 
may have increased the political risk for investors in Endesa. The securitization was eventually 
approved on December 22nd., but its final implementation still depended on an inquiry opened 
by the European Commission.
4.3.3 The Second Takeover Bid
On January 22nd of 1999 Spanish Endesa announced a takeover bid for another 329i of Enersis. 
two weeks before the shareholders meeting that was expected to approve the sale of Enersis' 
stake in Chilean Endesa. Spanish Endesa announced that it would subsequently take control 
of Endesa Chile. The takeover would take place both in the Chilean and US stock markets, 
for an expected cost of US$ 1,450 million. The offer included a 3G9c premium on the current 
stock trading. The offer was conditional on a previous lifting by Enersis' shareholders of the 
32% ceiling on a single shareholders’ ownership. For this decision to be taken, the vote of the 
Pension Funds was pivotal. 15 Although Endesa lost the vote in a first shareholder meeting by 
a very narrow margin and due to not enough vote from the owners of ADRs, some irregularities 
were detected in the vote. A new shareholders’ meeting took place (as it can be seen in table 
5), this time at the initiative of the pension funds represented in the Board of Enersis. 16
According to newspaper El Mercurio (23/1/99), if the takeover succeeded, Endesa’s invest­
ment in Chile would total US$ 3,000 million, US$1,500 million for each tranche. This amount 
was bound to be eventually even higher if Spanish Endesa increased Enersis’ or its own par­
ticipation in Chilean Endesa, as turned out to be the case. Spanish Endesa announced that it 
would also try to lift the limits on shareholder concentration in Chilean Endesa.
This second takeover bid for Enersis had two aims from Endesa’s point of view: first, to 
put an end to the problems in Chile triggered by the first takeover and, second, to bolster its 
presence in the Latin American region.
The timing of the operation was targeted at preventing Enersis from selling its stake in 
Chilean Endesa and taking advantage of low stock prices in Latin America after the crisis in 
Brazil.
The pension funds holding shares in Enersis admitted that the $320 offered by Spanish 
Endesa was a unique opportunity, given that they had been unable to sell so far given the
15This change in Enersis’ statutes needed the support of 75% of shareholders attending the meeting. His­
torically, nearly 80% of outstanding shares were represented in shareholders’ meetings. If this percentage was 
maintained, Spanish Endesa would only need 60% of all shares to modify the statutes, which was achievable 
summing the 29.2% owned by Pension Funds and the 32% owned by Endesa.
16The behaviour of the main blockholders (the pension funds and the Luksic group) in the shareholders’ 
meetings where the cap on shareholders’ concentration was raised is consistent with the findings obtained by 
Brickley et al. (1988) for a sample of American firms. They show that blockholders usually endorse the bidder 
in this kind of votes.
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insufficient liquidity in the market. They believed that such an opportunity would not occur 
again and the takeover eventually succeeded.
Once Endesa had acquired control in Enersis. it used the Chilean holding to fight for tin- 
control of Chilean Endesa with the US electricity company Duke Energy, which had just an­
nounced a takeover bid for a majority stake in Endesa Chile. According to The Wall Strtct 
Journal (19 April 1999), Spanish Endesa pursued the Chilean company after Duke rejected a 
proposal to share control. The financial newspaper also said that the news of Spanish Endesa's 
increased bid raised fears that the Spanish utility might be overstretching its finances at a time 
of falling electricity rates and revenue at home. The final winner of this contest was Spanish 
Endesa, after both it and Duke increased their initial bids in the following days. After Duke 
withdrew from the battle, Spanish Endesa still had to overcome the last hurdle: the Chilean 
antitrust authority decided to temporarily block the takeover on anti-competitive grounds. On 
May 10th the final go ahead was given and Spanish Endesa completed a control battle that 
had started twenty-one months earlier and that had costed more than three times the initial 
estimate.
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T able 5
D ate Event descrip tion (Second Bid)
A R
End.
A R
Ene.
22/1/99
Endesa announces that it will make a public offer 
for an additional 32% of Enersis, both in Chile 
and the US, at a price of Pesos 320 per share.
0.94
(0.59)
6.65**
(2.27)
28/1/99
A legislative official announces that the Chamber 
of Deputies could initiate an inquiry about Endesa’s 
takeover attempt on Enersis.
-3.16**
(-1.98)
0.35
(0 .1 1 )
29/1/99
Endesa officially announces a tender offer 
for 32% of Enersis’ capital.
-3.63**
(-2.27)
7.33***
(2.50)
4/2/99
The shareholders’ meeting of Enersis decides 
to sell its 25.28% stake in Endesa Chile.
-3.47**
(-2.17)
-2.74
(-0.94)
7/2/99
The Pension Funds announce that they will reject 
to raise the cap on shareholders’ concentration.
-3.02*
(-1.89)
-1.70
(-0.58)
18/2/99
The US electricity company Duke Energy offers 
to buy 51% of Endesa Chile for Pesos 250 per share.
1.48
(0.93)
-4.01
(-1.36)
24/2/99
The shareholders’ meeting of Enersis rejects 
the proposal to raise the cap on shareholders' 
concentration from 32 to 65%.
-0.52
(-0.32)
0.43
(0.15)
9/3/99
Enersis board decides
to hold a new shareholders' meeting on 30/3 
to raise the cap on shareholders’ concentration
0.24
(0.15)
0.64
(0 .2 2 )
30/3/99
The shareholders’ meeting approves the proposal 
to raise the cap on shareholders' concentration 
from 32 to 65%.
0 .2 1
(0.13)
1.09
(0.37)
7/4/99
Endesa completes successfully its tender offer for 
Enersis, acquiring 21.78% of it in the Santiago, 
and 10.22% in the New York stock exchanges.
-2.99*
( - 1 .8 6 )
-19.88***
(-6.79)
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D ate Event descrip tion  (Second B id)
A R
End.
AR j
Ene. |
1 3 /4 /9 9
Enersis offers to buy 29.7% of Endesa Chile at a price of 
Pesos 305 per share.
-5 .8 5 * * *
( - 3 .G 6 )
-0.84
( - 0 .2 9 )
1 6 /4 /9 9
Duke Energy increases its offer to Pesos 275 per share 
to acquire a 60% of Endesa Chile.
-7.79***
( - 4 .8 7 )
-2.91
( - 0 .9 9 )
2 0 /4 /9 9
Enersis raises its bid for Endesa Chile from Pesos 305 to 
Pesos 360 per share, for a 34.7% of the target firm.
-1.19
(-0.74)
-12.39***
( - 4 .2 3 )
2 1 / 4 /9 9 Duke withdraws its offer for Endesa Chile.
3.27**
(2 .0 4 )
-18.26***
(-6.24)
2 2 /4 /9 9
Enersis announces the success of its takeover on 
Endesa Chile and the antitrust authority announces an 
inquiry.
2.98*
(1 .8 6 )
-4.48***
( - 4 .0 9 )
2 7 / 4 /9 9
The antitrust prosecutor, Rodrigo Asenjo, announces 
his position in favour of stopping the takeover of 
Enersis on Endesa Chile.
0.35
(0 .2 2 )
-4.61***
(-3.26)
2 8 / 4 /9 9
The Chilean antitrust authority approves
an injuction blocking the tender offer
for Endesa, in order to inquire
whether the increased stake of Enersis in Endesa
reduces competition in the sector.
- 1 .1 2
(-0.7)
-8.03***
( - 2 .7 4 )
10/5/99
The Anti-trust authority eventually announces 
that Enersis can complete the takeover of Endesa 
under some conditions.
2.24*
(1.40)
4.88*
(1.67)
1 4 /5 /9 9
A new Board of Directors is appointed in Endesa 
Chile, with a majority of representatives from Enersis. 
Pablo Yrarrazaval, a Chilean stock market 
operator, is appointed as Chairman.
0.43
(0 .2 6 )
1.32
(0.45)
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As can be seen from the quantitative results, Endesa’s shareholders reacted negatively to the 
announcement of the second takeover, and they reacted negatively as well to the announcement 
of the takeover bid on Endesa Chile (in this case, the bidder was Enersis itself, but the operation 
was financed with a loan from Spanish Endesa, the new controller of Enersis at the time). 
Enersis reacted positively to the takeover announcement of Spanish Endesa, and negatively to 
the completion of the takeover. This reflects that the problems in all the process had increased 
the bargaining position of those who sold their shares, but that the deal was not value-enhancing 
for those who remained as small shareholders of Enersis.
4.3.4 Sum m ary and Discussion
Although in general the reaction of investors in the Spanish company to the events in Chile 
was negative, Endesa’s executives were trapped in a escalation of commitments due to the high 
sums initially invested in Enersis. Only in 1999, Endesa disbursed $1407 million for the control 
of Enersis, and $ 2113 million for the control of Endesa Chile. The company announced a 
significant increase in its debt level. Table 6  summarizes the results for Endesa’s shareholders.
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Ta b le  6
Endesa’s stock returns (9i)
n Tm CAR t-statistic
Overall Period 
(All Trading days)
90.53 114.61 -30.34* -1.52
Overall Period 
(Only takeover related events)
-13.7 -4.78 -14.82* -1.60
1997
(Only takeover related events)
-3.76 -2.75 -9.25* -1.51
1998
(Only takeover related events)
3.69 2.15 6.16** 2 .2 2
1999
(Only takeover related events)
-13.63 -4.18 -11.74** -1.85
r tT Endesa’s stock return
rm: Ibex-35 return
CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
t  =  CAR
y/N*SD(AR)
Table 7 summarizes the results for Enersis’ shareholders (note that the negative returns of 
the Chilean market are related to the emerging economies crisis of 1998):
1 1 8
I
Table T
Enersis’ stock returns (%)
r, rm CAR t-statistic
Overall Period 
(All Trading days)
-32.76 -22.02 -40.53 -1.09
Overall Period 
(Only takeover related events)
14.9 23.32 -8.70 -0.52
1997
(Only takeover related events)
8.68 2.13 7.43 0.72
1998
(Only takeover related events)
15.52 7.52 13.43** 2.29
1999
(Only takeover related events)
-9.3 13.68 -29.57*** -2.55
7*ì : Enersis stock return 
r m : Ipsa return
CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
t  —  __f J A K
VN*SD(AR)
Table 8 reports the effects of the events analyzed on the combined market value of both 
Endesa and Enersis. The measure of this combined market value is a portfolio index of both 
stock prices, weighted by the market capitalization of each company five days before the first 
announcement of the takeover took place, following Bradley et al. (1988). The estimation 
window goes between January 1995 and June 1997. The market index used is the S&P 100 
Index of the US. This reflects the opportunities for diversification of international investors, 
which can invest in American Depositary Receipts of both companies in the New York Stock 
Exchange.
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Portfolio’s returns (%)
Table 8
Ti r m CAR t-statistic
Overall Period
(All Trading days)
1.68 8.19 -18.35* -1.62
Overall Period 
(Only takeover related events)
0.63 43.06 -55.92** -2.24
r*: Portfolio Index Return
r m: US S&P 100 return
CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
t  =  CAR 
V n +SD{AR)
These results are consistent with an agency motivation for the takeover (see Weston et al., 
1998). The abnormal returns for the acquirer and the joint portfolio are negative and the  
abnormal returns for the target are non significant. The shareholders did not expect any value 
creation from the takeover. If agency motivations in the bidding firm determine the acquisition, 
shareholder wealth is not maximized, and hence they result in a loss for the joint value of target 
and bidder (negative abnormal returns), and in a loss for the bidder shareholders (also negative 
abnormal returns). In the case of target shareholders, they could extract part of the agency 
rents depending on the price paid by the bidder. In this case, however, the returns for the  
target shareholders are not significant either.
If the shareholders expected any significant synergies between both firms, this should be 
reflected in a significant positive return for the joint value and for target shareholders (Weston et 
al., 1998). The acquirer shareholders would obtain positive, zero or negative returns depending 
on the price paid.17
Agency problems in Endesa at the time of the first takeover bid may be related to the  
fact that the firm was still in the public sector, and the Chairman and the managerial team
,7Under the hubris hypotesis, the managers of the bidding firm overestimate their ability to manage the target 
assets and pay in excess of their ability to create value. See Roll (1986).
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owed their positions to political appointments. The firm was then privatized to result in a 
very widely held company, and the same managerial team stayed in place and undertook the 
second takeover bid. The managerial team had probably had time to learn and it faced now 
the scrutiny of the financial markets (although part of the ownership had already been floated 
before), but besides these ”external’* control, there was no strategic investor able to overcome 
the free-rider problem and effectively monitor the managers.
The regulatory agreement of the Spanish government with the electricity companies in 1998 
may also have had a positive impact on the decision to commit more funds to the control of 
Enersis. 18 This agreement (which complemented the effects of the pool generation market in 
operation since 1 January 1997) involved the acceleration of liberalization, the elimination of 
tariff uncertainty for the next years and the securitization of stranded costs. This agreement de­
creased regulatory risk but increased market risk. As a result, the Spanish electricity companies, 
and Endesa in particular as the largest one, increased both their means (more cash-flow) and 
their motivation (reduced earnings prospects in the domestic market) to undertake investments 
in foreign markets.
Endesa’s management team learned that to succeed in the control of Enersis the pension 
funds (AFPs) played a key role.19 The behaviour of the pension funds in the process was based 
on their role as pivotal shareholders in Enersis and their desire to reduce their exposure to the 
Chilean electricity sector. Although they could not legally control companies, as a result of their 
ownership stake, they de facto proposed the new Chairman after Yurazcek’s resignation and 
their votes were crucial in the Directors’ Board during the transition period. But as institutional 
investors, their fundamental goal was to obtain the maximum return for their clients through 
a diversified portfolio.
Chilean politicians showed a remarkable degree of activism over the whole process of control
18The situation for many electricity companies facing liberalization in the home market is similar to the oil 
companies in the seventies, analyzed by Jensen (1986 and 1988) as an illustration of his free cash flow theory. 
They have high levels of cash flow (due to high product prices for oil companies in the seventies and to generous 
regulation the electricity companies on the eve of deregulation), but they also face the prospect of declining 
earnings in the core business (due to excess capacity the oil sector in the seventies and due to liberalization the 
electricity sector).
19The AFP were the result of the privatization of the Social Security system in Chile. In 1985-86 they were 
allowed to enter the stock market, although they were formally prevented from controlling companies, to minimize 
the risk of insider trading.
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Ichange in Enersis. Many of the political reactions to the first takeover bid took place in the 
run-up to the legislative Chilean elections of 11 December 1997 (a perfectly predictable event 
that could have been taken into account by Endesa’s strategists when considering the timing of 
the takeover). In January 1999 the Chilean government sent to the Parliament new legislation 
on takeovers and small investor protection. At the same time, the regulatory climate towards 
private utilities had become tougher in the late nineties, as a result of demands for better and 
cheaper services coinciding with am economic crisis
4.4 The Vertical Integration of Electricity in Chile
The evidence this clinical study may provide on the vertical integration issue in the electricity 
industry is of independent interest. In Chile, Spanish Endesa was in favour of maintaining the  
vertical links between Enersis and Endesa Chile, and Guzman’s team was in favor of putting  
an end to the vertical integration and focussing Enersis on consumer service in the distribution 
segments of energy, water and other end-user products. Indeed, the boardroom battle in Enersis 
and the control contest for Endesa Chile can be interpreted as a war of ideas about different 
strategies in the network industries.
The events analyzed here may provide a testing ground for the hypothesis of synergies be­
tween the two Chilean companies Enersis and Endesa (through productive efficiency or through 
collusion in the product market).
In the following I report the reaction of Enersis and Endesa Chile’s stock prices (in the form 
of three-day abnormal returns) to the 4 events related to the Enersis-Endesa Chile relationship.
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Table 9
Date Enersis Endesa Chile
18/12/98
9.54**'
(3.26)
6.70***
(3.20)
4/2/99
-2.74
(-0.94)
-0.54
(-0.26)
18/2/99
-4.01
(-1.36)
2.30
(1 .1 0 )
13/4/99
-0.84
(-0.29)
2.23
(1.07)
The events in table 11 are: 1) 18/12/98: the decision of Enersis’ board to sell its stake in 
Endesa Chile. 2) 4/2/99: the same decision by the shareholder meeting. 3) 18/2/99: Duke’s 
takeover bid announcement for Endesa Chile. 4) 13/4/99: Spanish Endesa’s announcement of 
the takeover of Endesa Chile, through Enersis.
The only significant effect for both companies20 is the first, and in both cases it is positive. 
This suggests that the synergies (either productive or collusive) between the two companies were 
inexistent, if shareholders attach a positive probability that the divestiture will eventually take 
place. It also suggests that Chilean Endesa’s shareholders reckoned that vertical integration 
would prevent the company from obtaining competitive prices for its generated electricity. A 
possible alternative interpretation to the significantly positive reaction to the event in December 
1998 is that shareholders were reacting positively to the gains they would make from the takeover 
activity that was being opened, irrespective of any effect from a productive or collusive point 
of view. But if this is the case, the investors also expected that takeovers of both companies 
separately would be more profitable than a takeover on one single firm. Alternatively, the event 
on 18/12/98 may have been interpreted by investors as increasing the probability that Spanish 
Endesa’s full takeover on Enersis would take place. There is no evidence of shareholder value
20As shown in Cox and Portes (1998), to make any point about synergies from an event study, inferences must 
be based on stock data on both companies affected (to avoid drawing normative conclusions from data that 
might reflect only bargaining power).
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creation in the announcement of further vertical integration in Chilean electricity industry (non 
significant reaction to the announcement of the fourth event, on 13/4/99).
4.5 Conclusions
The case shows that takeovers in regulated sectors may trigger the political reaction of stake­
holders, which creates additional costs as compared to other sectors. The clinical study pre­
sented also suggests that agency problems in the bidding firm investing the free cash flow may 
outweigh any synergies achieved with the transaction.21
Jensen (1988) expects that in case of managerial slack in the bidding firm the bidder will 
become the target in a subsequent takeover. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show empirical evidence 
consistent with this, although electric utilities are excluded from their sample. However, a 
successful takeover bid for Endesa seems unlikely in the short run, since the Spanish government 
has a 10 year golden share on Endesa (as compared to 5 year golden shares in the UK privatized 
electricity companies, for example) . 22
Incumbent utilities, especially those that are still related to governments, have a large free 
cash flow, and the mechanisms to correct their potentially bad managerial performance are 
weak.
4.6 Appendix
Table A1 shows the daily returns of the companies and the market indices of interest in the 
relevant dates and the results of the sensitivity analysis. Five different models were estimated 
in addition to the simplest one (MO) reported in the main text:
-M odel 1  (M l). The same as MO but without adjusting the market returns for the weights 
of each company, i.e., w* =  0 in equation (4.1). (Columns 6  to 9 in the first table).
21Burkart (1997) suggests that the protection of shareholders in bidding firms should be part of takeover 
regulation, which so far only protects target shareholders. He proposes that takeover bids should be approved 
by a shareholder meeting of the acquiring company.
22Hirshleifer (1995) points out that the possibility of dilution (excluding minority shareholders from the gains 
in the resulting company after the takeover) may allow the bidder firm to overcome the free-rider problem in a 
tender offer. Burkart et al. (1998) also point out that agency problems in the resulting firm may be an incentive 
for bidding managers to undertake a takeover attempt.
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-M odel 2 (M 2 ). The estimation procedure is like in MO but the t-statistics are computed 
differently. In T2 they are adjusted for the autocorrelation of returns. In t3, they are the t- 
statistics of the prediction error. In both cases the test statistic for the 3-day abnormal returns 
is given by t =  , where A R Z is the three day prediction error as an estimator of the abnormal
returns.
In T2,
SD3 =  [3 * V A R (A R t) + 4 * CO VAR{ARu ARt (4.2)
In t3,
SD Z = VA R(A Rt) <
n (  5 3  — (3 * -Rm)^
3  I 9  ■ VT=T*______________
N  ( N ^ l ) * V A R ( R m)
(4.3)
where variances and covariances are computed using the estimation window and N  is the 
number of observations in the estimation window. Rm is the market return and the subindex 
r  is used to denote observations in the event window. (Columns 10 to 12 in the first table and 
2 to 4 in the second table).
-M odel 3 (M 3). The normal returns are computed like in Ml but imposing the values 
q =  0  and p  — 1 . (Columns 5 to 8  in the second table).
-M odel 4 (M 4), The normal returns are obtained with a two-factor model where the 
explanatory variables are the market return and the change in the interest rates, where interest 
rates are the eight-year government bond in Chile and the ten-year government bond in Spain, 
obtained both from Datastream. (Columns 9 to 12 in the second table).
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Table A.2
Sensitivity Analysis
Date Endesa Ibex Encrais Ipsa AR<Ele)M1T(Ele)M1AR(Eis)MTT<£is)M1AR(Ele)M2t2(EleH3{Ele
30/7/97 0.19 -0.05 0 67 1.37 0285401
1/8/97 -5.22 -3 57 2 64 0  9 -1037456
4/8/97 -3 95 -2.15 106 0 7 4  -1416246 -
5/8/97 057  1.59 *126 -0.5 -1238836 -
19/8/97 177 n i 051 2 59 0  218502
28/8/97 -113 -1.04 -155 -2.11 011491
16/9/97 1.33 3 15 2 7 3 0 43 -2.290184 -
29/9/97 3.07 2 0 2 -1 3 2 0.11 0.761882
9/10/97! -2 67 -4.16 -0.28 0 0 3  2.197605
14/10/97 -4.58 -104 -1.6 -151 -3 33509
15/10/97 j -5 68 -171 -107 -1 7 4  -4.005475 -
16/10/971 -5.25 -275 -0.36 -1 7 6  -2 36791 -
17/10/97: -642 -1.12! -0.36 -1 2 2 , -5.0822 -
20/10/97! -2.85 134 -0.36 -0 5 8  -4.368556^
0 2034_ -0 92755 
O 7394J.604308J 
1.0094 0.215578 
0  8329 -0 622Ô8 
Î? 1557^-2 54598
0 Ô8Î9_1.Ô12576 
T6323 1956163 '
0 543~ -1411*3* 
1.5663 -077566* 
^207/0245313* 
2.8548 0 69Í633
1 6677 1.425541 
3 6222 1 138636* 
3.1136’ 0373556*
-0 4848 
0.8386 
0.1127'
0 3252' 
Ï  3308’ 
0.5293'
1 0225' 
0.7377* 
Ò.1441*
0.29619 
-1548761* 
-1 83927* 
-1 271796* 
0 333925 
*0 005884* 
-2 311324* 
Í.039281* 
'2.062259*
0 17 0 178
•068 
-ì Ò4 
-072 
019 
0
-1.31
-093
- 1.1
-076
02
0004
-1.38
01282 -3 906674 
0 36Ï 5* -4 703177* 
0 74*51’ -2.947909* 
Ó 5952* -5 895863* 
0.1953 -4.845616
0 59 0 623 
1.17*1 232 
■2 21* -2 34 
-2.66~-2.82 
-1 671 : \ 77 
-3 33 -3 54 
-274* -2 0
23/10/97; -0.73 -3.68 -1 0 5 -0.77: 3.5802671 2.5517 -0.08931,-0.0467 367731 2.08 2.196
30/10/97' 6.83 5.5 8.55Î 3.54 ' 07811841 03429 4 358351 2 2781 1061762 0 6 0634
6/11/97 -271 -2 06) -4.54 -3 07 0.019253 0 0137 -0.8298 -07337 -0202492 -011 -0.12
18/11/971 1.12 4.08, -0.76 ! 0.45* -3.580025 -2.5516 -125775 -0 6574 -3.683021 •208 *2.2
27/11/97 377  2.81 0 4 0 5 9  0244597 0.1743 -026511 -0.1386 053001 0.3 0317
11/3/98. 7.48: 0 8 5 3.57, 1 2  6 530393 4.6543 2.175676 11372 7.466619 4.22 4 478
2/4/98 5.35: 3 51 ’ 0.72: 0.76- 1.311813 0.935 -0 14633 -0 0775 1806867 102 1083
_  3/4/98I 
17/4/98T
_7.25j_
-1.771
4.4> 1.44
1.39 -2.28
0 .791 2.176416;
-3 91*^3.3466121 -2.3852
y 5526 0 535806 i 
2.43436sT
0.2801 
1 2724’
6/6/98
-2.8807^
2.76j___-4.3633 -3.ÌÒ98;
9 .18 4.098884] 20214] 
• 0 3 1 -3 026015^ 2 .1567 :
1.47T-3.52*7136i -2.5139, 
-0.33 -2*925143|~-2.0648) - 
-2 *324566 i -1.656T" ‘
3.04, -7.201762: -5.1328 - 0.54607- 
2.0505ÎTÔ62312’ 
-6.2111; -0.71732*
1.288063) 0918
_4.J5044j_
3740793,
6.12608J
05Ò8833 
4.852908[ 
17953^  
-2 8*8624 
-4.46957T
2878822 
_  -3681758
0 2854 J-8.233008* 
0 5657 3.058027 
-0 3749 -9 02916*
27694 -4 357642" 
*16417; -4 599715* 
JJ.2021 4 211595- 
0*266* -3*160502* 
~2.5366j-3*6308751 
•0 9364 -3472Ï23* 
-1.5086***3.016275'
r55i^.531J98 
0 87l~0 290462 
0730393
-03788; 1.193131 
0 2Ò7 0.14017ÍT 
0.0929. 0.13727"3r
-14J57,
-8.39!
2 ,4 8 p 2  933966l -2.09ÎTT'-16.0445' - 
1.56 -5*11682*~3 6483 -1.31*468'
-6.656912 ¡ - 4 7 445 -3.61784Î 
0 51 : -1^0262ÌT-0 7314 -9.44947~ 
3.63j~~2 94757 2 p M  008 p 1 7804j
28/4/99 0.091 1.02’ -5.8 0 2 4
10/5/99 2.95! 0.92Ì 5 7 8  2.54
14/5/99 T 94 .2.1*4! Ô 6 —0.6T
-1.Ò56997
1.919115
0.582142
J 7 3 2 6  -475546 
0.1629T -6.11433 
-075331*^6,0467 
1.367B 2.483789 
0  4149! 1705282
2.3362 1.480293 
0.6236^-0.516631 
0.0730 [Ó.244Ì47t 
007Ì8*_0.20854* 
0 3 8 6 /  -2.99049*51 
C.6 872’’-5.848271 
-1.691^7794329!* 
-4.9392 -1.190296’ 
6*1575 î 3 7653441 
-2 4857! 2 975265**
1 63 1.722 
-208  -221 
-4 6 5 ^ 4  94 
1 73 1832 
-51 ^-5 .3 2  
-2 7 6 ^ 2 .6  ì 
-2 6 1 -2 7 5  
2 .38JT 5Ï4  
1 7 9  -1.89 
2.05 -277 
-1.96 ^ 2  06 
-171 j - 1 8 
0 841 0.B8B 
-079*T-0 31 
0.14 0746  
ÓT210.125 
-169, 7 7 9  
-3 7 1*-  
-471
-3 5 1 
7 .6 7
-3.1959,
-37606Î
j0345266^
-1.12Ï4
-0 67, -07 1 
1.85 1956 
1.68 1783 
'  0.2*0207 
0.63i -0.67
1.2983; 2 .24394,
'07345  ' 0728032'
Notes:
Endesa, Enersis: 3-day returns of each company’s stock price. 
Ibex, Ipsa: 3-day return of each stock exchange index.
AR: 3-day abnormal return.
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Table A.2
(Continued)
Date AR(Eis)M2t21Ei»H3(Ei»>AR{Ele)M3t2(Ele)AR(Eis)M3 t2(Ei») AR(Ele)M4 t(Ele) AR(Eis)M4 t ( ü s l
7/30/97 -0,45161 -0.15 ^ .154
8/1/97' 2.61228f  0.672' 0.691’ 
P  6/4/97 0,653055 0~.218’ 0 223] 
8/5/97 -29143 -0 43** -Ó.44]
8/19/97 - 1.79679' J oV _-0612 
’ 8/28/97 -0.18475 -0 06 -0 063 
J j/T 6/97 2 76815 0 924 0 94 V
9/29/97 ^1 93734 -0 65_-0 661  ^
'10/9 /97 ' -0 47561 -0 1^6 1 -6.162'
10/14/97 -0 80804 -0.27 -0.275’ 
JjO/t 5/97; -0.16598" -6.06p0.057" 
16/16/97: 0,799684 Ó.267 0.273" 
1Ó/Í7/97 0.577046 0.193 0.197* 
0.006
0 269663 0_1571 
-1 8 5 3 9 3 ^ 1 .0 8 ”  
-2 02247 ” -1 1 7 8 ' 
' P  1 4 6 0 7 ^0 6 6 8 ] 
0404494 0 2356 
-0 1 0 1 1 2 ^-0 0 5 9 ' 
-2.04494 -1,19V 
_1 J 79775 0_6873 
1.674157 0 9753*
10/20/97 -0.01666 
16/23/97 -076083' 
T0/30/97r 8~ 046949) 
*11/6/97, -3.28273I 
11/18/97' -1,50573
_ -0 .0 l_ _  _
-025^-0.259 
'2.686 : 2744”  
-1.1; -1.119”
•3 97753 -2.317 -0.14063 
-4.79775 -2.795 0 578125'  
14607 , -1.B33 1.71875
-5" 95508 ■ -3469 1 34375”
-1 09375 -0 361 0 306503 
2 71875^0 8984 -1 07448
11 _P-5 ^07652 -1.51713
-1.1875* -0 392” -i'37907"
__ -3.25' -1 074’ 0 266183'
_ 0  875^0 289V Ó 149475* 
3*125 1 0326 -2 23085*
-2 23438__-0 738 0 72302'
-0 4  8438 -0 .16 '2  123571'
-0 046*
•0 08821, -0 03
-0 .5^ 0,513 
^0 034 
1.219! 
0062 '
4/3/98 1.113575: 0.372 0.38*
^ 1/27/97
3/11/98_3.574564M .j193 
4/2/98 ÓV8Ó956’ 0.06
0 51125. 0.171: 0.1744/17/98 
_  6/8/98 
8/12/98 -1.59248^-0.53 
10/14/98 1.909883 0638 
12/16/98 *9 537167
J12/2t/98 j 5 902515, 1.97 
J /2 2 /9 9 t_14.16693; 
1/28/99 f 0.35056,
0 542 
_  0_65
3.184 ” 3.249 
2.0Í3
0 2186 -0 92164 -0 482 
-0 766”  1 606236' 0 839 
-1 082” ’0 213709j_0.112 
-0 984”  -0 62291 -0 326 
6 1898” -2 53923 -1 327 
0 1Ó66”  j  012535”  0 529 
A. 59j  1 9 6 5 0 9 '' 1 027
0 5156' -1 4063B -0 735 
1.5145" -0 ’26715” -0 14 
-3 28605 -2.343* 0.258075*0.135 
0.191 -3 98785* -2 844* 0 6’9 7 3 2 Íp 0 3 6 4  
0 5679 -241853* -1.725 1431217 0.748 
_  0 444 -513725* -3 664* 1.1~42644” ~0 597
^4  70787^2.743 0.34375 01 Í36*’-4 41446 -3.148 0.379739 0.198
3.314607) 1 9309 -0*4375 -0.145* 3.594568* 2 5635 -0 09382 -0 049
1.4943821 0 8706 7 828125* 2.5867] 0 410479*0 2927r 4.354689;~2 276 
-0.39326 -0.229 -2.296’88 -0 759 0.Ó23116 0 0Í65^ 0 8 3 0 5 3 ^ 0  434
*-3 3 2 5 8 4 ^1 9 3 7  -1.89063 -0.625* -3_57397”  -2 549 -1 25974 -0 658
ÓJ41573 0.4321^0.29688 -0 098*0 245403”  0175^ *-0 2759 -0 144 
7.449438*4.3397, 3.7031257*1.2236* 6 601479' 4 7079* 2.18949V 1.144
1.31993B* 0.9413 -0.1602V -*0 084
1.5834* O 5358Ó3J__ 0 28
•2.398*2 427926_1.269 
-5.136^0 547545 1 0.286 
285393311 6626 0.296875 0,0981 2.946652 2.1014, 1.094713^*07572
2.067418 1.2044 
3.202247* 1.8655
-0 0625_ j 0.021 
1.015625 0.3356* 2.220303 
-3 55056’ -2.068 2 546875 0 8416^” -3 3618 
2.628028 0 877; 0 896 -8.21348! -4.7851 1.71875 0 5679 -7.2Ó234
-8.21348: -4.TB51 0.1875, 0.062 -8.83789, -6.303 -0.73796^-0.386
JI/29/991 
1 2/4/99' 
”2/8/99 
*2/18/99
_7.325967M.445 
-2.74307) -0*92 
-1.70374] 
-4.00925!
-4.1236) -2.402 1 B.3125, 2.7467^ -4 03564 ^ 2 .8 7 8 ^  4.160543 ' 2J74
-4.2~5843|T2.48l[ 5.6875¡ 1.B 79V -4.43455‘ -3.163) 3.142662’”  1.642
4.729' __4J2, 3 79775372.2124 12.3125 4 0684 4.191039’ 2 9889* 6 131497^3.204
am t 0.12Xt~í’Í07l -2.89888p 1  689*"0.646625T 0.2117] -3 05804* - 2 1 8 l " 0 448644t 0.234 -3.28O9tTT.9TTT 7.968751*2.63311 -3.57665* -2 S5Í) 4 793862 ] ~2 505
■3,573031 -2.081: 
-3.31461 j -1.931 
1.483146 ¡ 0.864
-2 96675; -0.981; -2 98079 -2.128: -1 80862 -0945  
-3 53125) -1 167) ’-”27316, -1 6 5 2 p -2  88455p1.S07
-6 09375, -2.OI4112S4537* 0 8947
2/24/99: 0 429628! 0.143;
__3/9/99' 0 639176 ) 0.213,' 0218]
3/30/99r l .088873 0 3 6 3 p 0  371
0.1461 -0.4382) -0.255 1.328125 0 4389 -0 55618 -0.397
0.188539106982) 0 421875, 0 1394 0 344893 0 246
'■* 0625; 02065* 0 Í2 6 4 9 lj 0 0902
4/7/99, -19.B766' -6.64: -0.6861 
0 8413! -0.2B; -6.28714/13/99
'4/16/99
0 .258427)01505 
-2 67416 
'5.83146
-4 47171 i -2.337
-2.9131V -0.971-0 691
4/20/99 -12.3931; 
4/21 /9 9 P  18.2638J 
*4/22/99P T  1.9812] 
4/27/99! -9.5 31*6*5
•4.14; -4.211
- 6.1
4/28/99) -8 03406 
” ’5/10/99: ” 4.87936 
5/14/99 H ,  319603
-3.18
•2.6B
1.629
0.44
j-6,221
-4 075
-3.249
-2,736
1.664 
* 0.45
24.375 -8 054, -2.89115 _ -2  062 
_ _. ^  . . .  V64Ó63 -0.542]_-5.13 8 3 3 _ 0 664
-7.93258p4.62TT -4.7812 5 t ~ - i .5 8 p 6 7 1827) -4.791 
-14.6719 -4 848 -079714iT -0 693’ 
-19.S781 j -6.469: 3.029604; 2 1606 
-100156 -3.*309T 2.39649V 1 7091
JJT20225; -0.7
3 168539 
3.134831 
0.41573 
- 1 04494 
2.260899' 
0.224719
1,8458 
1.8262 
0 2422 
0.609 
V3287 
0.Í309
_______  _____  . _ I I .  . _ _ _
-10 1875p 3 .3 6 6 t  0~2Í0 í 19 i 0 1498 
-9.4375) -3.118) -T .07039p0  763 
4.59375j 1.S179M 858167[ ~1.32521 2 471548
1.9375:0.640210.545994 0 3894
1.193439 , 0.624 
0 112797^ 0 0 5 9  
67147155 ) 0.077 
-1 6 .0 5 0 0 -0 3 8 7  
-1 .3 l4 1 9 p 0.687 
"-3.61637 j -1.89
♦9.44965: -4,938 
- 11.78321 -6.157
-4.76133^-2488 
J 3 .1 1605 -3.196
-6.04706pT3.ieJj - J . I O
if* 1292
1 404356: 0.734
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